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ABSTRACT
THE CONTINUUM HYPOTHESIS: INDEPENDENCE AND
TRUTH-VALUE Submitted to the Department of
Philosophy, M.I.T., in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.
In the Introduction, Cantor's continuum hypothesis (CH) is stated, and
the history of attempts to prove it is reviewed. The major problems of the
thesis are stated: Does the CH have a truth-value, and if so, how could
we discover what it is, given the proofs of its independence from the most
widely accepts set theories? By way of a prima facie case that CH has no
truth-value, several versions of formalist accounts of truth in mathematics
are described.
Chapter I examines the claim that the independence proofs for CH
are only possible because of inadequacies in first-order formalized set
theory. Various strategies for repairing or generalizing formal systems
are examined and it is shown that no so far proposed strategy based on
the usual axioms of set theory excapes independence proofs. The latter part
of the chapter discusses G. Kreisel's claim that the CH is "decided" in second -
order formulations of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. It is argued that (a)
second-order logic is of no heuristic value in discovering a proof or refutation
of CH, and that (b) Kreisel's semantic arguments that CH is "decided" are
sound only if a much simpler argument that does not used second-order logic
is also sound. This simpler argument is investigated in the second chapter.
In Chapter II, the question of the truth-value of CH is examined from
the point of view of various sorts of realism. A notion of "minimal realism"
is formulated which forms the basis of subsequent discussion. It is argued
that this form of realism is plausible, but that it cannot be sufficiently
clarified at present to exclude the possibility that there may be alternative
equally natural interpretations of set theory, some according to which the
CH is true, and others according to which it is false. Various historical
cases are examined to show that the possibility of multiple natural
interpretations has been a major difficulty in other problems in mathematics.
The model construction techniques of Godel and Cohen and their generalizations
are examined to see if they provide equally plausible interpretations of
set theory, and it is concluded that they do not. In the final section, it is
argued that although we cannot conclusively rule out multiple interpretations
of set theory, it is very implausible that the portion of "the universe"
of sets which concerns the CH has multiple interpretations, and that the
fact of independence results does not increase the plausibility of this view.
In Appendix A, various types of plausibility arguments in mathematics
are sketched, and the controversies over the plausibility of the CH and the
axiom of choice are reviewed and compared. It is concluded that the axiom
of choice should be regarded as well established, but no existing arguments
show that CH or its negation are plausible.
Three technical appendices prove results used in the text and summarize
axiomatic theories discussed there.
The author gratefully acknowledges the patient help of his committee,
Professors Richard Cartwright and George Boolos. Invaluable advice and moral
support were also provided by Professors Richard Boyd and Hillary Putnam.
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IN TR ODUC TION
What is the Continuum Hypothesis ?
(CH) "Every infinite set of real numbers can be put into one-to-one
correspondence either with the set of natural numbers or with the set
of all real numbers."
This is, in essence, the continuum hypothesis, first proposed by
Georg Cantor in 1878.1 In the presence of the axiom of choice,
which will be assumed throughout most of this thesis, CH is
equivalent to the Aleph Hypothesis: (AH) 2 =
That is, the cardinal of the continuum is the first uncountable
cardinal.
Cantor himself accepted the AC, or rather its equivalent,
the statement that every set can be well-ordered,2 so this
distinction was unnecessary for him. In the sequel, we shall
distinguish CH from AH only in Appendix A, where the status
of AC is discussed.
Since we will be discussing the CH in the context of set
theory, we will always mean by 'the continuum' the set of all
sets of finite ordinals, IP(w), to which the real numbers are
isomorphic in a natural and familiar way.
The History of the Continuum Question
At the time when he proposed CH, Cantor promised that
"an exact solution to this question" closed by his "theorem"
would come later.3 There followed a long series of unsuccessful
attempts to deliver on this promise, but none of his attempts
at proof succeeded. 4
In 1904 and again in 1905, Konig claimed to have shown that
CH is false, but these arguments were faulty and were withdrawn. 5
In 1900, Hilbert had listed the continuum problem first on
his famous list of outstanding unsolved mathematical problems. 6
In 1925, he announced a proof of CH which also proved faulty.
The only correct partial result from this collection of faulty
proofs in Konig's "lemma" that 2 is not the limit of countably
many smaller cardinals. 8
In 1938, Kurt Godel was able to prove that if Zermelo-
Frankel set theory (ZF) 9 is consistent, then it remains so on
addition of AC and CH. Godel accomplished this by showing that
the sets satisfying the apparently restrictive condition of con-
structibility10 form an interpretation satisfying ZF and AC
and CH.11 The relative consistency of NCH with the axioms
of ZF cannot be shown by an analogous method,12 however,
and this result was only obtained 25 years later by Paul Cohen.13
His completion of the proof that CH is independent of the axioms
of ZF, even if the axiom of choice is assumed, confirmed a
conjecture of Skolem made in 1922. 14 Both Godel's and Cohen's
results extend to the generalized continuum hypothesis (GCH)
2f 15
that 2 ý = + for all c 5. CH has since proved to be
independent of ZF even when any of "'large cardinal" axioms
are added to it. 16
Present Status
It is evident that CH is a "simple" question, in the sense
that it can be simply stated in familiar terms. It represents
a proposed solution to a natural problem, that of the position
of the cardinal of the continuum in the series of N 's, the
infinite cardinal numbers. It has proved sufficiently interesting
to attract some of the most talented mathermrticians of this
and the last generation. In addition to its independence of ZF
and most other set theories and unlike the axiom of choice,
which is also independent of ZF, there are no compelling
plausibility considerations which favor either CH or its
negation.17 This suggests that its solution, if indeed this
will be possible, will require quite new principles of a type
which can not now be envisioned.
This unsettling situation has provoked a variety of alarmed
responses among set theorists and philosophers of mathematics.
It is asserted by some that CH lacks a truth value at all,
or that the independence results have instituted a state of
crisis in set theory comparable to that in geometry provoked
by the proof of independence of the fifth postulate, which may
result in set theory dividing into mutually exclusive types,
some accepting CH and some its negation.
None of these assertions is accepting by the present
writer, but they deserve answers, and giving those answers
is the subject of this thesis. Specifically, we hope to answer
the following questions:
(1) Do the independence results give any reason to
believe that CH is neither true nor false?
(2) If so, are these reasons compelling?
(3) If not, is it reasonable to expect that CH or
its negation will actually be shown to be true?
In the sequel, we will say that a sentence is determined
if it has a truth-value, and that it is decided (w. r.t. some
contextually-definite theory) if it is either provable or
refutable (in the theory).
CH is not determined: A prima facie case.
By way of motivation for the study of questions (1) through
(3), it is useful to state a prima facie case that CH is not
determined, that is, arguments which pretend to establish
this claim, but which may be either faulty or answerable.
Since some of the queasy feeling aroused by the
independence proofs is undoubtedly due to sympathy with
formalist views, discussion will here be confined to that
general kind of view. Later, in Chapter II, we will agree
to reject formalism and give a prima facie case from a
realist position.
We consider two variations of formalist doctrine.
According to the first, we can construe formalism as a
stingy theory of truth, or at least of having a truth value.
That is, a sentence concerning some area of mathematics
will be determined if and only if it is decided in the formal
system which is most preferable on grounds of utility or
elegance ana wicn encompasses tne given area or matnematics.
,__~_____ _.__~ __r_. r_ _ II · r·l
Since ZF or a ZF-based theory would undoubtedly be the
most preferable theory in this sense and since no presently
available or foreseeable considerations lead us to prefer such
a theory in which CH is decided, CH is not determined.
The second version of formalism differs from the first in
refusing to speak of truth in mathematics at all, but only of the
most preferable or acceptable theory. This view accords better
with the statements of most of those who have titled themselves
formalists, particularly with such characteristic statements as:
"any mention or purported mention of infinite totalities is,
literally, meaningless. ,,19 It is, of course, difficult to see
how meaningless sentences can be determined. It may still
be possible to select from among these meaningless sentences
some which have truth-like properties, such as being incorporable
into a preferred formal theory, but this seems to be excluded
for CH and its negation just as on the previous view.
On either view of formalism, then, CH is not determined,
and on the latter, not even "determined" as to acceptability for
incorporation into the preferred theory. This is so provided that
it is really the case that no formulation of set theory like those
presently entertained decides CH. It has, however, been
doubted whether every reasonable formulation does fail to
decide the CH. Clearly refuting or establishing this is the
first order of business before more subtle considerations are
taken up. This is the subject of the first chapter. There I hope
11
to establish that there is no escape from independence results
via reformulations based on presently accepted axioms.
In the second chapter, I explore the three questions (1) through
(3) from a realist point of view. Plausibility arguments for CH
and AC are taken up in Appendix A, and Appendix B cummarizes
the formal theories discussed in the text.
Chapter I
Introduction
Godel and Cohen stated their independence results for ZF, but
their methods extend to virtually every formal set theory so far
developed. (We shall have more to say about this infra). Thus,
in the logician' s sense of 'theory', that is, a set of sentences of
a given--usually artificial--language which is closed under specified
inference rules, the CH is independent of virtually all set theories.
If it happens however, that some existing theory is not subject to the
independence methods, or even if it seems likely that such a theory
may yet be developed, even the formalist may hope for a solution
to the continuum problem.
If some system in which CH is decided were to be developed,
and we were able to find good reasons to believe this theory true
(formalists may substitute 'good reasons to accept it'), then this
would surely count as solving CH. But the development of such
a system seems not only sufficient but necessary--for, the continuum
problem cannot be counted solved unless there is a clear and
disciplined presentation of a proof from principles whose truth is
at least probable. It has been the case up to now that any single
correct mathematical proof can be incorporated--by a natural
translation--into some formalized system, and it is extremely
difficult to see how an argument which was incapable of such
incorporation could be counted as reliable. Thus the question of
whether an actual solution of the continuum question is
presently foreseeable reduces to the question of whether
we have or are close to having a formal system of set theory
(satisfying the stated conditions) which decides CH.
In this chapter, we will consider two kinds of claims:
(1) There actually exist acceptable formal theories which
decide CH, and
(2) Although we do not now have the kind of theory in (1),
there are sufficient resources in present mathematical prac-
tice beyond its formal theories that is reasonable to hope for
a solution to the continuum question on the basis of what we
already know--even if we do not know that we know it.
It is the contention of this writer that both these claims
are false. A modified version of (2), which holds that we have
reason, based on the current state of mathematical practice, to
believe that CH is determined will be defended in Chapter II.
Claim (1) is, in effect, made by Professor Kreisel and perhaps
others. These views will be discussed later in this chapter.
For the present, we will concern ourselves with (2). An
advocate of (2) must maintain that ZF and the other formal theo-
ries to which Godel-Cohen independence techniques for CH apply
do not fully represent "set theory", where 'theory' is taken
not in the logician's sense, but as an human institution with
its accompanying beliefs, practices and techniques. If we are
correct in maintaining that a condition on clarity of a proof of
CH or its negation is the possibility of incorporation into an ac-
ceptable formal system, then the advocate of (2) must maintain that
some formal system can more adequately represent at least a
portion of set theory which deals with cardinals. Mostowski,
for example, has held that
... the identification of the Godel-Bernays system with the
intuitive set theory is not justified. This at any rate is my
point of view. We need new axioms to codify the intuitive
set theory. The disquieting fact is that we do not know
where to look for them. 1
Adherents of most philosophical positions about set theory would
agree with Mostowski that new axioms are to be sought, but what
makes his position a version of ( 2 ) is his claim that these new
axioms are already present (implicitly? ) in "intuitive set theory".
It is not an easy matter to make a case that such axioms exist
which decide CH if "intuitive set theory" is identified with the
present institution of set theory, since axioms so far proposed,
e. g., "large cardinals", do not decided CH when added to ZF.
We will, however, be concerned first with a more radical
version of ( 2 ) and its accompanying "diagnosis" of the
independence results. This version, held by Paul Bernays and
others, maintains that presently accepted axioms decide CH
if properly understood, but that these principles are incompletely
captured in formal systems of set theory. For example,
Bernays claims that
... the results of Paul J. Cohen on the independence of the
continuum hypothesis do not directly concern set theory
itself, but rather the axiomatization of set theory; and not
even Zermelo's original axiomatization, but a sharper
axiomatization which allows of strict formalization.... in
model theory one might argue that the original question has
not been answered, as Cohen's proof applies only to a
formalized axiomatization of set theory.
Bernays also states that the inadequacies which appear in formal
systems of set theory are quite general and apply to other
theories:
From our experiences with non-standard models, it appears
that a mathematical theory like number theory cannot be
fully represented by a formal system: and this is the case
not only with regard to derivability, as Godel's incomplete-
ness theorem has shown, but already with regard to the
means of expression. For a full representation, we need
an open succession of formal systems. 3
These views, and some related ones of other authors, 4
will be discussed in the next few sections; we give them the
descriptive title 'informalist'. In what follows, we will consider
informalists to fault formalized theories for failing to represent
adequately mathematical theories, and to maintain that this
accounts for the independence results. We do not want to
include in the characterization of informalism the related notion
that formal theories cannot adequately represent some
mathematical structure such as the universe of sets or the series
of natural numbers. This position will be alluded to in what
follows, but will receive a fuller discussion in Chapter II.
Our characterization of informalism is still incomplete on
one crucial point: if formal theories do not adequately represent
set theory, does any thing else do better? Bernays suggests,
in a passage quoted above, that Zermelo's '"original
axiomatization" is better, and other authors are more explicit:
... Zermelo's system, despite its nonformal character,
comes far closer to the true Cantorian set theory. 4
This suggests that the notion that some theories expressed in a
natural language--in Zermelo's case, German--are better than
formal systems of set theory. Thi s interpretation is born out
by an examination of Bernays list of specific defects of formal systems,
which have already quoted. He claims that ( a ) the "means
of expression" of formal systems are inadequate; that ('b )
"derivability" relations are not faithfully represented in formal
systems; and that ( c ) the defects in ( a ) and ( b ) can be
remedied by "an open succession of formal systems". The
context suggests that remedy ( c ) is only intended to apply to
arithmetic. For ZF, he suggests that if "strictly formal
methods ... are transgressed" by restating axioms with an
"unrestricted concept of predicate", then the means of expression
of the resulting theory are no longer inadequate. 5 We will take
up this specific suggestion in due course, but it is clear that
Bernays regards this as a case where natural language descrip-
tion of principles of set theory is superior to "strictly" formal-
ized ones.
Bernays' ground for ( a ) is the existence of non-standard
models for formal theories. He argues for (b ) on grounds
of Godel's Incompleteness theorem. As a preliminary to discus-
sion of specific suggestions of informalists for improvements on
ZF, we will examine Bernay's claims ( a ) - ( c ). We will
accept ( b ) with reservations and, in part, ( c ), while
demurring to ( a ).
Fixing Up Formal Theories:
Up to now, we have used the term 'formal system' without
explanation, meaning by it first-order systems of the usual sort
and perhaps others. It is useful at this point, however, to be
a little more precise. Until further notice, we will take a formal
system to be have a specified syntax, rules of inference and axioms,
and to satisfy the condition that we can effectively tell whether a
given formula is well-formed and whether a given sequence of
formulas is a proof of the system. In practice, we shall always
substitute 'recursively' for 'effectively' ; that is, we assume
Church' s thesis.
If this notion of formal system is adopted, it follows from
well-known results of Godel, as strengthened by Rosser, that
any formal system which is consistent and sufficiently strong to
express and prove the usual properties of "plus" and "times" in
arithmetic has an undecided sentence. 5a For the case of first-
order arithmetic, this sentence can be taken to be of the form (x) Fx
where 'x' is a number variable and 'F' is a recursive--i.e.,
a relatively "simple"--predicate. Furthermore, Godel's proof
clearly shows that, if arithmetic is consistent, this sentence
is true -- that is, it is true of the natural numbers. Since we
can prove, in a way which is satisfactory according to usual
mathematical practice, that arithmetic is consistent, we can
prove, in mathematical practice, that the Godel sentence of any
of the usual first-order formulations of arithmetic is true, al-
though it cannot be proved in that system. Presumably, this is
Bernay's point (b ), that "derivability" relations in arithmetic
are not adequately represented in formalized arithmetic. Doubtful
points remain, however, for the mathematical practice proofs
alluded to, for example Gentzen's 6 , are conducted in a vocabulary
richer than that of the usual first-order systems of arithmetic. It
is less than evident that Godel's results could form the basis of an
argument that proof resources in mathematical practice which
use the same vocabulary as first-order formal arithmetic are
more potent than the resources of the formal theory, especially
since the only known proofs of some arithmetic sentences use
notions from complex-variable theory. On the other hand, if
we consider formal theories with a richer vocabulary, we will
still be able to obtain Godel's result, but it is less than obvious
that we will be able to prove the consistency of this theory in
mathematical practice.
The salvagable point here is that we do know that "sufficiently
strong" formal theories are incomplete, but we do not know that
any true mathematical sentences are unprovable by all mathematical
practice methods. If we did know that this was the case at present,
we would surely attempt to develop new methods to remedy this
defect. So formal theories are faulty in a way which we hope
mathematical methods generally are not, and which we would
attempt to remedy if it should turn out that way.
It is plain that there is a superficial analogy between the
Godel-Rosser incompleteness results for arithmetic and stronger
systems, and the Godel-Cohen independence theorms for formal
set theories, in that both are incompleteness results. Evidently
Bernays feels that the analogy is more than superficial, and
Cohen hints at this as well. 7 Since it is possible to remedy the
incompleteness of formal arithmetic by introducing what Bernays
calls "an open succession of formal systems", it is worth while
to examine briefly how this works and to see if the same or similar
devices may remedy the "defect" of the independence results for
formal set theory. If this were possible, it would be a strong point
in favor of the informalist position, but in fact the prospects for a
"remedy" along this line are poor. For definiteness, we will
concern ourselves in the discussion which follows with the system of
first-order arithmetic S described in Mendelson's book. 8
Two Devices for "Completing" Arithmetic
The first device to be discussed in the so-called "1 -rule". By
way of motivation, we look more closely at the undecided sentence
of S given by Godel's proof. Godel' s basic device is to assign
every formula and finite sequence of formulas a code number in a
systematic way, so that the various metamathematical notions such
as "is a well-formed formula", "is an axiom", "is a proof of",
etc, can be represented by numerical predicates and relations. For
example, let Prf(x, y) be the number-theoretic relation which holds
when x is the code number of a proof of the formula with code number
y. Let m be a code number for ( x )-Prf(x,y). Then Godel's
result is that ( x )-Prf(x, m) , a formula which says "I am not provable",
is true, hence unprovable in S , provided S is consistent. It
happens, however, that each of the instances of this formula,
-Prf (0, m), -Prf (1, m), ... are theorms of the system. This suggests
that if we add a new rule of inference to S which would allow us to
infer ( x ) F (x ) from F( ), F (), F (), ... , then we could
prove the recalcitrant sentence, and hopefully render our system
complete. This does happen, in fact, and our new rule is called
the w -rule. 9
Our reason for considering such devices in the first place,
however, was the alledged inadequate representation of a mathematical
theory by its formal counterpart. On this criterion, the w-rule fails
for reasons other than incompleteness of the resulting quasi-formal
system, for it requires that some proofs be infinitely long, and this is
surely a non-trivial idealization of the actual activities of mathematicians.
There is, however, another device for completeing formal arithmetic
which obviates this particular difficulty.
This new device relies on the fact that provability in S can be
represented by Prf (x, y). It is possible to make use of this relation
to prove that every instance of some single free-valiable formula
F , F ( 0 ), F (1), etc., is provable in S, and then, by analogy
with the w-rule, permit the inference to ( x ) F ( x ). That is, one
adds the rule that:
(*) From (x) ( y) Prf (y,I (f, x), infer (x)F (x)
where f is the code number of F, and I (f,x) represents a
function whose value is the code number of the xth numerical in-
stance of the formula whose code number is f.
If (*) is added to S, the Godel sentence ( x )-Prf (x,m)
becomes provable. However, the resulting system has another
undecided sentence which can be decided in turn by an analogue (**)
of (*) with the predicate Prf* which describes provability in the
system with rule ('). This system is, in turn, incomplete, and
so on. In this way, one can generate an "open succession of
formal systems" with the property that every true sentence and no
false one can eventually be proved in a system of the sequence. 10
The theorems of the sequence thus correspond to the so-called
"true arithmetic", the set of sentences of S true in the standard
interpretation. These same results may be obtained if instead
of the rule (*) and its counterparts, a schema of axioms:
(*') (x) ( y ) Prf (y, I(T, x) ) D ( x ) F ( x)
is added to S and similarly for succeeding stages. Since (*')
"says" that a sentence ( x ) F ( x ) of number theory holds if
all its numerical instances are proved in S, it is evidently true
(i.e. all instances are true) if S is consistent, and similarly
for succeeding stages.
Difficulties still remain, however, about representing number-
theoretic proofs in this fashion. In order to formulated the Prf-like
predicates far out in the sequence of theories, one must be able to
represent certain characteristics of the progression of theories
either by the apparatus of ordinal numbers, or by some system of
notations for ordinals, such as Kleene's system O. But either
choice requires information either not expressible in S (ordinals)
or not provable in S (facts about notations in O).11 So provability
in formal number theory cannot be fixed up by this device to
correspond to truth in number theory without using more powerful
theory for which a "correspondence problem" arises all over
again. As before, we are entitled to make use of this fact to show
a lack of correspondence between provability in formal theories
and mathematical practice only by making the attractive but incom-
pletely warranted assumption that all true sentences of arithmetic
are provable in mathematical practice.
Despite the stated defects of the second sort of remedy for
incompleteness of S, however, it does yield completeness, and
it is evident that the added axioms are true (or the added rules
sound), so this gives some justification for Bernays' claim ( c )
that derivability defects of formal systems are not present in an
"open succession" of them. But unfortunately, these devices do not
decide CH when applied to formal set theory. This application
can be accomplished by translating sentences of arithmetic into set
theory in the usual way and then adding either an w -rule or
"succession" rules applied to these arithmetic translations. 12
The sad fact is that, on the reasonable hypothesis that there are
well-founded models for, say, ZF, there are models for ZF in
which the arithmetic portion is the same but which give different truth-
values to CH. Hence neither CH nor its negation can be a con-
sequence of any of the newly provable arithmetic sentences.
Other ways to "fix" ZF:
Even though the devices which complete arithmetic fail for ZF,
it is worth asking whether some analogous devices may work. We
cannot, of course, cover all "analogous devices", but some
partial negative results are available.
The pecular feature of arithmetic which makes a sound w-rule
possible is the existence, for each element of the intended model,
of a term--a numeral--which denotes it. Hence we can say that if
F ( t ) holds for every term in a certain class, then ( x ) F ( x ).
Since no formal system which satisfies our effectivity requirements
can have more than countably many terms, and there are uncountably
many sets, we cannot construct a sound analogue to the w-rule for ZF.lZa
If there are any well-founded models for ZF, however, there is
a model for ZF which satisfies the following requirement:
There is a sequence of formulas with one free variable fAn(X) I new
such that every element of the model satisfies exactly one of the
An(x). Using the definite description operator (ix), we can
construct the required class of terms T = f (ix)An(x) I new
It may be that an "W -rulef" based on this class of terms would
decide CH, since it is in fact true in the model, but this would
tie us to a model which is certainly unnatural, since it is countable.
A more promising idea is to attempt to construct a succession
of systems based on ZF using notions more powerful than
arithmetic ones. Takeutil 3 has had partial success in such a
project. The technical details for this system are formidable,
so we confine ourselves to a somewhat impressionistic description
of the main result. Takeuti begins with ZF plus the so-called
axiom of constructibility (treated in the next chapter). He then
constructs a transfinite hierarchy of "types" with the sets as
the lowest type. In turn, this type theory serves as the basis
for a sequence of theories, where each theory is obtained from
its predecessor by the addition certain new axioms. These axioms
make use of formula 'ProvT(x)' which say that the formula with
code number x is provable in the system T. If T is a theory
in the sequence, the succeeding theory T' is obtained by adding
ProvT(m) for each code number m of a formula provable in
T and -ProvT(m) for each m which codes a formula unprovable in T.
Unlike the succession of theories based on arithmetic, this
sequence begins with a theory including enough resources to
prove all the required information about the succession
characteristics of the sequence of theories. Takeuti is able
to obtain a completeness result for an important class of sentences
of ZF, viz., the class of first-order formulas of ZF with
quantifiers relativized to constructible sets. Takeuti shows that
a formula in this class is provable if and only if it true. He also
seems hopeful that this result may be extended to all first-order
sentences of ZF, but it is evident that this cannot be done by
any straightforward method, since Takeuti's argument makes
strong use of features of the constructible sets very probably
not shared by the entire universe of sets, such as the existence
of a definable well-ordering of all sets. Takeuti's partial result
is of no help on the CH, however, since it was already known
that CH is true when relativized to the constructible sets.
Our conclusion must be that the devices which "repair" the
incompleteness of arithmetic, and their analogues, fail to perform
the same service for ZF, at least as far as is presently known
or seems likely to be. If we are to continue an informalist program
of seeking liberalizations of formal systems which will not
suffer from the defect of incompleteness, we must follow out
another suggestion of Bernays', involving the "unrestricted notion
of predicate" in set theory. Before proceeding to this however,
we still must deal with Bernays' claim (a) that formal theories are
deficient in their "means of expression" because they must allow
of non-standard interpretations.
Non-Standard Models and Expressibility
It is the conventional wisdom in mathematical ontology
that there are few if any contexts in which it makes any
mathematical difference which of a class of isomorphic structures
we take to be the subject matter of a mathematical theory.
In accordance with this usual line of thinking, we shall speak
somewhat inaccurately and mean by 'standard model of theory
T' either some one isomorph of the class or the class itself,
depending on the context.
Incomplete theories are guaranteed to have models other
than the standard one(s), because there must be non-isomorphic
models of each of its incompatible completions. When we are
dealing with complete quasi-theories of the sort described
in previous sections, whose theorems constitute, say, true
arithmetic, we must use other methods to show the existence
of non-standard models. Standard theorems of model theory, such
as the so-called Upward Lbwenheim-Skolem Theorem, guarantee
that true arithmetic has uncountable, hence non-standard, models.
It turns out, however, that it also has countable ones.14 If as
Bernays seems to maintain in the passage quoted above, the
existence of non-standard models of sentences of formal languages
shows that they fail to express adequately the sense of their natural
language counterparts, then the "open succession" of systems would
fail on the same grounds as the incomplete theory S. So if Bernays
claim (a) that the "means of expression" of S are inadequate were
supported by the existence of non-standard models, the "open
succession of systems" would fare no better. This writter, however,
sees no reason to grant this.
No doubt any set of sentence of an artificial or natural
language which are true under some standard interpretation
can be reinterpreted so that they are also true according to
completely unintended ones as well. It is possible to lay it
down that 'Quine is a philosopher' is to be interpreted in such
a way that 'Quine' refers to Nixon and 'is a philosopher' has
the usual sense of 'is a politician'. But the fact that such a
reinterpretation is possible does not show that 'Quine is a
philosopher' does not say that Quine is a philosopher. It
merely shows that these words might have been understood in
a way in which they are not. The simple structure of the usual
first-order languages and the existence of a model theory
for them makes the existence of a large variety of possible
interpretations which preserve grammatical categories of
"predicate", "individual constant", etc., stick out like a
sore thumb. But there is no philosophically significant reason
and likely no reason at all why such a model theory should not
eventually be available for natural languages as well.
Logicians sometimes study theories with no intended
interpretation, but it is far more common to study a theory
because of the interest of its intended interpretation. For
theories of this latter type, the intended interpretation of the
constants, function symbols, etc., is invariably explained in
the same way as the natural language technical terms of any
part of mathematics or natural science, by explaining the
intended sense or "pointing to" the intended reference in some
natural language the speaker and his audience both understand.
If these explanations and supplimentary examples and audience
guesses are inadequate for determination of meaning or reference
in one case, they are also defective in the other.
Such explanations may, in fact, be vague or otherwise
incomplete, and further investigation may show that several
incompatible refinements of them lead to different interpretations,
none obviously more correct than the others. (We give some
examples of this in Chapter II). But for at least one of the
formal theories which Bernays alledges to be defective in the
"means of expression", that is, S, possible ambiguities in
the standard interpretations of '0', '+', 'x', etc., have not
been detected and we have not the slightest reason to believe
that any will come to light.
This writer believes that the existence of "the" standard
interpretation of the 'e' of set theory is a little less clear cut,
a matter which we look into further in Chapter II. It is clear,
however that the existence of undisputedly unintended interpretations
of ZF goes no farther in showing that the "means of expression"
of that theory are inadequate than in the case of S.
In summary, we have found that one of the alledged defects
of formal languages--the "means of expression"--is non-existent.
The other defect, incompleteness, is real enough, but the evidence
is not conclusive that mathematical practice fares any better.
The devices which remedy this defect for arithmetic fail to do so
for ZF, so our diagnosis of incompleteness must be somewhat
different for the two cases. We have yet to follow out Bernays'
suggestion that enriching formal set theory to permit an
"unrestricted" concept of predicate would decide CH. This
topic, examined from several sides, will concern us for
the rest of this chapter.
"Unrestricted Concept of Predicate": Background
Historically, the notion of predicate enters set theory
with the comprehension principle, that the extension of every
predicate is a set. This principle was proved inconsistent
by Russell, but all modern set theories preserve it in some
less general form.
In Zermelo's set theory of 190815, the principal ancestor of
ZF and the cluster of related theories with which we will be
almost exclusively concerned, the comprehension principle
is replaced by a short list of its instances--the powerset, infinity,
pairing, nullset, union, and choise axioms--and by a modified
comprehension principle called the axiom of separation
[Aussonderungsaxiom]. In its earliest version, this axiom
states that
Whenever the propositional function G(x) is definite
for all elements of a set M, M possesses a subset
MG containing as elements precisely those elements
x of M for which G(x) is true. 17
Zermelo' s explanation of the key term 'definite' in this definition is:
A question or assertion is said to be definite if the
fundamental relations of the domain [i. e., membership],
by means of the axioms and the universally valid laws
of logic, determine without arbitrariness whether it
holds or not. Likewise, a "propositional function"
[Klassenaussage] G(x), in which the variable term x
ranges over all individuals is said to be definite
if it is definite for each single individual x of the
class R. Thus the question of whether aeb or not
is always defi i e, as is the question of whether
M cN or not.
The new feature of the separation axiom which distinguishes
it from the comprehension principle is the limitation to subsets
of some set. Other than the limitation as the definiteness, the
'"propositional function'' G(x) is unrestricted in the sense in
which Bernays uses that term. As we shall see, Bernays
(and others) allege that (a) later formulations of the separation
axiom have introduced restrictions on G(x) and that (b) these
restrictions are responsible for the independence results.
It will be our aim to take on this (two-part) claim by reviewing
the history of the notion of definiteness since Zermelo in order
to see what restrictions, if any, have been introduced and
what affects they may have had.
Zermelo later admitted that the explanation of definiteness
which we have quoted leaves much to be desired: it was just
for this reason that the 'more restrictive" accounts of definiteness
were proposed. From his own original account, about all one
can conclude is that his intention was to exclude "propositional
functions" with borderline cases among the members of the
set M. That is, he excludes cases in which it is impossible
to determine "without arbitrariness" whether G(x) holds,
not because our knowledge is inadequate, but because no answer
is correct.
In his original paper--from which the earlier quotations
are taken--Zermelo gives examples of definite propositional
functions but none of non-definite ones. These he supplied,
however, in a much later paper, lisiting "green colored set"
and "smallest irrational number which can be defined in a
finite number of words of an arbitrary European language",
and, in general, "every sentence which includes extrasystematic
[systemfremde] relations. "20 These examples suggest that
a reasonable way of avoiding non-definite propositional
functions is to restrict the language in which set theoretic
proofs may be carried out so as to exclude the "extra-systematic"
terms. This has proved to be the basic technique of later set
theorists in their accounts of definiteness.
Skolem' s Approach
Of the two main strategies for incorporating a more precise
account of definiteness into set theory, the work of Skolem
is representative of the treatment which eventually resulted in ZF.
On his account, a proposition is definite if it is a "finite
expression constructed from elementary propositions of the form
aeb or a = b" by means of negation, conjuction, disjunction, and
universal and existential quantification. 21 A similar proposal
was made independently by A. Fraenkel, which he used to
proved the independence of the axiom of choice from a version
of ZF. 22
Skolem regarded his notion as "completely clear, and
"sufficiently comprehensive to carry out all ordinary set
theoretic proofs", and it is clear that each of the applications
of separation in Zermelo's 1908 paper is justified in Skolem's
version of definitenes s. 2 4
Skolem' s idea is preserved in the moderm formulation
of the Replacement (and Foundation) axiom schema(ta) of ZF:
Replacement: (zl) ... (Zn)(X)((u)(uex D(9!v)F(u, v, z I . . zn )) D
(2y)(v)(vey = (u)(uex &F(u,v, zl,..., zn))
where F is a well-formed formula of the
language of ZF, and the free variables of
F are among u, v, z, . ., z n
The axiom of separation is a easy consequence of replacement,
so it need not be listed separately among the axioms of ZF.
That is, for any formula G(v, z l , ... , zn) with the free variables
shown, one need only consider the instance of replacement with
u = v & G(v, zl, ... , Zn)
in place of F. The separation axiom,
Separation: (zl) ... (zn) (x)(2y) (v)(ve y- ve x & G(v, zl,..., z))
is then a consequence by quantifier logic.
Evidently, the conditions imposed on G which are inherited
from those in the replacement schema are exactly equivalent to
those in Skolem's proposal. Few would argue that experience
with ZF has not substantiated his claim that his account is "adequate
for all ordinary set theoretic reasoning."
Zermelo's Reaction to Skolem and Fraenkel
In 1929, Zermelo wrote a short paper on definiteness,25 which
attacked Frankel's approach and presented a new account of his own.
He seems to have been unaware of Skolem's related work.2 6
Zermelo was critical of the Skolem-Fraenkel account on two
grounds. First, he held that Fraenkel's "constructive" procedure
of " admitting only special forms of propositional functions"
"fundamentally contradicts the purposed and essence of the
axiomatic method. "Z7 He offers almost nothing by way of explanation
for this indictment of constructive methods. He says only that
Fraenkel' s "genetic" procedure concerns only the "origin or
generation [Erzengung] of the sentence, rather than the sentence
itself, and yields no certain decision in involved cases".
Whatever is at stake in this objection, and I do not pretend to be
clear about it , exactly similar arguments could be raised against
Zermelo' s own proposal, which we will consider shortly.
Zermelo's second objection is far clearer but no more
decisive. Fraenkel states that definite functions to be used in
the separation axiom are those which can be formed "by a prescribed
application (repeated only a finite number of times, of course, . ..)"
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of the five fundamental operations, as in Skolem' s proposal.
Zermelo objects that this version "depends on the concept finite
2Z8a
number, whose clarification is still a principle task of set theory."
Zermelo offers no argument for the claim that the notion of finite
number is in need of clarification or needed it in 1929, nor can
I see any reason to believe that this is so. In any case, it is
not strictly true that the Fraenkel-Skolem formulation makes
use of finiteness, even though Fraenkel did include the word
'finite' in a parenthetical remark. In fact, both writers are
simply giving recursive definitions, and the clauses of such
definitions, as for example
"If F, G are definite, so is their conjunction, "
say nothing about numbers at all.29
It is true, of course, that the expressions which result
are all finite. This is an important fact because languages with
expressions of infinite length will fail to meet our effectivity
requirement for formal systems except is the quite special
case where well-formedness and axiomhood can be determined
from some finite initial portion of each expression. But we
still need not say anything about finiteness when describing
the language when it contains only the usual sort of syntax.
A further noteworthy point is that, like the first, this
objection also applies to Zermelo's own new account of definiteness,
which we have yet to describe.
Restriction on Definite predicates and Independence
Despite the inconclusiveness of Zermelo's attack on the
Fraenkel-Skolem proposal, his opinion that it was too restrictive,
admitting only "certain special forms of propositional functions"30
anticipates the objections of Bernays and other writers.
As an example of Bernays' view, consider the following remarks
which he made in reply to criticism of the paper we cited at the
beginning of this chapter:
For the applicability of Cohen's result it does not,
of course, matter . . . whether axiomatic set theory
is presented as a formal system or not, and even
less in what particular system it is formalized.
What the applicability does depend on is the
mentioned sharper axiomatization by which strict
formalization becomes possible, that is, the
Fraenkel-Skolem delimitation of Zermelo' s
concept 'definit Eigenschaft' [definite property].
In a similar vein, R. Smullyan states that
Zermelo's system, despite its nonformal character,
comes far closer to the true Cantorian set theory.
Of course, there is no harm in laying down formal
axiom which force at least the first-order properties
into the picture, but there is no reason to identify
all properties with those3 roperties whose existence
is forced by the axioms.
Smullyan calls attention to the system VBI, which we shall
shortly consider. He regards this system as having axioms
for "second-order properties", but believes that it too is
over- restrictive:
[VBI] should not be thought of as the whole Cantorian
set theory, since there is no reason to identify properties
with second-order properties either. 3 3
As previsouly announced, our aim is to examine attempts
to lift the supposed restrictions introduced by Fraenkel and
Skolem, and to see if any of these attempts produce a system
in which it is possible to decide the CH. We will survey six
proposals. The first three are von Neumann's and two which
derive from it, Zermelo's later proposal and VBI. The fourth,
J. Friedman' s STC is an extension of von Neumann' s system
in a richer language. Next, we will treat takeuti's NTT which
is based on ZF in a richer language. Finally, we will consider
Kreisel's proposal to reformulate ZF with a second-order
underlying logic. All of these systems are described in some
detail in Appendix B; the text will concern only basic ideas.
We will begin by describing the modern version of von Neumann's
system, VBG (for von Neumann-Bernays-Godel set theory).
Before proceeding, however, it is in order to ask why we
should have to consider additional technical proposals, rather than
sticking to Zermelo's system as Smullyan suggests. The
reason is that because of the vagueness of Zermelo's account of
definiteness, we simply cannot tell whether independence results
can be carried out or not. We have Zermelo's word for it that
the Frankel-Skolem account departs from his intentions, but it
is far from clear just which features of their account are deficient
or what definite properties they exclude. Plainly we must have
some of this sort of information if we are to be able to evaluate
the informalist explanation of the independence of CH. As I see
it, the cash value of the informalist position must be some reason
to believe that theories with a richer supply of definite properties
would decide CH. The conclusion which I will draw is that a
survey of existing proposals provides no such reasons. We will
return to this question after the specific proposals have been
examined.
Von Neumann' s System
Von Neumann' s system was the first of a long series of attempts
to clarify the separation priciple by providing axioms for definite
properties rather than treating the predicates which express them.
34In his original system, Von Neumann left unspecified the
relation between the definite properties, which he called
"type II objects", and the sets of his systems. Bernays
subsequenctly proposed a system in which no "type II object"
is a set, but every set has a corresponding "type II object"
which represents it; the converse, however, does not hold. 3 5
A tidier system is VBG, in which every set is a "type
II object"-- now called a class--but some classes are not sets.
Classes cannot be thought of as definite properties, however,
but only as surrogates for them. Classes are "surrogates"
because they are extensional w. r. t. the "exemplification"
relation. That is, classes which are "exemplified" by the
same objects are identical, and it is a commonplace that
this is, in general, false of properties. It might be maintained
that definite properties are extensional, and hence that classes
need not be regarded as surrogates, but as definite properties
themselves. If the non-extensionality of properties generally
is as important as the conventional wisdom would have it,
however, it is implausible that it should apply only to indefinite
ones, since these are simply properties without border-line
cases or such as are (perhaps) expressed by nonsense predicates
such as 'green-colored set'. Since classes are extensional,
it is perhaps most reasonable to regard them as the extensions
of definite properties.
In VBG, the "set" axioms are the same as those for ZF,
except that the two schemata of replacement and foundation are
each replaced by a single axiom involving quantification over classes:
Repl: (F)(x)(Func(F) D(H2y)(v)(ve y E (Su)(<u, v> e F &ue x)))
Found: (X)(X 0 3D(3u)(ue X &unX = 0 )
In these formulas, upper-case Roman letters are class variables;
'Func' is a formula which says that F is a functional class of
ordered pairs. In addition to these two axioms, an axiom schema
of class existence is added which assures the "definite property
representing" function of classes:
Comp: (X1) ... (Xn) ('Y) (x) (xe Y _ G(x,X1
, . . ., X n ) )
This "comprehension" schema says, in essence, that the extension
of a well-formed formula with one free set variable is a class.
This bald statement of the class comprehension principle needs
the following important qualification for VBG, that the formula
G may contain no bound class variables. If this restriction is
lifted so that classes may be defined by quantifying over classes,
the system which results is the so-called Kelley-Morse system, 36
which we will call VBI (for VonNeumann-Bernays-Impredicative).
Smullyan's remarks about VBI give us reason to be particularly
interested in this system, and we will return to it shortly.
As for VBG, the exclusion of bound class variables in Comp
has the consequence that VBG is equivalent in strength to ZF
in the sense that a formula of VBG without class variables is a
theorem of VBG iff it is a theorem of ZF. On the other hand,
the apparatus of class quantification in VBG permits a slightly
greater expressive power. For example, we will shortly define
a function defined on all sets--the so-called rank function--which
can be proved to exist in VBG, but not in ZF. In ZF, it is possible
to prove the existence of each portion of this function which is a set,
so each application of the rank function to sets can be expressed
in ZF in a rather less convenient way. The price of this greater
technical convenience of VBG is, however, the philosophical
difficulty of interpreting class quantification; we will treat this
problem in the next chapter.
As one would expect, lifting the restriction on Comp to yield
VBI results in a somewhat greater proof-theoretic strength of
that theory. In particular, we can formulate a truth definition
for VBG in VBG, but it cannot be proved in VBG that all the theorems
of VBG are true unless VBG is actually inconsistent. In VBI,
on the other hand, we can prove this fact about VBG. The proof
uses a formula (2X)C(X,y), where C contains no bound class
variables, to define a class A:
37a
A = (iY)(x) (xe Y E (HX)C(X, x)).
If this class could be defined in VBG, the proof would go thru
within that system; so if VBG is consistent, A is a class which
can be defined in VBI but in VBG. There are, in fact, many more
of these, but in order to look into the matter of the additional
definite properties required by VBI, we need a short digression.
Natural Models for ZF, VBG &VBI
There is a class of "natural" models of the theories which we
have been dealing with which informalist writers and others are
particularly and rightly concerned to study and characterize.
Although we will reserve most model-theoretic questions for
the next chapter, it is useful to describe them here. For the
time being, we forget any possible doubts about whether
there is must one "universe" of sets and simple speak about
the sets, distinguishing them occasionally form other structures
which may be models of the theories we discuss.
It is a theorem of VBG that there is a function defined on
all ordinals which has the universe of sets as its range, and
decomposes this universe into levels or ranks, each containing
the previous ones. This rank function R may be defined by
transfinite induction as follows:
R(O) = 0
R(a') = P(R(v)), where P is the operation "powerset of"
R( ) = jU R(ca), where X is a limit ordinal.
c< X
When we are thinking of "the" universe of sets with the structure
imposed by R, we will speak of the "cumulative type structure"
(CTS). If x is a set, we call the least ordinal N such that
x e R(at+ 1) the rank of x.
It is natural to ask whether some initial portion of the CTS,
the sets of rank less than some ordinal x, form a model for VBG.
The answer to this question is "yes" if there exist ordinals of a
certain "large" size, called inaccessible ordinals. An ordinal x
is said to be (strongly) inaccessible if it is a regular cardinal
and if, for all c!< , 2 < x, where regular ordinals a! are
those which are not the sum of fewer than a ordinals less than a.
By this definition, w is inaccessible. For reasons which we
will briefly indicate in the next chapter, it is plausible that there
are inaccessibles > w, but this cannot be proved in VBG or VBI.
Since we will be interested only in such inaccessibles, we include
the condition "> Im" in the definition of inaccessibility.
The fact which makes inaccessibles in this sense interesting
for the present discussion is that if x is inaccessible, the sets
in R (K + I) form a model M for VBG and VBI, with the 'I' symbol
interpreted as the "real" e relation restricted to R(Nx+1).38 In this
model, the "sets" are the elements of R(k), and the proper (non-set)
classes are elements of R(x+1) - R(X), the subsets of R(K). It is
plain that M is a natural model from the point of view of the
separation axiom. That is, separation is used to prove the
existence of various subsets, but the construction of M guarantees
that every "actual" subset of any set in the "universe" is (the
extension of) a definite property.
In order to have a "rank model" of the set portion of VBG or VBI,
however, it is not necessary to include all of the subsets of sets
of the model. Instead, we need only include certain subsets which
are definable in a way which parallels the class comprehension axiom.
That is, we call a set S first-order definable over a rank structure
R(t) (or more generally, over any transitive set of sets) if there is
a formula of ZF, F(x, zl, ... , Zn)
, which is true in the structure R(X)
of all and only the x's which are in S, where zl, ... , zn are
given some fixed interpretation in R(x). We call the set of
all such sets S:Fodo (R(x)). It then happens that R(,)UFodo(R(n))
is a model for VBG, but not VBI. This shows that not all
of the subsets of R(t) need have been included in M to obtain
a model of VBG, since Fodo(R(x)) is smaller (in the sense of
cardinality) than R(x + 1) - R(h ). It also permits us to gauge the
effect of the restrictions on the Comp axiom of VBG, because
we can show that the axioms of VBI require more of R(x + 1) - R(t)
than Fodo(R(;t)) to be added to R(Nh) to obtain a model. In fact,
it is easy to show that if R(x ) U B is a model for VBI, and
B c R(n+ 1), then B must contain at least as many "classes"
not in Fodo (R(;)) as there are in Fodo R(N) itself. 4 0 On the
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other hand, B need not contain all of R(x + 1) - R(ht), so VBI
does not have sufficient power to "force" all of the "classes" in
R(h + 1) to "exist".
VBG and VBI Compared:
The preceeding discussing makes clear that with respect to
the natural models given by the function R, VBI can prove the
existence of substantially more definite properties than VBG,
although neither theory can prove the existence of all the "classes"
of a natural model. The additional strength of VBI carries
with it some attendant risks, however, in that the more generous
class comprehension axioms may introduce some inconsistency.
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It is easy to show that VBG is extremely conservative in its
class existence principles, and that it represents a quasi-constructive
approach to class existence in a way in which VBI does not. The
technical fact which justifies this claim is that the predicative
comprehension schema of VBG can be replaced by one purely
existential axiom and six additional axioms which permit constructions
from classes previously shown to exist. The existential axiom
asserts the existence of a class of all ordered pairs <x, y> such that
xe y. The other axioms guarantee the existence of the intersection,
compliment, cross-product, etc., of any classes. Since all these
operations are of a familiar, elementary, and constructive kind,
accepting VBG commits us only to classes which can be proved to
exist by a finite sequence of operations which we have not the
slightest reason to believe would lead to any inconsistency. This
intuitive argument for confidence in the class existence assumptions
of VBG is, or course, born out by the previously cited "equivilence"
of ZF and VBG.
Such a conservative interpretation of class existence assumptions
will plainly not be possible for VBI, since any axiomatization of
that theory must include at least one class existence axiom with
bound class variables. This axiom would exclude the "ordered
generation" scheme just described for VBG because it would define
a class by reference to (that is, quantification over) the whole
totality of classes, not just previously constructed ones. It has not,
in fact, even been shown that VBI is finitely axiomatizable.
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to over-estimate the
risks of VBI, since it is known that if VBG plus the assertion
that there exists an inaccessible ordinal is consistent, so is VBI. 4 2
The prevailing opinion is that the likelihood that such a theory is
inconsistent is small.
Despite its extra "richness" in definite properties, the final
outcome of our discussion of VBI is rather anti-climactic. Despite
the hope of Smullyan and conjectures by others,43 Tharp and
43aSolovay have (independently) shown that CH(and even GCH)
is independent of VBI, even if AC is added, so that the first step
of our attempt to cash in informalist objections does not succeed.
Zermelo's proposal:
As we noted above, Zermelo was dissatisfied with the Fraenkel-
Skolem proposal because it (allegedly) makes use of finiteness and
"yields no certain decision in involved cases." His own offering
was an axiomatization of definite propositional functions as follows:
Let some class B of objects be given: then the "fundamental
relations" of the theory in question, in our case, the membership
relation, are definite for all "Ivalue combinations" from B. I. e.,
(1) D(xe y) for all arguments x, y from B, where D(p)
is to be read "p is definite".
Next, he states that "definiteness carries over to compound prop-
ositions",44 that is,
(2) If D(p), then D(p), where p is the negation of p,
and
(3) If D(p) and D(q), then D(p.q) and D(p v q), where
p. q, p v q are the conjunction and disjunction of
p and q, respectively.
For quantification, he states that
(4) If D(f(x, y, z, ... )) for all "value combinations" from B,
then D((x)(y)(z) ... f(x,y,z,...) and
D((9x)(ay) (Fz)...f(x,y,z,...)).
Zermelo also lays down an axiom for "second order" quantification
of propositional functions, that is
(5) "If D(F(f)) for all definite functions f = f(x, y,x, ...),
then also D((f)F(f)) and D((2f) F(f))".45
Finally, Zermelo includes a restrictive clause which "concerns
not so much the particular 'definite' propositions p as their
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totality P". This axiom states that
(6) The collection P of definite propositions must contain
no "proper subsystem [echtes Untersystem] Pl1 4 7 which
satisfies (1) - (5).
Zermelo asserts that this characterization avoids the use of
finiteness, but we have already seen that the Fraenkel-Skolem idea
48does so as well. In a reply to Zermelo' s paper, Skolem asserted
that the only difference between Zermelo' s new notion and his own
is the second-order quantification clause (5) and the restrictive
clause (6). 4 9 Skolem criticized (5) as unclear, unjustified,
45
dangerously close to the paradoxes, and not clearly more extensive
than his own proposal. 50 Against (6), he argued that whether or
not finiteness needs to be clarified by set theory, the notion of
"subsystem" certainly should be. 51
This later objection is certainly well taken, but it we
substitute classes for definite properties (or "propositional
functions") in (1) - (5), the result is the class comprehension
principle of VBI. Even if troublesome points remain inthe
interpretation of classes in VBI, it is clear from our previous
discussion that the risks of antinomies in VBI are small and that
VBI does provide for more definite properties than the Skolem-like
principle in VBG.
VBI does not, of course, contain anything corresponding to
the restriction (6). Indeed, it could not, for (6) is essentially
a metatheoretical statement not expressible in VBI itself. We
must conclude that VBI is at least as rich in definite properties
as Zermelo' s proposal, so that the independence results cannot
be eliminated by adopting his characterization.
"Superclass" Theories:
So far, the accounts of definite properties, propositions,
functions, etc., which we have considered amount to small
modifications of the basic class comprehension principle of VBG.
We now turn to a group of theories which take the axioms of VBG
or ZF as a basis and add a heirarchy of "superclasses" which
can be used in Replacement, Foundation, etc., just as are classes.
In VBG and VBI, proper classes are distinguished from sets
by 'non-elementhood",. That is, a class is proper just in case
it is not a member of any class. This criterion plays a role in the
avoidance of the paradoxes such as Russell's, since there can be
no classes of proper classes at all, much less a class of non-
self-membered classes.
Several authors52 have developed variations of VBG which
counternance new entities which can contain proper classes
as elements, and it is these added entities we will call "superclasses".
The particular proposals which we will discuss are J. I. Freidman's
theory STC, and G. Takeuti's NTT(for Nodal Type Theory), beginning
with the former.
To form STC, Freidman adds a hierarchy of "extended" sets,
indexed by ordinals and "extended ordinals", to the sets and classes
of VBG. Level zero extended sets are simply sets, and level zero
extended proper classes are simply proper classes in the usual sense.
Extended sets of level one contain sets and classes of level zero,
and the collection of level one extended sets is a level one proper
class. In general, for each ordinal (or "extended ordinal") A there
is a level) consisting of extended sets and classes, each level
containing all earlier levels.53
Friedman formulates STC by adding to the language of VBG
a new predicate M(x), interpreted as "x is an extended set", and
he shows that STC can be interpreted 54 in VBG+IO, VBG augmented
by the assertion that there exists an inaccessible ordinal. 55 In fact,
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VBG+IO is equiconsistent with the theory VBG+ "there is a class
M satisfying the hierarchy axioms of STC". 56
In effect, adding "higher type" or "super" classes to VBG
in the manner of STC is equivalent to adding sets farther
out in the rank hierarchy of sets. This should not come as any
great surprise if we recall that in the natural rank models for VBG,
the Oproper classes" are simply the sets of highest rank. This
phenomenon also bears out an observation of Godel (in a slightly
different context) that "the following could be true: Any proof
for a set theoretical theorm in the next higher system above set
theory . . . is replaceable by a proof from . . an axiom of
infinity". 57
STC does just this: it erects a "higher system above set
theory" in the form of extended sets and classes. The fact of the
equivalence of this procedure with the assertion that the CTS
itself is "long", -- that is, an appropriate axiom of infinity such
as IO--gives just the result we would expect about CH. That is,
since virtually all of the axioms of infinity, including IO0, fail
to decide CH or even GCH, 58 these statements are both
independent of STC. 59
Nodal Type Theory:
In formulating NTT, Takeuti makes use of the rough
equivalence between "higher type" classes and higher rank sets
in natural models which we have already noted. In the simplest case,
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the R(%+ 1) model of VBG, the proper classes are members
of R(K + 1) - R(4) . For example, in the formula (X)F(X), where
X is a class variable, and the set variables are regarded as ranging
over R(ao) , (X)F(X) may be rewritten as (x)(xe R(a + 1) DF(x)).
Takeuti considers a generalization of this idea in which the
reinterpretation of (X)F(X) is (x)(x e R(f(a )) D F(x)), where f
is some function of a, perhaps different from ca+ 1. In Takeuti's
treatement, the function f is replaced by a formula A(a ,p ) functional
in its first argument. The variable X which is reinterpreted in this
way is then labeled with the formula A(ca,p ) as a superscript:
(XA)F(X ). Such variables are then classified as to "degree".
The degree of a set variables is zero, and if A(oa,p ) is a formula
in the ordinary (first-order) language of ZF, XA has degree 1.
If A(a , ) involves variables of degree higher than 0, say at
most n, then the degree of XA is n+l. The types or levels
of the "superclasses" of NTT are thus labeled by formulas of
an expanded language based on the language of ZF, as opposed to
STC's indexing of levels by ordinals and "extended ordinals".
Besides this difference in formulation of the hierarchy of
superclasses, NTT has a completely new feature having no
counterpart in STC, the notion of "nodal" class of ordinals.
This notion may be explained as follows. Consider the first-order
language LZF whose only non-logical symbol is ' ' and let
T be the "theory of R(a)", the set of all sentences of ZF true
in R(a). Takeuti reasons that since the number of distinct T 's
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is bounded but the class of ordinals is not, some theory T
must appear infinitely often in the series of T 's. Takeuti
conjectures that there is only one theory which will appear
"overwhelmingly often", and he wishes to "define the absolute
set theory to be this theory" 60
In order to make precise the (quasi-measure-theoretic)
notion of "overwhelmingly often", Takeuti introduces the notion
of a "nodal" class of ordinals. The fundamental property
of nodal classes is intended to be that for any closed sentence
(, ", is true" will be equivalent to "the class of aY's such that
e( ) E T is nodal", where ) is the relativization
of 4 to the rank R (a ).
The explanation of the previous paragraph was confined
to formulas of ZF; in NTT, Takeuti extends the same
idea to the language including typed variables XA , and also
adds a new one-place predicate N(X), read "X is a nodal
class" (or superclass). The result is that NTT is a extremely
powerful theory compared to ZF. This power may be
illustrated in the following way:
We have already noted that the existence of inaccessible
ordinals cannot be proved in ZF. In NTT, however, it is
a theorem that the inaccessibles form a nodal class. In other
words, there are overwhelmingly many inaccessibles according to
NTT. 6 1
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From one point of view, this is an extremely implausible
result, since an inaccessible is an ordinal which is enormously
larger than any of its predecessors, and it is difficult to believe that
"almost all" ordinals have this property. There is, however, as
rationale by which we may justify retaining the nodal notion
despite this feature. This rationale is that the nodal axioms
of NTT may be thought of as very strong axioms of infinity.
Such axioms as that of measurable cardinal (MC) are known to
imply the existence of many inaccessibles. In particular,
ZF + MC implies that there are X inaccessibles less than the least
measurable cardinal .62
This interpretation of the consquences of the nodal axioms
conforms with Takeuti's stated intentions of presenting a theory
in which "the creation of ordinals is endless, and therefore there
is no absolute universe of our set theory". 6 3
The way in which such ,"large infinity" properties are incorporated
into NTT may be seen in this way: A reflection principle is a
principle which states that for any formula gq of some given
language of set theory, there is an R(cz) such that p is true
of all sets just in case R() is true in R(ca). Depending on the
given language and the additional conditions imposed, reflection
principles are equivalent to various strong axioms of infinity.
(Reinhardt has even obtained a principle which is equivalent
to MC. )64 In NTT, one has an extremely strong reflection
principle. This principle is simply the fundamental property
of nodal classes, that if V is a closed sentence of NTT, and R() is p
relativized to R(a,) in a special way given in NTT, then
V *N(f (YI/p (a) .
In other words, c is true just in case it is "reflected" in almost
all R (a)' s.
NTT & CH:
Complete independence investigations for NTT are not yet
available, but the partial ones so far obtained suggest that CH
may well be independent of NTT.
The first result is that if NTT is consistent, so is NTT +
"Every set is constructible'. 65 It is, or course, already known
that this implies the consistency of CH and GCH with NTT. The
second partial result concerns NTT 1 , the restricted version of
NTT which results from excluding variables of degree greater
than 1. Takeuti credits R. Solovay with showing that NTT1
can be interpreted in "a system" in which there are measureable
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cardinals. It is known, however, that for ZF, there are
non-constructible sets if there is a measurable cardinal. 67f
this result carries over to NTT , "Every set is constructible"
cannot be a theorem of NTT1. Thus, very provisionally we have
some reason to believe (subject to future research) in the independence
of "Every set is constructible" from NTT1. This does not, or
course, settle the independence of CH even from NTT1, but it
represents a first step in independence theorems for NTT.
NTT and Informalism:
We have seen that of all of the proposals about definite
properties which we set out to investigate, only NTT could
possibly decide CH. Our incomplete knowledge about NTT
is not really an obstacle to evaluation of the program we had set out,
however. That program was to determine whether enriching set
theory with definite properties might settle CH. The reason
that NTT has this status is that although it does have an enriched
apparatus for "superclasses", it clearly has new set theoretic
axioms as well. As we saw at the outset, informalism is only
interesting doctrine if it is construed as claiming that the
standard axioms, properly formulated, would decide CH.
But NTT goes beyond standard axioms to such as extent that
we should not regard a proof that NTT implies CH, in the
unlikely event that one should be produced, as a vindication
of the informalist position. Nevertheless, NTT is worthy of
consideration, for it gives some indication of the complexities
of definite property notions which may yet be investigated. 68
Our investigation of axiomatic systems which may be
richer in definite properties than ZF has been confined to
theories with the same fundamental conception of the structure
of the universe of sets as ZF--the CTS. The reason for this is
that almost every one regards this class of theories as the
most plausible ones in the field. There are, however, other
theories, in particular Quine's NF and ML. We will discuss
these theories briefly in the next chapter, but we mention here
that no independence results have been published for these
theories. There are two reasons for this, as I see it. The
first is that although there was considerable interest in ML and
NF twenty years ago, investigators in foundations are no longer
concerned with them. The second reason is that since no clear
notion of the structure of the universe for ML--comparable to the
CTS for ZF--is known, the Godel-Cohen results cannt be carried
over to ML in any obvious way. Godel' s and Cohen' s costructions
make essential use of the idea of the CTS in the construction of
models. Both mimic the rank structure in their models. No
such simple principle about construction of models for ML is yet
known. Finally, we will argue in the next chapter that neither
ML nor NF is plausible, so that a proof or refutation of CH in
either theory would not settle the continuum question.
There remains one important approach to the problem of
definite properties which we must consider, the formulation of
ZF in second-order logic. This is the subject of the concluding
sections of this chapter.
Why Consider Second-Order Logic?
We are about to begin a discussion of second-order logic (SOL)
which will occasionally take us out of set theory altogether, so it
is important to justify this digression at the outset. We will first
provisionally characteriza SOL, and then consider two compelling
reasons for studying it in connection with CH.
As a working definition, we will say that a theory is formulated
in SOL if, in addition to the usual apparatus of a first-order
theory, it contains variables for predicates ( or relations ) and
permits quantification of them. With such a definition, we can
easily show continuity of SOL with our earlier concerns with
definite properties. The connection is simply this: If we thirik
of predicate constants as "standing for" ( we do not attempt to be
precise about what "standing for" means ) properties or relations,
then in binding predicate variables with quantifiers, we are pre-
sumably quantifying over properties. On this rationale, we are
automatically stLudying ( definite? ) properties if we study this
sort of logic.69 This is a conclusion which would have pleased
Zermelo, since he made it clear that he would have preferred to
study definite properties as a general problem of logic, not one
concerning only set theory. 70
Our second and more compelling reason for spending effort on
SOL as applied to set theory is G.Kreisel's repeated claim that
CH is decided in second-order formulations of ZF.71 To be
fair, Kreisel does not mean this in the particular sense of
'decided' which we have adopted, i. e., proved ot refuted. A
characterist ic formulation in his own words is that "CH is
( provably ) not independent of the full ( second-order ) version
of Zermelo's axioms".
It is my contention that these assertions of Kreisel's could
hardly be more misleading, and that his evaluation of the significance
of the mathematical facts on which he bases his claim is incorrect.
It is my intention in the remainder of this chapter to show just
why this is so, and to consider what value, if any, second-order
logic may have for further research on the CH.
The reader should be warned that although I will be attacking
Kreisel's position on this particular point, I am in agreement with
him on important points which will be treated in Chapter II. The
aim of the present discussion is to clear away matters which I
believe obscure those points.
In the sections which follow, we will treat first the question
of a more precise characterization of "second-orderness". We
will then consider a few of the differences between first- and
second- order theories, and see what advantages the latter may
have over the former. Finally we will see in just what sense CH
is "decided" in second-order ZF and consider what importance
would be attached to this result.
Arithmetic: A Second-Order Example:
Following our working definition of second-order theory, we
could formulate arithmetic as follows: Our language contains,
besides logical constants, the constant 'O' , the function symbol
'S' ( "successor" ) and the function symbols '+' and 'x'. We
include one-place predicate variables, and adopt the usual ( first-
order ) axioms except that the induction schema is replaced by a
single axiom with predicate quantification:
( 1 ) (P) ((P(0) & (x) (P(x) D P(S(x) ) ) ) D (x) P(x) ).
We call the resulting theory S . 7 3 A possible model M for S2
can then be defined as the sextuple (N_, C, +, x, S, 0 ) . N
is the first-order universe of "natural numbers'; C is the
second-order universe, consisting of subsets of N ( not neces-
sarily all of them ). We also have 0 e N, S : N -. N, + : N x N -
N. We will deal later with the question of just how much of the
powerset of N is to be in C.
As an alternative formulation of "second-order" arithmetic,
2, 2con-
S , we consider the following theory. The language of S con-
tains only first-order quantification, with non-logical constants
'O', 'S', T+1, 'x' as before, and two new one-polace predicate
symbols 'N', 'C', read "is a number" and "is a set', respectively.
Finally, we add a two-place predicate symbol 'e' , interpreted,
as usual, as membership. The induction axiom for S2 ' may
be stated:
(2) (x)((C(x) & 0 ex &(y)((N(y)&y ex)) DS(y) x D(y)(N(y) Dy ex))
Of course (2), together with the other usual Peano axioms will
not yield a viable formulation of arithmetic. We will need
some axioms of class existence, an extensionality axiom for
s ' , axioms which state that every thing is either a number or a
set but not both, and axioms to settle similar technical matters. 74
A possible model for S21 will be of the form ( U, N, C,+, x, S, 0, 6)
where U = N U C, C c P(N), and the other elements have the
obvious interpr etat ions.
Is S2 ' a second-order system ? If we stick by our
provisional definition, the answer must be "no", for S2 1 does
not permit quantification over predicates. But there is a rationale
for answering "yes", and abandoning the restrictions of the
provisional definition. It is plain that nothing we have said so
far about the possible models for S2 and S2 ' rules out our
taking the possible models for S2 to be exactly those obtained
from S2 ' structures by omittting the first and last elements.
There are clearly other intimate relations between S2
and S2 , most easily summarized as follows: If M is the
standard model for S2, where N is the set of natural numbers,
C is the powerset of N, etc., and M' is the S2 structure
obtained from M by adding the set e = (x,y) I x eN &y eC &x ey}
as the last element of the tuple and U = N UC as its first, then
(3) M J P(x) iff M' ý N(x) &C(y) &x ey, where the
interpretation of the predicate variable P is the same
as that of y.
Of course there are also marked differences between our
two "versions" of arithmetic. The difference between individual
and predicate variables is marked by variable style in S2 and
by the predicates C(x) and N(x) in S2 ' . As we have seen, this
gives rise to a few additional axioms in S2 ' which concern C(x)
and N(x).
Evidently, S2' must also have some axioms guaranteeing
the existence of various sets, but we have listed no comparable
"comprehension" axioms for S2 . This distinction is about
to disappear, however, because as we have formulated S2 ,
there is no way to show that specific (first-order) predicates
may be substituted in (1), the induction axiom for S2
This defect must be remedied by stating further logical axioms
for the second-order portion of S2, as is done, for example
in Church' s book. 75 Such axioms have the form of a schema,
the closure of
(4) (P)F(P) D F( ),
where Y is a formula satisfying certain restrictions we will
mention later. It is plain that transposing (4) and prenexing
the resulting predicate quantifier will yield a schema whose
form is (the closure of )
(5) (HP) (G( ) D G(P)),
which is evidently a kind of comprehension schema for
predicates, but counted among the logical axioms of S2
The point that I wish to extract from this pair of examples
is that there is a strict parallel between theories which are
second-order in our original, provisional sense, and those
which are what we would ordinarily consider first-order
theories with set theoretic notions included. In later sections,
we will show that the parallelism exhibited in these arithmetic
examples also exists between second-order formulations of
ZF and VBI.
For the present, we will confine our discussion of SOL to the
original sense of that term, but the reader is requested to keep
in mind that our remarks could be recast interms of the first-order-
cum-set theory sort of SOL exemplified by S2 . The following
section will be concerned with the model theoretic and metalogical
properties of SOL, as compared with general properties of first-
order logic ( FOL ).
Properties of SOL:
So far, I have been deliberately vague about how much of the
powerset of the first-order universe of a possible model in SOL
must be included in the second-order universe ( that is, the
range of the second-order variables ). There are three commonly
considered conditions for such possible models, and as one would
expect, the properties of the resulting model theory for SOL depends
critically on which one is chosen.
The first condition is that the SO universe should include only
the finite subsets of the FO one. The result is called weak second -
order logic, and we will not consider it here. The second possible
condition is to require that the SO universe be identical with the
powerset of the FO universe. This is the notion which Kreisel has
in mind. We shall call such structures '*-structures', or, where
appropriate, '*-models'.
The third possibility is that one may require the SO universe
to contain sufficient subsets of the FO universe to satisfy the
substitution schema (4). We shall call such structures (models)
general structures (models). Plainly, every *-structure is a distinct
general structure, but the converse does not hold. The properties
of SOL when general structures are considered are not significantly
differently from those of FOL, but striking differences appear when
we restrict our attention to *-structures. We list a few interesting
properties of SOL for possible models of this type--call it '*SOL'.
I. S2 is Categorical
It is well-known that no first-order theory with any infinite
models is categorical--that is, has all of its models isomorphic
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to one another. But let us consider S2. Let a O , a l , a 2 , ... be
the sequence of (necessarily distince and without other predecessors)
denotations of the numericals of S2 : 'O', 'S(O)', 'S(S(O))', etc.,
w.r.t. some model M = (N,C, ... ) of S. Let A = { a. i }.
Since C = IP (N) and A c N, A e C. So A is within the range
of the universal quantifier (P) in the induction axiom (1). Since
0 E A and x E A D S (x) E A , all numbers are in A, i. e., N =A.
Clearly we can show this for all *-models of S2 , so they are all
isomorphic. 76
II. *SOL is not Semantically Complete
We say that a system consisting of a class of logical axioms,
inference rules and possible models is semantically complete if
any sentence ep ( of an appropriate language ) can be proved from
a given set of sentences F by means of the axioms and rules just
in case the given sentence cp is true in every model of F . It is
well-known that FOL is complete in this sense.77
It is an easy consequence of the result in I. above that 'SOL
cannot be semantically complete. The Godel-Rosser incompleteness
theorem shows how to obtain a sentence ep of S2 which is true in
the standard interpretation of S , but unprovable by the usual rules
and axioms. Since all *-models of S are isomorphic, p is true
in all of them, even though it is unprovable. Hence *SOL is not
semantically complete w. r. t. the usual axioms and rules.
This result may be generalized as follows: Given any effective set
of axioms true in all *-structures ( of some particular language type )
and any effective set of sound and effective rules for SOL, *SOL is
not semantically complete w. r.t. these rules and axioms. This re-
markable result, that no acceptable set of rules and axioms can prove
all the "semantic consequences" of every *SOL theory will be the basis
of my critique of Kreisel's position on CH and SOL. That is, it can
be shown--under "common sense" assumptions--that CH has the same
truth value in all *-models of second-order ZF, and also that CH can be
neither proved nor refuted in SO ZF either by the usual rules or by any
other acceptable set of rules. We will return to this point below.
In addition to semantic incompleteness, other embarrassing proper-
ties of *SOL may be easily proved using the ideas of the previous few
paragraphs. For example, there are extensions of S2 which are con-
sistent (i. e., no contradiction is a theorem) but which have no *-models.
We will mention a few such properties below in connection with SO ZF.
General Structures & SOL
The remarkable properties of -SOL disappear if we do not
confine attention only to *'-structures b it admit all general
structures. The categoricity result I. can no longer be obtained,
for the proof of I. used the fact that A E C , but if C / IP (N),
we have no guarantee of this. Hence, I. cannot be proved by this
method. In fact, one can show that I. is simply false for general
models, because Henkin78 has shown that SOL is complete for
general models, so the result of II. is false for such structures,
and we have shown that I. implies II.
Second-Order Set Theory
Having considered some basic properties of SOL, it is now
appropriate to describe second-order ZF and state the relevant
results about it.
As before, we will consider only one-place quantified predi-
cates, and we will have 'E' as the only non-logical constant.80
We call ZF 2 the theory stated in such a language whose axioms
are the usual first-order axioms of ZF with Replacement and
Foundation replaced by:
Found: (P) ( (ax)Px D (ax) (Px & (y) (yEx D vpy)
and the translation into primitive notation of:
Repl: (P) ( (x)(y)(z)(P (< x, y> ) & P ( < x, z> ) y = z)
(x)( 2y)(z)(z E y (Hu) (ue x & P(<u, z>)))).
For convenience, we may also state the axiom of Separation:
Separation: (P)(x)( y)(z)(z E y = z E x & Pz)
We also have available the logical axioms for SOL, including
the substitution schema (4) given earlier. With the aid of (4),
it is easy to show that all instances of first-order Foundation
and Replacement are theorems of ZF 2
A possible model of ZF2 is a triple M = (U, B, R ), where
B IP ( U ), R C U x U , and M satisfies the logical axioms
of ZF2 . If B = IP(U ), we shall speak of *-structures and
models, as before, and use the term 'AZF 2 when we are
considering only models in this sense.
Comparing VBI and ZF 2
In an earlier section, we suggested that S2 and S2 ' ought
to be regarded as variant formulations of the same theory, despite
the fact that SZ ' is technically a first-order theory. In this section,
-we describe a similar relation which holds between ZF2 and VBI.
Let E be the following formula of ZF2z
(F)(G)((x)(F(x) = G(x)) D F = G).
E is an axiom of extensionality for predicate variables; it is plainly
true in all general or *-structures, so the theory ZF + E is con-
sistent if ZF2 is. The precise relation between VBI and ZF 2
is given by the following proposition, which is proved in appendix
C:
Proposition: If CP is a formula of VBI and (cP is the formula
of ZF2 which results from replacing every atom of Tp of the form
x £ X by the predicate variable X(x), then VBI I- rp iff
ZF 2 + E -Ep*.
Since CH contains no class or predicate variables, CH = CH*.
It is thus an easy corollary of Tharp's and Solovay's independence
results for VBI that CH is not decided in ZF , since it is not
decided in the extension Z F 2 +E.
I know; of no mention of the above proposition in print, but
the proof is simply quantification theory, and it would be surprising
if Kreisel were unaware of it. Clearly, he has another sort of
result in mind, which we describe in the following section.
A "Categoricity" Result for ZF 2
'Categoricity' appears in shudder quotes in the title of this
section because it is unlikely that the '-models of ZF 2 actually
fall into a single isomorphism class. In fact, if there is a
measurable cardinal x, there are at least h non-isomorphic
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*-models of ZF . We can prove, however, that all the
*-models of ZF 2 are closely related in a sense which will be
described below.
First, we note that all '-models are well-founded. The
first-order theory ZF has, or course, an axiom which "says"
that the s -relation is well-founded, but there are models of
that theory--which of course satisfy this axiom--which are not
8Z
well-founded. It is plain, however, that a *-structure satisfies
the SO foundation axiom iff it is actually well-founded. Using
83this fact, and the so-called Isomorphism Theorem for first-
order theories, we may infer that all '-models of ZF 2 are
isomorphic to an e -model, that is, a model of the form <U, B, R>,
where U consists only of sets, and R is the restriction of the
e -relation to U.
By a more involved argument, which we outline in Appendix D,
we can give a much more detailed characterization of the *-models
Before stating this result, we must make a technical reservation.
It is entirely possible that there are no *-models of ZF 2 at all,
even if the axioms of this theory are true under the intended
interpretation, since the collection of all sets cannot itself be
a set, hence not a model of anything. We will argue in the next
chapter that this technical point has more than technical significance,
but for the present, we will ignore this point and refer to the CTS
itself as a model. We can now state the promised result:
Proposition: Every *-model of ZF 2 is isomorphic to the entire
CTS or to a natural model with first-order universe R(I), where
t is inaccessible.
It follows immediately from this proposition that if there are
no inaccessibles, then *ZF 2 is categorical. We may also state
a related result for Z 2 , the theory obtained from ZF 2 by omitting
the replacement axiom.
Proposition: Every *-model of Z2 is isomorphic either to the
entire CTS or to a natural model with first-order universe R(CY),
where ao is a limit ordinal greater than w.
From this second proposition, we obtain an independence proof
of the second-order replacement axiom from Z 2 , since there are
non-inaccessibles which are limit ordinals greater than w, e. g., w + w.
Either proposition illustrates the mathematical facts on
which Kreisel bases his case that CH is "decided" in
ZF2(or Z2), for the CH concerns only sets in R(w+3), the
initial portion of the CTS out to w+3. Since all *-models of either
theory (are isomorphic to models which) contain these sets as
their initial portion, the CH has the same truth value in all of
84them. Thus, unless we have some cause to challenge the
"categoricity, argument for *ZF 2 , we have proved that CH is
determined, although it is not decided in ZF 2
As with the categoricity proof for S2 , however, the two
propositions stated above fail to hold if we include consideration
of general models. It is not even the case that such models
must be well-founded. Even if well-foundedness could be
quaranteed, the rest of the argument would not succeed, as
the reader may see by examining the proof sketch in Appendix D.
Significance of the "Categoricity" of *ZF 2
At first glance, the results of the previous two sections
provide an inviting solution to the problem of this thesis. That
is, we have been able to show that despite the fact that CH is
undecided in ZF 2 , it is determined provided we accept one
natural sense of 'model' for SOL. In the view of this writer,
however, this "solution" is defective on two counts:
First, I will argue that *ZF is a system of questionable
value as a practical foundation for set theory, in that it conceals
significant features more clearly presented in, say VBI.
Second, I will offer an argument to the same conclusion as Kreisel's
-- that CH is determined--using a proper subset of his premises,
one which I believe to be far less problematic.
In order to deal properly with the first objection, I propose
to consider briefly Kreisel's reasons for profering *SOL, in
general and in set theory. Later, we will return to the second
point.
Claimed Advantages of *SOL
Although Kreisel gives no compact defence of *SOL, he makes
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three main claims in various articles: (1) *SOL is more
natural to the ordinary mathematician and to earlier writers on
foundations: (2) SO axioms provide the evidence for FO schemata
of accepted theories; (3) second-order formulations are heuristically
fruitful in finding interesting theories which may ultimately
be cast in first-order form. We will deal with these points in order.
As for (1), Kreisel is plainly right in claiming that some earlier
researchers intended to give categorical formulations of their theories.86
Dedekind gives a categoricity proof for his formulation of artithmetic,
which, on account of the Skolem-Lowenheim Theorem, would be
impossible if the underlying logic were first-order. 87 Similarly,
the first-order formulation of Peano's original five axioms, stated
in terms of "zero" and "successor", is not sufficient to prove
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the existence of "plus" and "times" functions. One must
either include these two notions as primitives, add some simple
set theory--or, employ second-order logic.
Kreisel cites one further, more problematic case,
claiming that Zermelo himself employed SOL for his "categoricity"
results on ZF. 89 While it is not unreasonable to read SOL
into Zermelo's paper, 90 it does need to be read in; Zermelo
himself specifies no underlying logic. Kreisel' s interpretation
of Zermelo's argument has not gone unchallenged. Shepherdson,
in his refinement of Zermelo's results, 91 maintained that
Zermelo was simply mistaken, and set out to correct the
"logical shortcomings" of his proof and produce a related
first-order theorem. 9 2 A reasonable guess as to Kreisel's
reasons for reading Zermelo's proof as second-order is
that otherwise his result is false.
Kreisel's conclusions from such cases as these is that
categoricity is a (necessary) adequacy condition for "set
theoretic foundations as originally intended" by earlier
logicians. 93 Apparently, Kreisel agrees that this "original
intention" was correct, for he regards the fact that no infinite
mathematical structure may be categorically characterized
by a first-order theory as "establishing the inadequacy of
'first-order' foundations". 94
Besides faithfulness to the hopes of earlier investigators,
and the possibility of categoricity, Kreisel suggests one other
sense in which SOL is more natural. He argues that mathematical
practice proofs of the kind given by, say, Bourbaki, are best
understood as having an (implicit) SOL logic. Several other
writers have also expressed the view that SOL is closer to
mathematical practice, 96 but Kreisel's own argument is extremely
tenuous. He cites Bourbaki's practice of extreme care in
stating hypotheses, while making no mention of the set
comprehension axioms needed for the proof. This procedure
would be "extremely unscientific", he claims, unless second-order
logic is intended. 97
Such an argument leaves us free to conclude that even Bourbaki
may be somewhat unscientific, but it is more plausible that they
simply have no interest in the detailed formulation of the intuitive
set theory in which they work. This writer sees no reason to
regard such an attitude as unscientific, but more importantly,
Kreisel himself is concerned to defend "informal rigour"
against "positivisitic" or "doctrinare" challenges. 98 If refinements
do need to be read into even Bourbaki's carful proofs, I see
no reason to read in SOL rather than set theory.
As a final defense of the naturalness of SOL, Kreisel argues
that the notion of validity in the sense of truth in all *-structures
corresponds to "intuitive validity". His argument to this effect
is a rather self-defeating analogy to the first-order case. For
that case, he makes use of the Godel completeness theorem to
argue that first-order sentences are ,intuitively valid" iff they
are valid in the usual model-theoretic sense, and he states that
"one would expect''9 9 such a result for SO sentences as well.
100Kreisel plainly does expect such a result, but his reasons
are not entirely clear. It may be that he is relying on the fact
that the definition of SO consequence "uses exactly the same basic
notions as that of first order consequence. "101 In any case, his
first-order argument makes use of the completeness theorem,
which is false for *-structures in SOL, and Kreisel gives no
indication of how a second-order argument may be constructed
which avoids this embarassing fact.
The outcome of this series of arguments (of Kreisel's) seems
to this writer to be inconclusive at best. The intentions of the
earlier writers mentioned may not be realizable. Categoricity is
a nice property of theories, but we have seen how categoricity
arguments for theories formulated in SOL lead directly to incom-
pleteness results. Even if we could establish the naturalness of
SOL formulations of mathematical practice proofs, it is not clear
that this is important. Kreisel's remarks about intuitive validity
seem to count against, not for, *SOL. We turn next to evidential
and heuristic arguments for SOL.
Evidential Superiority of *SOL
Kreisel's view on this matter is most clearly put in connection
with the induction axiom (SOL) or schema (FOL) in arithmetic:
"A moments reflection shows that the evidence for the first order
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axiom schema derives from the second order schema [sic. 1
Kreisel does not elaborate an argument, but his intent here
is plain enough. Ones reason for believing that all instances of
the first-order schema are true is that one believes that induction
works for all properties, hence in particular, the ones defined by
formulas in the schema. This is a sensibl e enough view, and I
am not concerned to dispute it. I only wish to note that whatever
force this argument has for the SO induction axiom of S2 , it also
has for the set theoretic formulation in S 2 , which, we have noted,
is a first-order theory. S2 ' even has the advantage of offering at
least a minimal characterization of the sets (or properties) involved.
The point may be put concisely this way. A SO axiom may be
"evidentially superior" to a schema of its first order instances
without being superior in this respect to other first-order formu-
lations of "the same" axiom with set (or class) variables. In the
particular case of set theory, it is plainly absurd to maintain, say,
that ZF 2 is "evidentially superior" to VBI.
Heuristic Value of SOL
Kreisel offers two specific examples of the heuristic value of
SOL, and one additional one is suggested by his remarks. We will
not consider the first example, because he himself notes that
"quite simple reflection principles" are superior in that case for
the "discovery of new axioms". 10 3
The second example is the argument that CH is "decided" in
*SOL which we have already cited. Presumably, what *SOL aides
us in discovering by this procedure is that CH has a truth value,
but at this point, we are still in the process of evaluating this
"discovery". In another context, 104 Kreisel suggests that the SO
categoricity results suggests that properties other than those de-
finable in the usual (FO) language of set theory should be investi-
gated in new attacks on the continuum problem. As we have seen,
a number of people regard this approach as fruitful, some no doubt
inspired by the SOL categoricity.105
The third case, suggested by Kreisel's comments,1 0 6 concerns
the previously mentioned case of the plus and times functions for
arithmetic. The existence of these functions may be proved in SO
arithmetic formulated in the meager language containing only
"zero" and "successor" as non-logical constants. But the first-
order theory in this language is so weak that it is decidable. 107
As we mentioned in the earlier discussion, a satisfactory FO
theory may be obtained without set theory only by adding plus and
times as primitives. Kreisel seems to believe that such additional
technical complexity of the first-order axioms make it easier to
discover the SO ones first, and then concoct the first-order theory:
The general principle which distinguishes the discovery of
the basic axiomatic systems here considered [ arithmetic,
analysis, and set theory ] from technical ones like the axioms
of group theory is this:
We have a second order (categorical) axiomatization
of a mathematical structure, and then pass to a first order
system either (i) by using a schema or (ii)by using a many
sorted calculus and giving explicit closure conditions for the
"sets". U8
Taken as an historical thesis, this view is not unreasonable, but
the question we must ask is whether following such a scheme may
help solve the continuum problem. If the course we have consider-
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ed in the bulk of this chapter and which Kreisel endorses - -better
characterization of definite properties--is to lead to a solution,
'SOL is unlikely to help. The reason for this is well put by
Mostowski, who maintains that
S. . we obtain no additional information on the status of the
continuum problem if we pass from the first order logic
to the second order one.... We need axioms which will
characterize the notion of an arbitrary predicate. The sol-
ution of the continuum problem depends essentially on the choice
of these axioms. But is the problem of their choice in essence notthe same .as the problem of finding suitable axioms for the notion
of a set? 11
The proof-theoretic equilavence of VBI and ZF 2 gives clear
support to Mostowski's statement that "we obtain no additional
information" about CH in the passage from FOL to SOL.
The second-order logic which interests Kreisel, *SOL, is
worse off than FOL, in the sense that rather than providing
additional information about the CH (or anything else), crucial
restrictive conditions are concealed in the definition of '-models.
As we have noted, the axioms of ZF 2 (or VBI) which concern class
existence, the substitution schema (or class comprehension
schema, respectively)are not sufficient to replace the condition
on *-structures that the SO universe be the powerset of the
FO universe. Without such a condition, the "categoricity"
result for ZF2 evaporates. But if the condition is justifiably
imposed, an exactly parallel one could perfectly well be stated
for VBI or even VBG. That is, one could require that the only
models for VBG to be considered are those isomorphic to an
s -model M in which the "classes" (elements X of M for
which M ) (2Y) (Ye X)) are exactly the actual subclasses of the
universe of M. Such models are called "supercomplete",
and VBG and VBI are "categorical" w. r. t. supercomplete
models in exactly the same sense in which ":ZF is "categorical".2
Mostowski states--and this writer agrees-that what one
needs are principles, axiomatically presented, which better
characterize all--or more of--the actual subclasses of an
e -model. It is absolutely no help in doing this to make "*-ness"
or supercompleteness part of the definition of 'possible model'.
If anything, choosing a SOL formulation, which makes the class
existence schemata part of the logical apparatus of the theory
obscures this effort, because the problem to be solved is, as
Mostowski notes, "in essence" a set-theoretic one. Such
interesting new attempts to characterize classes as Takeuti's
notion of "nodal class of ordinals" could be stated in SOL terms,
but this is plainly less clear than adding to the VBI comprehension
schema. The clearly warranted conclusion is that as far
as heuristic value for the "definite property" problem goes,
SOL (with or without the '*') is inferior to first-order theories.
Further Disadvantages of -ZF 2
The conclusion I wish to draw from the disscussion of the
previous few sections is that the advantages of SOL, if any,
are slight, and in crucial matters related to the continuum
problem, definitely outweighted by disadvantages. Further
disadvantages of *SOL in general were cited in the case of S2 , speci-
fically the lack of a completeness theorem and consequent
undesirable properties. We may cite as an example the existence of
2  112
consistent extensions of S with no *'-odels
Similar examples could be cited for set theory. Several have
113been collected in a paper by A. Levy, 13 who attributes them
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to Mostowski. Levy' s examples turn on the non-equivalence
of predicate quantified statements and the schemata of their instances.
For example, he shows that there is a certain schema of theorems
of ZF 2 , -y (o), which, when replaced by the predicate quantified
statement (P) ~Y (P), yields a consistent theory with no *-models.
As one might expect, this result turns on a trick about truth
definitions. AY (P) says that P is not a truth set for ZF 2 , and
by Tarski's Theorem, we have ~ - (N), for all cp. (P) - T(P) is
actually false, however, because the truth set for ZF 2 mus t
actually be contained in any *-model of ZF 2 , even though it is
not defined by any p. A similar construction yields a consistent
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extension of ZF with more *-models than ZF
Levy concludes that these examples "show the inadequacy for
general use of the notion of standard model introduced in
S2 [i. e., "--models]".116 One might reply, however, that the
examples simply illustrate the fact, repeatedly noted by Kreisel,117
that SO sentences need not be equivalent to the schemata of their
instances. Rather than showing the unsuitability of the ;-structure
notion for "general use", Levy's examples merely add to our list of
unhappy features of "SOL.118
A Better Argument that CH is Determined
At the outset of our critique of Kreisel's claims for SOL, I
promised a simpler argument that CH is determined. In this
section, we deliver on that promise.
First, we must recall that all our discussion of 'SOL, including
the technical arguments of Appendix D, have rested on a proposition
perhaps too obvious and fundamental to be called a premise.
This proposition is that, contrary to formalist views, the terms
'set', 'is a member of', and the like, have a settled interpretation,
and further that this interpretation is that given by a single
mathematical structure, the CTS. We explicitly noted such
an "assumption" in our earlier discussion of natural models,118a
and Kreisel introduces his discussion of SOL with a similar
statement: "This section takes the precise notion of set (in the
sense of the cumulative type structure of Zermelo) ... as starting
point. . .119 Using this "assumption", we can put our argument
that CH is determined as follows:
Consider the initial portion of the CTS, R(w+3). Since CH
concerns only this portion of the CTS, 119a if we let
M = ( R(w +3), e f R(w+3)) then we have the following:
There is a unique intended interpretation of the terms of set
theory and a structure M such that:
(1) The CH is true under the intended interpretation iff
M P CH, and
(2) The CH is false under the intended interpretation iff
M N CH, and
(3) M CH or M K -CH.
(4) Therefore, there is a unique intended interpretation
of the terms of set theory such that CH is either true
or false under that interpretation
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In the (three part) premise of (A), (1) and (2) simply express (for CH)
the correspondence between truth under the intended interpretation
and the technical notion of satisfaction in M. (3) is a trivial theorem
of model theory. It is plain that the argument (A) is valid, and
given principles Kreisel accepts, it is also sound. Consequently,
Kreisel's long detour thru the morass of *-SOL is simply
mathematical obfuscation of a philosophical triviality.
The Critical "Assumption"
The reader should be warned that by using the term 'assumption',
I do not mean to imply that the proposition in question is doubtful
or unsupported. I do mean to suggest that this proposition deserves
examination. One reason for this is that it has been repeatedly
denied by recent writers on the significance of the independence
proofs (not all of them formalists), and denied on the grounds of
the independence of CH in particular. It is this view which we
will examine in the next chapter. Our final conclusion will be
that (1) - (4) does really settle the question of whether CH is
determined, provided only that a minimal realism is adopted.
CHAPTER II
REALISM AND THE CONTINUUM QUESTION
Setting the Problem
At the end of the last chapter, I outlined an argument to the
effect that CH is determined, which is restated here:
There is a unique intended interpretation of the terms
of set theory and a model M given by this interpretation
such that:
(A) (1) The CH is true under the intended interpretation iff
M r- CH, and
(2) The CH is false under the intended interpretation
iff M ý - CH, and
(3) M k CH or M -N CH.
(4) Therefore, there is a unique intended interpretation
of set theory according to which the CH is either
true or false.
The single premise of the argument (A) has the form of the
existential generalization of the conjunction of the three clauses
( 1 ) - ( 3 ) . In the discussion which follows, we will occasionally
speak loosly and refer to ( 1 ), ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) as premises of (A)
Argument (A) is easily shown to be valid by quantification theory,
and our examination of its soundness will serve to organize the
discussion of this chapter. In a later section, we will consider
another argument that CH is determined whose premises do not
have the explicitly existential character of those of (A), and will
there justify our concentration on (A).
It is plain that (A) will be totally unacceptable from the point
of view of several widely discussed views in the philosophy of
mathematics. In the introduction, we outlined formalist views
which either reject the notion of truth in mathematics altogether,
or identify it with provability in a preferred formal system. For
the first of these two views, all the premises of (A) are nonsense.
For the second, the satisfaction relation "IM ý ' must be replaced
by assertions about provability in some formal system, in which case
( 3 ) will be false.
Likewise, (A) cannot be accepted by the Intuitionists of the
Dutch school, if only for the reason that ( 3 ) would be for them
an unjustified appeal to the principle of the excluded middle.
The fact that our argument is unacceptable on either intuitionist
or formalist views does not, however, oblidge us to give a general
evaluation of these doctrines in order to continue our discussion of
the main question, that of whether CH is determined. We need not
do this because in one way or another, this question is already
settled from the point of view of these two positions.
From a formalist point of view, the question is settled in the
negative by the technical results outlined in the previous chapter.
For intuitionists, moreover, the question does not even arise,
because they reject entirely the greater part of set theory, in
particular that part necessary to state the CH, namely, cardinal
arithmetic beyond0 1
The positions that remain to be considered, and which may be
reasonably be said to be assumed both in Kreisel's argument and
in (A), are those which are generally call "realist", or, perjora-
tively, "platonist". The realism implicit in (A) has two aspects:
first the assertion that there exists a unique intended interpretation
of set theory, and second, that for CH, truth under that interpret-
ation coincides with satisfaction in a certain mathematical structure
(or group of related structures) M.
The project of the present chapter is to investigate the soundness
of the argument (A) , assuming some form of realism. We need
just enough realism to make good sense both of the assertion that
there is a unique intended interpretation of set theory (and the
structure or structures M) and of the notion of satisfaction of CH
in M, but we also need enough leeway in our assumptions about
realism to be able to challenge the assertion that there is indeed
a unique such interpretation. Just why this leeway is needed will
be seen below, when examine the arguments that there may be more
than one candidate for the "intended interpretation" of set theory,
so that the premise of (A) might be false.
There are a number of philosophers of this and recent gene-
rations who have been concerned with mathematical truth and
existence, and who have called themselves realists. The ideal
procedure for our present discussion would be to simply take one
of these announced positions or the common part of several of
them and state it as an assumption on which our examination of
(A) will rest. I believe, however, that the discussion below will
show that this T"ideal" procedure will not work in the present case,
because none of the usual views are both sufficiently clear and
reasonably plausible so as to serve as a basis for our investigation.
Both the advocates and the opponents of such views describe them
in language which is vague, impressionistic, metaphorical, or
down-right paradoxical. As a result, it will be necessary to defer
our discussion of the argument (A) until two subsidiary matters
are taken up. The first is a brief review of realist positions in
mathematics, and the second, which is a natural outgrowth of the
first, is a review of theories of mathematical truth. After these
two digression, I will present my own version of a minimal realist
position which I hope will be both clear and plausible and which will
not beg the questions which we must ask about the premises of (A).
Realist positions in Mathematics:
Several writers whose views are discussed elsewhere in this
thesis are characterized by themselves or by others as realist.
K. Godel, for example, has stated his view that
The set-theoretical concepts and theorems describe some
well-determined reality, in which Cantor's conjecture
must be either true or false. 2
In an earlier statement, Godel expresses a similar idea:
Classes and concepts may, however, also be conceived
as real objects, namely classes as "pluralities of things"
or as structures consisting of a plurality of things and
concepts as the properties and relations of things exist-
ing independently of our definitions and constructions.
It seems to be that the assumption of such objects
is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical
bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in
their existence. They are in the same sense necessary
to obtain a satisfactory system of matherratics as physi-
cal bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our
sense perceptions and in both cases it is impossible to
interpret the propositions one wants to assert about
these entities as propositions about the "data", i. e.,
in the latter case the actually occuring sense perceptions.
Other phrases used by Godel to express the same view include
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'exist objectively'4, 'objective existence' , 'real objects' ,
and 'real content which cannot be explained away'7. Godel
also quotes (one of) Russell's view(s) :
Logic [including set theory--TSW] is concerned with the
real world just as truly as zoology, although in more
abstract and general features. 8
This remark of Russell's recalls a much earlier statement
of a realist view by Joseph Fourier:
The analytical equations ... are not restricted to those
properties of figures, and to those properties which
are the object of rational mechanics; they extend to all
general phenomena. There cannot be a language ...
more worthy to express the invariable relations
of natural things. Considered from this point of
view, mathematical analysis is as extensive as nature
itself. .... It brings together the phenomena the
most diverse and Iiscovers the hidden analogies
which unite them.
R. Smullyan, who styles his own views as realist, closely
follows Godel's language. He states his position in the follow-
ing terms:
We can describe the realist view point as follows: There
is a well-defined mathematical reality of sets, and in this
reality, the continuum hypothesis is definitely either
true or false. 10
As a final example of a clearly realist position, we must
deal briefly with Frege's ontological views. He divides the
entitles within the subject matter of mathematics into two kinds,
objects and functions:
I count as objects everything that is not a function, for
example, numbers, truth-values, and... courses-of-
values [classes]. 11
Clearly, Frege counts sets, the entities which interest us here,
as objects. If we could find in Frege's account (a) a clear
characterization of mathematical entities and (b) a clear dis-
tinction between objects and functions, it might aid us in explain-
ing realism in set theory. Unfortunately, as in the case of the
philosophers discussed earlier, we do not find these features
in Frege's work, but we do find suggestive and conscientiously
pursued attempts.
As for (a) , Frege develops his own views by contrast to
and criticism of two rival positions. One is formalism, the view
which "regards signs as the subject matter of this science
[mathematics] . Frege regards himself as having
"definitely refuted" this view; 11b the subject matter of arithme-
tic, for example, is not numerals, but "what they stand for,,,llc
namely numbers. One reason why this was not obvious to form-
alists was the "very widespread" tendency "not to recognize as
an object anything that cannot be perceived by means of the senses". d
But fhis is simply a mistake; one must distinguish what is "objective"
from what is
handlable or spacial or actual [wirklich]. The axis of the
earth is objective . . . but I should not call [it] actual in the
way the earth itself is so. Ile
The second sort of view which Frege is concerned to refute
is the notion that mathematical entities are ideas:
If number were an idea, then arithmetic would be psychology.
But arithmetic is no more psychology than, say, astronomy
is. Astronomy is concerned, not with the ideas of the planets,
but with the planets themselves, and by the same token the
objects of arithmetic are not ideas either. llf
Frege's own view on the nature of mathematical objects may
best be put negatively, by contrast to the two views that the
subject matter of mathematics consists of signs and that it consists
of the products of "a psychological process".llg Mathematical
objects are not either of these, but they are not physical either.
As he says of "thoughts" (propositions), which are in the same
ontological boat as mathematical objects, "[they] are by no means
unreal [unwirklich], but their reality is quite a different kind from
that of [physical] things. ",15
Most of the above discussion mentions objects only, but it
applies equally to functions. For example, Frege remarks that
although he takes numbers to be objects, he could have taken
them to be concepts (functions whose values are truth values). Ilh
It is clear that the functions in question are, like mathematical
objects, neither physical nor mental, but still "objective".
On Frege's view, neither 'object' nor 'function' can be defined, i
both being simple to "admit of logical analysis". llj The best that
can be done is to give "hints" of what is meant by this distinction.11k
He provides two sorts of hints, one a metaphor, and the second
a clearer grammatical cri terion. The metaphor is given a
typical expression in the following passage:
I am concerned to show that the argument does not belong
with the function, but goes together with the function to
make up a complete whole; for the function by itself must
be called incomplete, in need of supplementation, or
'unsaturated' . And in this respect functions differ funda-
mentally from numbers. 11,
The idea of the metaphor of "unsaturatedness" is that a function
is something such that when it is "completed" with one or more
objects (the arguments), the result is an object (the value of the
function).12 Frege gives some indication that he had the notion
of a function as a set of ordered pairs, but he regarded his own
llm
more arcane notion as "logically prior".
Besides the metaphorical description of a function, Frege
gives a grammatical criterion:
A concept is the reference of a predicate; an object is some-
thing that can never be the whole reference of a predicate,
but can be the reference of a subject. lln
This criterion also has shortcomings, however. It appears to
work only for certain functions (i. e. , concepts), and it admits of
some exceptions.llo Further, since Frege maintains that "the
singular definite article always indicates an object", 11p the
reference of the subject of the sentence 'the concept man is not empty'
is not a concept, but an object which "represents" the concept. 11q
What the relation is between this object and the concept represented
is very obscure. Generally speaking, the obscurity of the object
function distinction is the subject of a great deal of critical complaint
by Frege's commentators. 13
As a summary of the views we have sketched here, we can
list three key characteristics: (a) mathematical truths are "about"
"mathematical objects"; (b) these objects are "real"; and (c) they
are not mental. Frege is particularly explicit about this last clause,
but is clear from passages not quoted that all the other authors cited
also subscribe to it.
Quasi-R ealist Views
Several authors whose views we will be oblidged to discuss bear
some similarity to those reviewed in the previous section, but differ
in one or more important particulars from them.
Kreisel, for example, distinguishes three sorts of "realism",
but he discusses them is a, sufficiently hypothetical tone that it is
unclear which of these he may accept. He says, for example, that
The contact [of the analysis of mathematical experience] with
mathematical realism is, or course, the assumption that there
are basic elements with the properties assumed in the analyeis,
that is, the existential assumptions of set theory are valid.
Kreisel clearly accepts this much "realism"; he later distinguishes
three views, tstrong", I"weak"l, and "strict" forms of realism:
The realist position is here taken in its strong form, namely
as involving the existence of sets of high ordinal, and not
merely as involving the existence of some mathematical
objects [weak realism]. 17
"Strict," realism he takes to be the view that
all mathematical notions are built up from the notion of
set by means of logical definitions in the language of
pure set theory (e) .18
This view he regards as implausible.
The way in which Kreisel's version of realism is clearly
different from those of the previously cited authors is that he
appears uncertain whether mathematical objects may not be mental,
or, as he says, "objects not external to ourselves''. 19 He suggests
that analysis of the nature of "mathematical evidence" may make
the view that mathematical objects are indeed "not external to
ourselves" more plausible. 20 It appears, then that Kreisel rejects
characteristic (c) of realism as listed in the previous section.
In traditional terminology, his view is therefore closer to "concept-
ualism" than to "realism".
Another author with a similar view is P. Bernays. Bernays
claims to detect a "tendency ... which consists in viewing the
objects [of mathematics] as cut off from all links with the reflecting
subject". 21 He endorses this tendency to a limited extent, because
he believes that such a position is necessary to justify the excluded
middle in mathematical reasoning.22 The position he prefers
he calls "restricted platonism"
which does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal
projection of a domain of thought. But the matter has not
rested there. Several mathematicians and philosophers
interpret the methods of platonism in the sense of
conceptual realism, postulating the existence of a world
of ideal objects containing all the objects and relations
of mathematics. It is this absolute platonism which
has been shown untenable by the antinomies, particularly
by those surrounding the Russell-Zermelo paradox. 23
We will have occasion to discuss Bernays' argument in this last
sentence in a later section.
Finally, we must consider Cantor's position, which, paradoxically,
amounts to an argument that conceptualist and realist positions
amount to the same. There are, he says, two senses of 'actuality';
in the first sense,
We may regard the whole numbers as 'actual' in so far as they,
on the ground of definitions, take a perfectly determined place
in our understanding, are clearly distinguished from all other
constituitents of our thought, stand in definite relations to
them, and thus modify, in a definite way, the substance of o ir
mind. 24
In the second sense, we may ascribe "actuality" to our conceptions
insofar as they must be held to be an expression or an image
of processes and rplations in the outer world, as distinguished
from the intellect.
Cantor held, however, that "because of the unity of the All, to which
we ourselves belong" the first kind of actuality always implies the
second. 2 6 It would be pointless, even if it were possible, to clearly
explain Cantor's metaphysical argument here, but the outcome of the
argument is not hard to see: in mathematics, we need only consider
the first sort of "actuality". For example,
in the introduction of new numbers, it is only obligatory to
give such definitions of them as will afford them such a
definiteness, and, under certain circumstances, such a
relation to the older [natural] numbers, as permits them
to be distinguished from one another in given cases. As
soon as a number satisfies all these conditions, it can
and must be considered as existent and real in mathematics.
In this I see the grounds on which we must regard the
rational, irrational, and complex number as just as existent
as the positive integers. 2 6 a
Evaluation of Realist & Quasi-Realist Views
In an earlier section, we introducted our discussion of realist
position, and characterized them as "vague, impressionistic,
metaphorical or paradoxical". I think that our subsequent summaries
of positions, both "realist" and "quasi-realist", bear out this
perjorative description. I do not mean to imply, however, that
any of the characterizations are senseless, that the reader or
this writer has no idea what is meant by them, or that the remarks
have no value as methodological guides for the development of various
strains in mathematics. The philosophical remarks of intuitionist
mathematicians, for example, are notoriously obscure, 27 but
this has not prevented the development of a substantial body of
intuitionist mathematics.
I do wish to claim, as previously announced, that none of the
positions reviewed is both plausible and sufficiently clear to
provide a basis for evaluation of the argument (A). It is simply
not evident what we may infer from the statement that sets are
"real objects" or that there is a "well-defined mathematical reality
of sets". It will be our project in the next few sections to attempt
to give a minimal account of realism which will serve our
purposes in evaluating (A). We will do this by formulating
realism in terms of the notion of truth, and then defending a
notion of truth with properties we can use in evaluating (A).
Minimal Realism
We will formulate our version of realism only for set theory;
we state it as follows:
(a) Most of the statements of set theory (including exist-
ential ones) which secure wide acceptance among mathematicians
(B) acquainted with set theory, in particular most of the axioms
and theorems of ZF, are true under at least one natural
interpretation, and (b) these statements need not be reinter-
preted as facons de parler in order to be regarded as true.
At this point, it may well be unclear why we have chosen to
call position (B) realism; that will be clearer after we have
discussed theories of mathematical truth. It is clear, however,
that (B) is a reasonable assumption on which to base a discussion
of whether CH has a truth value, for (B) simply states that most
of the statements for which we have proofs acceptable by current
standards are true. If this is not taken as a starting point, then
it is idle to consider whether statements which are known to be
unprovable (according to these same standards) are true.
Although (b) is listed separately, I believe that discussion
below of natural interpretations will show that it is already implied
by the "at least one natural interpretation" clause of (a). It will
clarify matters, however, to give an illustration by way of
explanation of (b).
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In a 1905 paper, 28 Russell outlined three methods which might
avoid the paradoxes of set theory, among which is a theory he
called the "no classes theory". This method amounts to a
translation procedure for eliminating any proported reference
to sets, and so, Russell believed, developing a foundation for
29
mathematics without the assumption that sets exist. This is
the sort of position we have sought to rule out by clause (b).
Russell later developed his theory in some detail, but without the
ontological economies he had hoped for. 3 0
We now turn to a discussion of theories of truth in mathematics,
so that we may show the connection between (B) and the views we
have styled t"realist" and then prepare for an evaluation of (A).
Theories of Truth in Mathematics
Loosly speaking, we will be discussing four theories of truth,
although one of them is not an entire account of truth, but deals only
with quantified sentences, and another (conventionalism) is only
a loose collections of slogans. The remaining two theories are
two versions of Tarski's ideas, one that of Tarski himself, and
another based on his work.
Theory I: Conventionalism:
Empiricist writers of this century, especially before the
influence of Tarski's ideas became widespread, maintained that
truths of mathematics are such because they merely record rules
"which govern the use of language". 31 Another formulation puts
is this way:
The validity of mathematics ... derives from the stipulations
which determine the meaning of the mathematical concepts,
and ... the propositions of mathematics are therefore
essentially "true by definition." 32
It is held to be a consequence of such views that the truths of
mathematics need not be regarded as "truths about the world",33
"say nothing about any actual thing", 34 and convey no "factual
information. "35
As to the ontological implications of such a view, various
advocates disagree. The main attraction of conventionalist theories
for empiricists has been that they seem to provide an account of
mathematics which makes it possible to explain how one can come
to know mathematical truths which is consistent with their general
epistomological view. One might suppose that elementary statements,
for example, might be knowable simply by reflection on the meaning
of the terms they contain. This emphasis on the epistomological
aspects of mathematics has tended to overshadow ontological
questions. Does the truth of '2 + 2 = 4' imply that numbers exist?
Some maintained that this is a typical "pseudo-question", while others
answered 'no'. 36 The most sophistocated formulation is Carnap's;
he maintained that one should answer either 'yes' (for trivial reasons),
hold that ,"it is not a theoretical but a practical question, a matter
of decision rather than assertion", 37 or say that it is a pseudo-
question , depending on exactly how the question is meant. 38
Happily, we need not decide just what sort of ontology fits best
with conventionalist accounts of truth because we can simply reject
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those accounts. In doing so, we rely on the arguments of Quine, 39
who convincingly argues that no reasonable construal of conventionalism
can be right even about logic.
Quine's argument may be summarized as follows: While it may
not be necessary to a conventionalist thesis that someone has ever
explicity laid down the conventions in question, we must be able
to imagine that this be done:
In dropping the attributes of deliberateness and explicitness
from the notion of linguistic convention, we risk depriving
the latter of any explanatory force and reducing it to an idle
label. 38a
To see whether the making of deliberate and explicit- conventions
for the truth of logic could be possible, Quine traces out a program
of convention making for the logical truths--those sentences whose
truth depends (in a sense he makes precise) only on the occurences
and arrangement of the basic logical vocabulary: 'not', 'if .. . then',
'every'. The single condition of adequacy to be met by this (imaginary)
process of convention-making is that the results conform to the
present ordinary usage of the logical vocabulary, which we must
temporarily assume we do not understand.
If there were only finitely many sentences about which conventions
were to be made, the process would be simple. We would only
need to run thru an appropriate list and tick off the ones to be made
true so as to conform to ordinary usage. Unfortunately, we need
to make conventions about infinitely many sentences, and since human
beings cannot simply run thru infinite lists, we must do this by
adopting by convention some finite number of principles which
together determine the truth values of all the logical sentences.
The crucial difficulty which arises here is that both in stating the
principles and inferring particular sentences, we must use both
the locial vocabulary whose meaning is to be fixed by the
conventional assignment of truth values to the logical sentences, and
the logical principles we are seeking to make true by convention.
In Quine's words, "The difficulty is that if logic is to proceed
mediately from conventions, logic is needed for inferring logic
from conventions. "38b
Thus, there is no non-vacuous sense of 'convention' according
to which logic is true by convention. To this conclusion, we
need only add two remarks: (a) conventionalists typically regard
mathematics as part of logic;40 and (b) any plausibility
conventionalism may have for mathematics is certainly removed
if it won't work for logic.
It may seem that we have neatly dispensed with conventionalism,
but such is not quite the case, because although the particular
formulations quoted earlier cannot be correct, there are formulations
which make use of Tarski's ideas which are very close in spirit to
the statements cited here. We will examine such a position shortly.
Tarski' s Views
Just about all contemporary philosphical views on truth, as
well as the mathematical theory of models, derive in some manner
from Tarski's work. Several interpretations may be put on Tarski's
ideas, and I will maintain that the version that Tarski himself
accepted is not plausible. In discussing Tarski's views, I will
rely heavily on the arguments of a recent paper by Hartry Field,
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"Tarski's Theory of Truth", to which the reader is referred
for a more detailed treatment.
As Field shows, Tarski's theory may be regarded as
characterizing truth for a language L (which, for simplification,
we may take to be a first-order one of the usual sort) in terms
of the three additional semantic notions of (1) what an individual constant
c i refers to, (2) what a predicate (i. e., predicate letter) applies to,
and (3) which n+l-tuples of objects fulfill an n-place function symbol. 42
For convenience, we will use the term 'primitive denotation' to
cover all three of these notions. We will call T the Tarskian
theory which explains truth in terms of primitive denotation.
Thus formulated, the interest which T holds for us depends
on what account of primitive denotation we can supply. If we could
produce a clear and explanatory account of primitive denotation for
mathematics such that only things which "really exist" can be
referred to, we would have made progress in giving a clear account
of a realist point of view. We have no such account to offer in general
or for mathematics but (in a later section) we will suggest a line
enquiry which at least deserves to be followed up. First, however,
we review Tarski's own view.
Tarski's Theory of Primitive Denotation
Since it was Tarski's objective to "not make use of any
semantical term if I am now able previously to reduce it to other
[non- semantic] concepts", 43 he offered a further characterization
of referring, fulfillment and application exemplified by the following
treatment of the case of reference:
(C) (e) (a) (e is a constant that refers to a iff (e is 'c 1 ' and
a is cl) or (e is 'c Z ' and a is c2) or ... )
where 'cl', c2 . . . are all the individual constants of L, and
cI , c2 , ... is a list of the translations of these constants into
English (or any other language which we happen to be using).
Field emphasises the triviality of (C) as a "theory" of reference
by comparing it will the following "theory" of valence in chemistry:
(D) (E) (n) (element E has valence n iff (E is potassium
and n = + 1) or (E is sulphur and n= -2) or ... )
where the '...' indicates that (D) is to be filled out with a complete
list of the elements and their valences. Plainly, (D) is not a theory
of valence, any more than (C) is a theory of reference for L.
Both (C) and (D) do perforrn one function, however; they allow us
to eliminate the therms 'refers to ' or 'has valence! from many,
perhaps all, contexts, provided that the lists are correct and complete.
(C) thus answers to Tarski's stated aim of not using a semantic
term "if I am not able to previously reduce it to other concepts".
Field argues that (1) the translation list used in (C) for
eliminating the term 'refers to', and the counterparts of (C) for
'fulfills' and 'applies to' are of no philosophical importance, 4 4
and (2) that such accounts of the notion of primitive denotation
saddle Tarski's account with very considerable practical and
methodological drawbacks.45 To these conclusions, he attaches
only the proviso that some other treatment of primitive denotation
which is compatible with physicalism be possible. 4 6 As will be
seen, I fully agree with this view.
Tarski's addition to T for the case of reference may be put
in a somewhat more general form as follows: Translate the constants
of L into some language you understand, say L'; let the translation
of 'c' be 'glurg', and let 'swarp' be some term of L'. Then 'c'
refers to swarp just in case glurg = swarp, where this identity is
understood as a statement of L'. This may strike one a circular
or at least unhelpful , for we started to define truth for L and ended
with an account which depends on understanding statements of some
other (and richer) language L'. Tarski's procedure is really a
special case of this general method, for his translation is not
a systematic or explanatory account, but simply a list. But is
some truly explanatory account possible for some appropriate
language L'? Certainly many philosophers think not.
Carnap, for example, is easily able to adapt the Tarskian account,
T + (C), to his conventionalist framework. In his view, the choice
of the language L' and the translation into it are just as much a
matter of simple convenience as the choice of the language L of
our initial interest. The evident triviality of (C) as an account of
reference (which Carnap adopts) makes it possible for him to
countenance semantic notions and still maintain that "the
admissibility of entities of a certain type..,. as designata
[i. e., as things referred to -- tsw] is reduced to the question
of the acceptability of the linguistic framework for those entities", 4 7
and this "question of acceptibility" is a purely pragmatic one.48
Field believes that one important reason that Tarski's
translation "theory,, of reference has come to be accepted as that
nontrivial theories of reference with which philosophers are
familiar, such as Russell's business about "logically proper names",
are patently absurd. Field holds out hope for some sort of causal
49theory of reference, such as that sketched by Kripke. Field
summarizes this view as:
According to such [causal] theories, the facts that 'Cicero'
denotes Cicero and that 'muon' applies to muons are to be
explained in terms of certain kinds of causal networks between
Cicero (muons) and our uses of 'Cicero' ('muon'): causal
connections both of a social sort (the passing of the word
' Cicero' down to us from the original users of the name,
or the passing of the work 'muon' to laymen from physicists)
and of other sorts (the evidential causal connections that
gave the original users of the name "access" to Cicero and
gave physicists "access" to muons). I don't think that Kripke
or anyone else thinks that purely causal theories of primitive
denotation can be developed (even for proper names of past
physical objects and for naturalkind predicates), this however
should not blind us to the fact that he has suggested a kind of
factor involved in denotation that gives new hope to the idea of
explaining the connection between language and the things it is
about. 50
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It is just this hope which I share, but there is a special problem
for such a "causal" account of reference for mathematics. In fact,
it is widely maintained that a causal theory of reference for
mathematics is absurd. The argument is roughly that from the
point of view of realism, mathematical objects are objects, but
non-physical ones. (Clearly this the point of view of the realist
writers we have quoted such as Frege and Godel). But, so the
argument runs, it is absurd to hold that non-.physical objects could
enter into causal relations. 51 Similar arguments have been given
against causal theories of mathematical knowledge: one has to
believe in magic to believe that people can stand in causal relations
to mathematical objects. 52
Plainly, there is something right about such arguments. If (a)
mathematical objects are non-physical and (b) we cannot causally
interact with non-physical objects, then (c) we cannot causally
interact with mathematical objects. Realist view such as Frege's
and Godel's are clearly committed to (a), and (b) sounds plausible
in any case, so they are committed to (c) and causal theories of
reference and knowledge are plainly impossible on their views.
But outside of mathematics, we have at least a sketch of a causal
theory of reference, and more than a sketch of a causal theory of
knowledge 53 a which, in this writer's view, are the most promising
accounts of these notions. No such promising accounts of knowledge
and reference are available for the realist positions espoused by
Frege and Godel, and the remarks these authors make on these
53b
subjects are either uninformative or really do sound like magic.
For other realist position of the sort suggested by Russell
and Fourier, that mathematics deals with the most general
properties of the world, the argument (a) - (c) does not clearly
apply, however. For example, suppose that I come to know--by
looking -- that there are three oranges in the bowl on my table.
According to causal accounts of knowledge, I come to know this
by interacting causally with something: the bowl of oranges or a
state of affairs of which it is a part, or the fact that the bowl contains
three oranges. It does not follow, of course, that I interact with
the number three, and I am not sure exactly what should be said
about the relation between the property and the number. If the
Russell-Fourier suggestions can be followed out, it is far from
obvious that we will be committed to (a). It this should seem
far-fetched, I think it can be made to appear less so by comparison
with an example from physics.
Mass is certainly a physical quantity, if we are to come to
know anthing about it or refer to it, then on causal accounts of
these notions, we must causally interact with it. But mass (or
perhaps a measure of mass) is a relation between physical objects
(or systems) and real (or rational) numbers--or so it is
represented in formalizations of mechanics. Such an entity
certainly sounds like an abstract object, but it is also a physical
one. If we can causally interact with such entities, it is certainly
not absurd that we can causally interact with the abstract objects of
mathematics; such at least is the force of the present analogy.
Status of the Theory T:
I would be the first to admit that the remarks about reference
to mathematical objects at the end of the last section suffer from
the same deficiencies as those I pointed out for standard realist
and quasi-realist accounts: vagueness, metaphorical phraseology,
etc. It is not my object to try to convert these remarks into a
clear theory, because I do not see now to do it. I believe, however,
that the treatment we have suggested with prove sufficiently clear
for some applications to be made later in this chapter, and to
indicate that not-trivial theories of primitive denotation for
mathematics within the frameowrk of a Tarskian account of
truth may yet be possible.
For the present, it is enough to indicate what portion of
Tarski's theory we will accept, namely T, the portion without
the "list" accounts of primitive denotation, plus whatever account
of primitive denotation we are able to provide when needed. We
accept T for the following reason: it is the only theory in the
field which is at all plausible. This is important for two reasons.
First, we need to make it clear that truth corresponds to the
technical notion of satisfaction--based on the Tarskian account--
for clauses (1) and (2) of the argument (A). Second, if we are
to show any connection between our statement of minimal realism
(which is cast in terms of truth) and the ontological views of
the previous sections,a Tarskian account of truth, supplemented by
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appropriate accounts of primitive denotation, seems to me to be the
best and perhaps the only way to do this. Conventionalist accounts
of truth seem to provide no clues about the ontological questions
of mathematics: the remaining theory which we will discuss--
substitutional quantification- -seeks to be "ontologically neutral",
even though I doubt that it succeeds.
To establish that T is indeed the most plausible, we appeal to
the general good opinion that philosphers (and model theorists)
have of it and to Field's discussion in particular. It remains to
show that the other theories are unacceptable. We have already
done this for conventionalism, and there remains only one view to
be discussed. This is the so-called theory of substitutional
quantification (SQ). 54 According to SQ, truth for all atomic
sentences is assumed to be taken care of in some fashion. The
peculuar feature of SQ is that it defines truth for quantified sentences
not by means of the Tarskian notion of satisfaction, but as follows:
'(x)F(x)' is true iff 'F(t)' is true for every closed term 't'.
Truth for existential sentences is defined in a similar fashion.
(It is assumed, of course, that the language in question contains
countably many closed terms so that the above definition does not
reduce to the propositional case by finite conjuction of the
F(t)' s).
55J. Wallace has argued that even for the simple case of truth
in arithmetic, any adequate definition of SQ permits a definition
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of satisfaction to be constructed, so that in some sense SQ
presupposes the Tarskian account. In fact, however, much more
conclusive considerations weigh against SQ. I have shown elsewhere 56
that for any first-order language for ZF which meets the requirements
of SQ and is capable of any reasonable sort of translation into
English, ZF can prove about itself that its own quantification is
not substitutional. The idea of this proof is to formulate ZF
in any of the appropriate languages and add a truth predicate 'True(x)'
with axioms unobjectionable to an advocate of SQ. It is then easy
to show that the resulting theory is consistent if ZF is, and that
it contains a sentence F(x) not containing the truth predicate, such
that " '~(x)F(x)' is true" and "for every closed term t, 'F(t)'
is true" are both theorems.
Reference, fulfillment and application in model theory
Despite our suggestions that other accounts of primitive
denotation than the "list" translation are possible, the usual practice
in the mathematical theory of truth--that is, model theory--may
be described as a translation procedure. One does not, however,
simply pick any language which we understand. The language L'
into which the translations are made is a standard one, and the
essential features are more or less settled. As we have illustrated
in our discussion of natural models in the last chapter, this
language is the language of set theory, either VBG or (what comes to
the same) ZF augmented by class terms. 57
102
For example, for the language of number theory S, which
contains '+', 'x', ', and '0' as non-logical constants, we may
characterize, say, reference w. r. t. the standard model as follows:
The referent of '0' = 0 (the empty set)
and for application of the successor function, we have:
The function symbol 'I' applies to (x, y) iff
xew &yew &y=xUfx}
The treatment of '+' and 'x', and for other theories, predicates
and relations, is similarly routine.
The fact that model theory contains a standard, accepted
account of primitive denotation is significant or not depending
on why set theory has the special role it does.
It has been claimed that set theory constitutes the most
fundamental theory in mathematics, to which other theories may
be "reduced" in a sense parallel to the reduction of macrophysics
to quantum mechanics. For the present, this claim is obviously
true: the only other candidate for "most fundamental theory" status
is category theory, 58 and it remains to be seen whether category
theory is an alternative to set theory, an alternate form of set
theory, or reducible to set theory. 59
The fact that set theory is the background theory for model
theory raises some special problems for our enquiry, since we
wish to study the model theory of set theory itself. Using set
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theory to study set theory need not be automatically pointless,
for we are not attempting some sort of epistomological reduction
of set theory to something else more secure. On the contrary,
we are assuming a large body of accepted set theory to be true,
according to our statement (B) of minimal realism. For rather
well-known technical reasons, which we will shortly review, present
set theory will not in fact aid us in giving an account of primitive
denotation for terms of set theory which will be of much help in
settling the question of uniqueness of interpretation which is our
main interest. It will be useful, however, for us to review the
conventional wisdom about truth--i. e., primitive denotation--
characterizations for set theory, before seeing what other account
of primitive denotation for set theory may be possible.
Set-Theoretic Accounts of Primitive Denotation of 't' :
Since the only non-logical symbol of ZF--the theory which is
our central concern--is 'e' , we will consider the possibility of
an account of application for 'e' within ZF.
For statements in the language of ZF, a possible model is an
ordered pair (U, R) of the "universe" U and a subset R of UxU,
which interprets the application of ' e' as follows:
For allx, y eU, (U,R)~x ey iff (x, y) E R.
The usual set theoretic version of order pairs make them out to
be sets of higher rank than their elements, i. e., (x, y)> df {} , f x, y},
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so that if the rank of U is ca, (i. e., if ca is the least ordinal
such that UeR (a + I)), the rank of (U, R ) can be as high as
(Y+5 . A somewhat more involved definition of ordered pair can
be given such that if x, y e R(c ), then (x, y) R (a ) , provided that
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cY is infinite. Thus, in any case, the rank of any possible model
( U, RR) is at least as high as the rank of U. This fact, which
is hardly interesting for most first-order theories, brings
out a special problem if we attempt to give an account of application
for ' ' which covers all sets. If we are to construe the universe
of sets as a possible model (U, R) in the usual way, then it
must be a set, hence a member of the "universal set" U, and hence
of lower rank than U, which contradicts our previous rank
calculations.
This argument presupposes that there can be a set of all sets,
which raises other problems as well. For instance, such a set
would presumably be a member of itself, which contradicts the
axiom of foundation. Even if this axiom is omitted, which is
sometimes done, difficulties about the existence of such a set
remain, for every set has a powerst of larger cardinality
(Cantor's theorem) but the powerset of the set of all sets is
surely that universal set itself (or at any rate, contained in it),
which contradicts the irreflexiveness of the of the ,greater than"
relation among cardinals, which can be proved in ZF.
To these two familiar arguments, we can add others based
on the traditional paradoxes; each of these can be used to show
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that there can be no set of all sets in any of the ZF-based set
theories discussed in Chapter I. For example, supposed that
there is a set S of just those sets which are not members of
themselves. Then, by Russell's simple argument, S both is
and is not a member of itself, so there is no such set. But by
the axiom of foundation, the universe consists of just those sets
which are not members of themselves, so there is no universal
set. Similarly, if the axiom of foundation is not assumed, we
can still use the axiom of separation to show that if there were a
universal set, then the S defined above would also be a set,
which leads to a contradiction in the same manner as before.
Thus we can give an extraordinarily simple argument based on
Russell's paradox, which use very modest assumptions (either
foundation or separation) to show that there is no set of all sets.
We may conclude that not only is the existence of a universal set
incompatible with ZF, VBG, etc., but that modification of these
systems to obtain a system compatible with the existence of such
a set requires that one give up quite fundamental principles of
those theories.
Application for ' ' in Other S'et Theories
There are several set theories which we have not yet considered
in which it is a theorem that there is a set of all sets. These are
the theories, NF (New Foundations) and ML (Mathematical Logic),
invented by Quine. 61 It would serve no particular purpose to give
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a thorough exposition of these systems; an outline of them appears
in Appendix B. For the sake of completeness in our discussion
of set-theoretic accounts of application, we will briefly examine
the question of whether the difficulties so far treated in defining
application for 'se ' in ZF and its relatives are lessened for
NF or ML.
The first problem, about the rank of the universe (U, R)
is easily settled, for no notion of rank similar to that for ZF is
available in either NF or ML. That is, we cannot arrange the
universe into well-ordered cumulative levels such that the members
of a set which first appear at a level has only members which
first appear at lower levels. This is because the universal set
is a member of itself, hence a member whose "rank" could not
be lower the that of the set itself.
The difficulty about Cantor's theorem is obviated in NF
because that theorem obtains in NF only for the so-called
"cantorian" sets--sets cardinally similar to the set of their
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unit sets. The set of all sets is, however, not cantorian.
Non-cantorian sets also have other special properties. For
example, the axiom of choice also fails for non-cantorian sets,
as is shown by the fact that the predecessors of the cardinal
of the universal set are not well-ordered, a strikingly counterintuitive
result. 63
The features of NF which we have noted are also reflected in
ML, which bears a relation to NF comparable to that which VBI
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bears to ZF. In ML, all sets--including the universal set--are
cantorian, but the one-one correspondences which guarantee
this are, in some cases, proper classes. The axiom of choice
is probably not inconsistent with ML, but only in a form which
guarantees a choice class for every exclusive set of sets.
The cardinal numbers are well-ordered, but in some cases
the required maps are again proper classes. Cantor's theorem
divides into the two statements that (a) every set is cardinally
less than the set of its subsets and (b) every class is cardinally
less than the class of its subclasses. The latter statement is
a theorem of ML, but the former is not--it fails for the
universal set. Clearly, classes in ML do not play the auxiliary
"formula substitute" role which they do in VBG, but are essential
for natural and important theorems of ML whose counterparts
in ZF, VBG, etc., involve only sets.
As to the model theory of these theories, NF is easily
disposed of, as it has no models in which both the integers and the
ordinals are well-ordered (under their respective order relations)
and in which the equality relation is interpreted as actual identity. 63a
No such dramatic result is known for ML, but it is easily seen
that ML has no advantage over ZF and VBG in the problem of
explaining application of 'e ' . First, since quanitifcation over
proper classes is essential to important theorems of ML, it is
no advantage to have a universal set U--one needs a universal
class containing all classes as its members, but there is no
such class according to ML.
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Second, and more important, our assumption (B) of minimal
realism includes the truth of accepted set theoretic statements
under at least one natural interpretation. We have not yet discussed
naturalness conditions for interpretations of set theory, but it is
plain that the description we have given of the CTS provides at
least a start for ZF. For ML, we lack any useful or natural
picture of an intended interpretation. Even if (B) is a perfectly
reasonable assumption for ZF, the same cannot be said for ML.
This being the case, it is hard to see the point of explaining
application for ML or for ZF within ML.
Further Attempts to Explain Application of 'e ':
Our difficulties have centered on the fact that the intended
interpretation (U, R) cannot be a set. One natural course of
action is to concede this and explore the possibility of treating it as
a proper class. This will not, I contend, lead to any advance in
explanatory clarity, but it is worth looking into, both to cover all
the possibilities, and specifically to provide a basis of some later
discus sion.
We will consider several possible accounts of proper classes,
beginning with the notion that proper classes are collections of
some sort, but ones too large to be sets. This intuitive idea of
proper classes departs from the point of view we took in the last
chapter, where we suggested that classes are definite properties
of sets, or surrogates for them. That interpretation is a bit
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contrived for the classes of VBG, but even there we can regard
classes as obtained (metaphorically) by ignoring differences
between properties with the same extension--perhaps by "weeding
out" all properties but one with a given extension--and ignoring
the distinction between a definite property whose extension is
a set and that extension.
Fortunately, we need not resort of such metaphorical
selecting and ignoring in order to accomodate the property
interpretation to VBG; Bernays has already developed a version
of VBG which does nicely. 64 In his version, identity of classes
is not even expressible, but is replaced by the relation "having
the same extension". A distinction is maintained between a set
and the class having the same "members". If we prefer to hold that
classes or at least proper ones are properties, then Bernays'
version should be counted as more precise, or at least more
revealing in its account of classes, although standard VBG may
still be preferred for its less cumbersome apparatus.
While the class-as-definite-property interpretation has
historical support--we outlined it in the last chapter--it is more
popular today to regard classes as large collections. This idea
is certainly encouraged by features of standard VBG, since it is
a theorem that a class is proper iff it is cardinally similar to the
universal class (class of all sets). So all proper classes are the
same size, and (by the replacement axiom) are all cardinally larger
than any set.
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Cantor's Proper Classes
The view that proper classes are distinguished from sets by
size is an old one--about the same vintage as the property
interpretation. In 1905, Russell suggested that sets may be
distinguished from "non-entities" by size. 65 Cantor had anticipated
such a distinction even earlier (1899) in a letter to Dedekind. 66
Cantor called his proper classes "inconsistent multiplicities. "
These are "multiplicities" which can not "be thought of without
contradiction as 'being together', so that they can be gathered
67
together into one thing' ".
This language contrasts with Cantor's earlier "definition" of
a set as "any collection into a whole M of definite and separate
68
objects m of our intuition or our thought". His examples
of "inconsistent multiplicities" include the multiplicity of all
ordinals, and that of all cardinals. 69
Surely any explanation of the collection of all sets as an
inconsistent multiplicity, if it is to be taken at all seriously,
can only convince us either that there is no such entity, or that
we have no reason to believe there is, for how can something
which Icannot be conceived as 'one thing' " be conceived of
as something at all? That is, if we construe "the universe",
the U in (U, R ) , as an inconsistent multiplicity, how can this
provide an explanation of application according to some unique
interpretation?
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Generally, it is wise not to put too much weight on such
semi-psychological considerations as what may or may not be
conceived. But according to Cantor's peculuar view as explained
in the section on "quasi-realism", these considerations are
important because our conceptions must be "an expression of ...
70processes and relations in the outer world". This invites
us to consider whether the collection of all sets -may actually be
somehow inconsistent in "the outer world". That is, we should
consider whether the assumption that all sets are "gathered together"
into a single collections leads to a contradiction.
Such a claim is suggested by Russell, 71 and actually stated
by Bernays:
The antinomies [he says] bring out the impossibility of
combining the following two things: the idea of the totality
of all mathematical objects and the general concepts of
set and function; for the totality itself would form a domain 72
of elements for sets, and arguments and values for functions.
We must, therefore, give up "absolute platonism", which is the
view that there is a "totality of all mathematical objects". 73
But plainly, giving up absolute platonism is not the only possible
course, even if Bernays' argument is accepted; we could, for example,
give up the idea that every "mathematical object" is eligible for
set membership or function argumenthood. This is the move
suggested by maintaining that not every collection is a set, and only
collections which are sets can be elements or arguments.
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In order to show that some contradiction follows from the
assumption that there is a collection of all sets, we would need
some principles of "collection theory", and it seems reasonable
to suppose that certain principles of set theory would serve.
Indeed, one might reasonably maintain that the only principles
of collection theory for which one can have any good grounds
now ,are those of set theory, since set theory is a kind of
rational reconstruction of the notion of collection, the only one
which has been well investigated.
Assuming we have some principles of collection theory,
adapted from set theory, it is extremely unlikely that the notion
that there exists a collection of all sets leads to a contradiction,
unless we are to assume at the outset that every collection is
a set and thus beg the question. For example, if we attempt
to carry over the version of Russell's argument which we used
previously to the present case, we can easily show that there
can be no collection of all collections; but the situation is more
complicated for sets. For example, if we supposed that there
is a collection of all sets, then, by a separation axiom for
collections, we infer that there must be a collection of all
non-selfmembered sets. If we could assume that this collection
were a set, we could derive the familiar contradiction that it
must be both a member of and not a member of itself. We cannot,
without question begging, make this assumption, so our attempt
to show that proper classes are more than metaphorical "inconsistent
multiplicities" is blocked.
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One further suggestion deserves examination, at least
as an attempted interpretation of Cantor, if not on its own
merits. In VBG, no proper class (and in Bernays' variant,
no class) can be a member of any set. By Cantor's definition,
any "separate and definite objects" can be members of a set,
so presumably a (proper) class ought not to be regarded
as a "separate, definite object". Whatever exactly this means,
"objects" which are not "separate and definite" certainly sound
like the sort of thing which could not be "conceived as one
thing", which is Cantor's description of "inconsistent
multiplicities". Taking "multiplicity which cannot be a member
of any set" as a formal counterpart to "inconsistent multipicity",
however, is unlikely to lead to a suitable argument that the
assumption that such multiplicities exist leads to an actual
contradiction. The reason is that we have shown that if there
are inaccessibles, there are models of ZF in which the "inconsistent
multiplicities" of the model are simply sets of higher rank than
any set in the model. Similarly, we may cite the equi-consistency
result for ZF and VBG, which says that predicatively definable
proper classes can be added to ZF without incurring inconsistency,
provided ZF is consistent. Since the "universal" class is such
a class, efforts to use Cantor's suggestions to show that a universal
class must be somehow inconsistent lead nowhere.
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Proper Classes as Definite Properties (Again)
Having made no notable progress in clarifying application
of ''e by means of the notion of "large collection", it is in
order to see whether we can do any better by construing proper
classes as properties. I think that we cannot, on account of the
familiar difficulties about identity of properties ably put by Quine:
The positing of attributes [i. e., properties] is accompanied
by no clue as to the circumstances under which attributes
may be said to be the same or different. This is perverse,
considering that the very use of terms and the very positing
of objects are unrecognizable to begin with except as keyed
in with idioms of sameness and difference.... The lack
of a proper identity concept for attributes is a lack that
philosophers feel impelled to supply; for, what sense is
there in saying that there are attributes when there is no 74
sense in saying when there is one attribute and when two?
It is not my intention in quoting Quine either to endorse the
doctrine suggested here about when "positing" of objects is
"recognizable" or to grind his axe about properties, viz.,
that talk of them ought to be dispensed with. I do believe, however,
that he is properly skeptical about the philosophical theories so
far advanced to clarify the "circumstances under which attributes
may be said to be the same or different". No doubt some similar
skeptical motive prompted Bernays to develop his variant of VBG
with its inexpressibility of identity of classes and his avoidance
of quantification over them. Virtually all putative explanations
of identity of properties so far offered have made use of notions
at least as much in need of clarification (if indeed this is possible)
as the notion of property identity itself, such as "synonomy of
expressions" or "possible worlds" or "necessary truth".
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One partial exception to this evaluation is the suggestion
that a property is the "sense" of a predicate expression (open
sentence with one free variable). The explanation given by advocates
of this view of what the "sense"of such an expression is ordinarily
makes use of such notions of "possible world", etc., but one
suggested criterion of identity of properties--that is, when
two predicate expressions have the same sense--is clear: Two
predicate expressions have the same property as their sense iff
they are logically equivalent. That is, A(x) and B(x) express
the same property iff '(x)(A(x) - B(x))' is logically valid. This
very narrow criterion is faulted by those who would make use of
some broader notion of necessary equivalence, and by those who
would permit synthetic identity of properties, but in any case,
it will not do for VBG. In that theory, it is a theorem that the
class of sets and the class of all non-self-membered sets are
identical, but '(x)(x=x - -x e x)' is not logically valid. If we were
to expand the language of Bernays' variant to introduce identity
of classes, the same difficulty would appear there.
As stated earlier, I do not wish to conclude from these
difficulties about identity of properties that property talk should
be dispensed with. There are two reasons, however, why the lack
of clarity about identity in this context is a problem for us. First,
we are concerned to determine whether there is a unique universe
of sets, and if "the" universe is a property and we don't know how
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to count properties, we won't be very clear about even how to say
that "the" universe is unique. Second, the separation principle,
used to "count" subsets, uses the notion of property. In fact,
the only way we succeeded in "counting" definite properties
in our discussion in the first chapter was to speak always
of their extensions. So, for the present at least, the property
interpretation of classes provides no clearer explanation of
application of ' ' w. r. t. a unique intended interpretation that
previous attempts. 75
It should be plain from the discussion of this and the previous
section that cavalierly responding to the discovery that there is
no set of all sets by saying "let the universe be a proper class"
leads to no advance whatever in explaining truth or specifying
interpretations for set theory--quite the reverse. At the very
least, some sufficiently strong theory of classes will be needed
for this task, and that theory must have a clear interpretation
in turn. So far, our discussion of proper classes shows them to
be less well understood than sets.
The Universe Described in English
So far, we have failed to give a satisfactory account of primitive
denotation for set theory within either set theory or its extension
by addition of proper classes. The main obstacle to such an account
has proved to be the impossibility of describing an intended inter-
pretation (U, R) within set theory, and the obscurity of considering
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it a proper class. Thus we have failed both to give an adequate
account of truth of set-theoretic sentences required for (B) and
to specify a unique interpretation required for (A).
Nothing of what we have said here is new, and realists have
attempted to deal with these familiar difficulties we have reviewed.
Bernays made use of facts we cited to reject a form of realism,
"absolute platonism", although we were unable to accept his
argument as conclusive. Other philosophers sympathetic to
realist views have had another response. Kreisel argues that
a description of "the" intended interpretation in non- technical
language and the reliance on an intuitive notion of truth under
such an interpretation is adequate to settle the question of
uniqueness of interpretation. We briefly review his account.
Kreisel's view that the intended interpretation of set theory
may be profitably described in English is shown in the following
passage:
In time, the remarkably clear and general cumulative type
structure was isolated, consisting of the objects generated
by iterating the operation: X ->X UP(X), where P(X) denotes
the powerset of X, and taking set theoretic unions at limits....
This structure was the result of analysis: not complicated
formal constructions, but the description (in words:) of the
cumulative type structure constituted the decisive foundational
advance. I, for one, would not claim that this, or any other
general notion is the naive notion of set....
The familiar axioms known as ZERMELO'S, hold for
the cumulative heirarchies obtained from the empty set by
iterating the power set construction to any limit ordinal; ....
.Objectively, at the present stage of knowledge, the
natural problem is to develop the theory and find out more about
the structure.
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Kreisel claims that description "in words" of the CTS, as
in the quoted passage, is adequate "to avoid an endless string of
ambiguities to be resolved by further basic distinctions. "77
Apparently, he believes this because the discription of the CTS
"in words" "provides a coherent source of axioms",78 both for
Zermelo initially and for us at present. The axioms beyond
ZF he has in mind are various strong axioms of infinity. 79
I find this argument from the fruitfulness of non-technical
descriptions of CTS inconclusive , for, as we have noted before,
horribly confused remarks such as Brouwer's can be a fruitful
source of interesting principles. Kreisel, however, plainly
believes that we are in a position to deny the "(alleged) bifurication
or multifurcation of our notion of set of the cumulative hierarchy...
[by] asserting the properties of our intuitive conception of the
cumulative type structure. "80
As for our understanding of truth in such a structure, Kreisel
is perfectly willing to consider models which are proper classes. 81
He also defends the notion of intuitive validity, that is, truth in
an "arbitrary structure", 82 including proper classes. He thinks
that set theoretic accounts of truth have increased our knowledge
about this notion, "but that doesn't mean that [it] was vague before". 83
Plainly, Kreisel is asserting that despite the lack of a completely
satisfactory theory of primitive denotation, set theoretic or otherwise,
we do understand the intended interpretation of set theory and truth
under that interpretation sufficiently well to accept the premises of (A),
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and hence its conclusion. In one passage, however, he introduces
a curious qualification to his claims about the uniqueness of CTS:
... unless one has theoretical or empirical reasons against
naive judgement, in particular against [CTS], the precise 84
notion of set ... is a foundation for [Zermelo's] axioms.
It should be clear to the reader from our repeated use of
the phrase "at least one natural interpretation for set theory"
that I think there m~y well be "reasons against naive judgments"
in this case. Other writers we will discuss--in particular,
Mostowski- -advance "theoretical ... reasons" based on the
independence results for the claim that there actually are several
equally natural interpretations for set theory. I do not find these
reasons conclusive, but I do think that this a serious question.
To show that the question of multiple interpretations is a
serious one, we will follow two lines of enquiry. We will examine
descriptions of the CTS of the sort diven by Kreisel for possible
ambiguities. We will then review several important cases in
the history of mathematics in which ambiguities and unclarity
were responsible--in part--for failure to resolve controversial
questions. Later, we will consider--but reject--arguments that
the ambiguities in the interpretation of set theory are not merely
possible, but actually exist. Before we can go into these questions,
however, we need to digress to provide a basis for questioning
the truth or clarity of any part of set theory.
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Set Theory vs. Number Theory
At the outset, we must deal with a feeling that some readers
must have at this point, that in questioning the uniqueness of the
of the intended interpretation of set theory, we are exhibiting a
sort of skepticism about set theory which is no more justified
about set theory than it would be about number theory.
It is my view that it would indeed be wrong to doubt that
number theory has a unique intended interpretation, but that there
are important differences between set theory and number theory
which bear both on the certainty of our beliefs in their respective
theorems and on the clarity of the interpretation of those theorems.
The argument that there are such differences rests on a
certain methodological rule of thumb, which I think is obvious, but
which deserves a brief discussion. The rule of thumb is this:
(E) A theoretical question of a scientific discipline has not been
settled with certainty if no candidate answer has obtained at
least near unanimous consent of the professional practitioners
of that discipline.
(E) is, or course, only a rule of thumb; for any particular
question, it may be that decisive arguments exist which are known
to some, but have not yet been generally recognized; but if the
question is an important one, it is wort'i determining whether such
arguments do in fact exist.
Persistent disagreement among professional practitioners of a
discipline requires an explanation. Plainly such an explanation must
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make reference to the plausibility of the various views held;
we cannot always explain such disagreements by maintaining
that is just a shortcoming of the advocates of one view that they
fail to perceive its total implausibility. But --- and this is the
point--we are not entitled to be certain of the truth of a proposition
if it is incompatible with another which is plausible.
Our case for differences between number theory and set theory
is thus partly sociological; it depends on which theories actually
secure acceptance and by whom. One question in set theory which
now, by our rule of thumb, has no answer presently deserving confident
belief is that of the nature of, and how to characterize, definite
properties. As we have already suggested--and will argue below--
this question is central to our understanding of other even more
fundamental notions of set theory, such as powerset.
In contrast, we find almost no disagreement in number theory.
The theory may be formulated in various ways: formally or
informally, first or second order, with various primitives, with
or without the w - rule. It is plain, however, that there is a single
intended interpretation which is the subject matter of these various
formulations. This standard model must be isomorphic to the
series of numerals, must be a progression, must have order type
w, all of which conditions are, of course, equivalent.
The only possible difficulty with this rosy picture is the existence
of intuitionistic number theory. If I correctly understand their
position, the intuitionists take themselves to be studying the same
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structure as classical number theorists, but how they could know
this to be the case if numbers are mental constructions is unclear.
Their methods for studying the subject matter of number theory
differ from the usual ones, but to an unknown degree, since their
formulations are vague and they hold a different interpretation of
the basic logical vocabulary.
If we are to abide by our rule of thumb, the existence of
this body of intuitionist theory may render some propositions
of number theory less certain than they would otherwise be.
The effect is certainly slight, however, for despite wide interest
in intuitionist views, few are actually persuaded that their
restrictive standands of proof are correct. Thus the "sociological"
evidence for the plausibility of intuitionist views is very weak.
Alternative Set Theories
In contrast to the virtual unaniminity in number theory, we
find a quite different situation in set theory, which can be traced
historically to the paradoxes discovered at the turn of the century.
Of course, it is not simply that people found some paradoxes
seventy years ago which gives set theory a different character
from arithmetic; this historical fact would not show anything about
the present case. An example which shows this clearly is the
paradoxes of 18th century analysis, which were more closely tied to
fundamental methods and questions than those of set theory. As
Berkeley analyzed a typical differentiation argument:
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herein is a direct fallacy: for, in the first place, it is
supposed that the abscisses z and x are unequal,
without which no one step could have been made; and in
the second place, it is supposed they are equal; which is a
manifest inconsistency. 85
We can now see that Berkeley's charge of inconsistency was correct;
but it would be ludicrous to maintain that since this situation once
obtained in analysis, this discipline is now less secure.
The situation we find in set theory is that the paradoxes86
have had a lasting effect in the form of a large variety of alternative
set theories embodying various incompatible features. Besides
Cantor's and Frege's theories, there are more than a dozen theories
which are still studied and many of them are still defended as
plausible. Four of these theories trace their ancestry to Frege,
simple and ramified type theory, and Quine's NF and ML. A larger
number derive from Zermelo, his own, ZF, VBG (two versions), VBI,
STC, TT, NTT, and Ackermann' s. New theories have recently
been published by H. Friedman, 87 Y. Moschovakis, 88 L. Tharp,89
and P. Hajek. 90
Although ZF and its relatives are the set theories receiving
the most attention--and deserving it--this was not the case, to
judge from the journals, as little as 20 years ago, when one finds
more attention given to Quine's theories.
It should be noted that some of these non-ZF-based theories
are not simply put together out of ad hoc principles thought to
avoid paradoxes, but have a certain intuitive support. (That is,
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intuitive support for someone who is familiar only with "naive"
set theory; whether the principles of alternatives theories are
intuitively natural for someone already trained to work with ZF
is another question). For example, Quine's ML takes the idea
that sets should be arranged in types--this is embodied in the
stratification condition on the definition of sets 9 1 - - and adds the
notion that every set should have a complement, so that "large"
and "small" sets are naturally related. This last principle
is certainly plausible; (again, to the non-initiate of ZF). Naively,
it is very hard to see why no set should have a complement, as is
the case in ZF.
We have already noted an important difference, however,
between the relative intuitive support for ZF and other theories
such as ML. ML is based on principles which are plausible
given the "naive" notion of set and which seem to avoid paradoxes.
ZF, on the other hand, is based on a intuitive idea of how the
entire universe is structured. Once one accepts this intuitive
picture, the particular axioms of ZF seem obviously true. Thus,
it has been possible for several authors to given either an
intuitively convincing argument for each axiom (Shoenfield, 92
Kreisel 93), or to derive the axioms from a few primciples about
ranks (Scott94). This is important because (a) we have some
reason to believe ZF consistent because we have an idea what
a model for it "looks like" and (b) as Kreisel suggests, it helps
to find new axioms.
12 5
One additional competitor to ZF needs to be mentioned:
category theory. Several people have proposed category theory
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as an alternative "working foundation" for mathematics, but that
is not the suggestion I wish to consider here. In particular, such a
notion would not tend to know that there is anything suspect about
ZF; it might just not turn out to be the most general or convenient
working basis for mathematics. The suggestion I wish to consider
is that some of the notions in category theory are alternative
set theoretic ones, in particular the so-called "large categories"
such as the category of all categories. Category theorists treat
such objects not, like the collection of all sets in ZF, as simply
"too big" to exist (i. e., be a set), but as to big to have a cardinality.
Consequently, one talks about these large categories, but does not
make cardinality arguments about them.
It is possible that this situation may be representable in some
ZF based theory such as STC by introducing new objects which are not
sets (extended ordinals) to be the cardinals of the collections
which are not sets, but it should be strongly emphasized that this
strategy represents an important departure from the basic notion
of ZF that all the collections one wishes to make use of are
obtained by iteration of powerset through all the ordinals. 96
The conclusion which I want to draw from these comparisions
of ZF with non-ZF-based theories of current interest is not that
we simply know nothing in the areas in which these theories conflict.
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On the contrary, I believe--as do most working set theorists--that
by far the most plausible account of set theory is represented by
ZF and its relatives. But on some matters it will be useful or
necessary to evaluate in just what respects this group of theories
is superior to alternatives and to elucidate some notions by compar-
ing their treatment in alternative theories. We can then apply our
rule of thumb to specific propositions of set theory. That is, we
can argue that some specific questions are not conclusively settled
simply because we have theories in the field which give different
answers to them.
Natural Interpretations of ZF
I have suggested above that (a) some theorems of ZF are less
certain than those of number theory, and that (b) it is not certain
that there is a single intended or most natural interpretation of ZF.
In the previous section, a case was made for (a), but we have yet
to do the same for (b). The idea of this section is to try to show how
non-isomorphic but equally natural interpretations of ZF might arise.
We will do so by analyzing the sort of description of CTS given by
Kreisel "in words".
We proceed by assuming that there is no ambiguity in the notion
of ordinal number, and discuss the iteration of the powerset operation
only. If our assumption about the ordinals is unjustified, then the
case for possible ambiguities in the notion of set will only be
strengthened. The power set of a set x must consist of all and
only its subsets, i. e.,
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(PS) P(x) = (iw) (y)(y sw y cx) .
One thing to be noted immediately is that the metaphor we have
used, of the universe being "constructed" or "generated" by
iteration of powerset through the ordinals, is seriously
misleading. Such a metaphor suggests a predicative construction,
where elements of one level are defined by quantification only
over elements of earlier levels. Powerset is not, however a
predicative notion, as an examination of the definition (PS) quickly
shows. The powerset of x contains all subsets of x--that is,
sets which are contained in x. This is simply because the
quantifier (y) in (PS) ranges over sets. But the relevant sets
are in general of higher rank than x itself, so it is misleading
to think of the set of higher rank as themselves "constructed"
by the powerset operation. What this powerset will contain depends
on what sets contained in x of higher rank than x "already exist".
The significance of this fact is suggested by the following intuitive
picture: it is conceivable that there should be "subcollections"
of x which are not sets. One fact which shows that this is indeed
conceivable is that in alternative set theories such as ML, there
are "subcollections" of some sets which are not sets. In
particular, the class of all non-self-membered sets is contained
in the set of all sets, but is not itself a set. This shows that in ML,
the separation principle fails even for definite properties expressible
in the language of ML.
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We are, of course, not dealing here with a notion of the structure
of the universe which is appropriate for ML, but merely using the
comparison with that theory to show that it is not crazy to suggest
that some "collections" contained in a set may not be sets. There
is, however, a theory TSS (for Theory of Semi-Sets) recently
developed by the Prague set theorists which is based on ZF and which
has this same feature. 97 TSS was developed to accomodate Vopenka's
formulation 9 8 of Cohen's independence methods, and it is not
clear that the intended interpretation of this theory is the standard
structure of sets. Rather, it is a convenient method for independence proofs
which do not deal explicity with models of set theory. Nevertheless,
one author has given an intuitive justification of TSS not depending
on construction of nonstandard models of ZF. 98a If the axiom
,"every semiset is a set" is added to TSS, the result is ZF minus
Foundation.
ZF and ZF-based theories other than TSS are, of course,
firmly committed to the separation principle, that for every set x
and every definite property G there is a subset of x consisting
of just those elements having G. Because of the importance of
this principle to the theories which have inherited it from Zermelo's,
it is plain that which collections contained in x are subsets of it
depends on what definite properties there are, and this is a
controversial matter receiving radically different treatments
even in theories which take the CTS as motivation.
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The matter comes down to this: In all natural interpretations
of ZF, the powerset of a set x contains all and only the subsets
of x, but which "candidate subsets" (subcollections) are actually
subsets might differ in two interpretations, provided that the ranges
of definite properties associated with the two interpretations are
distinct. Of course, we would want to chose as most natural the
interpretation which arises in this way which has the maximum
number of associated definite properties. But it is entirely
possible that this criterion may not dictate a choice between the two.
With the present chaotic range of treatments of definite properties,
it is possible that there are incompatible ways of choosing
maximum ranges of them.
What we are implicitly appealing to in the argument of the
previous paragraph is a principle about the CTS which might be
called the principle of maximum width:
(PMW) Every subcollection of a set is a subset of it.
PMW certainly seems a natural condition on natural interpretations.
Godel indicates approval of a slightly more general principle:
I am thinking of an axiom which ... would state some
maximum property of the system of all sets . ... Note
that only a maximum property would seem to harmonize
with the notion of set [of the CTS]. 100
The context of Godel' s remarks indicates that he had something
like PMW in mind. 10 1
Given that PMW is a plausible and important intuitive notion,
the question is how to formulate it in a useful way. Our earlier
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argument about definite properties essentially uses the separation
principle as a formulation of PMW, viz.,
(PMWI) For all definite properties G, fy I y has G & yex} e P(x).
Another way to formulate the intuitive idea of PMW is to simply
assert that there are "many" subsets of any infinite set, in some
appropriate sense of 'many'. The idea of this approach is that
if we can say that there are "many" subsets in a sufficiently strong
sense, this may have the same effect as saying that allcandidate
subsets are actual subsets. The problem is now to talk about
"many"f subsets. A leading principle proposed by G. Takeuti is
to formulate the notion of "many" in terms of cardinality:
(PMW2) "The cardinality of a powerset of an infinite set
is very big with respect to the notion of cardinal. "
There are two difficulties with this approach. The first, noted
103by Takeuti himself, is that the notion of cardinal of a set x
makes use of quantification over sets of higher rank than x, so it
already presupposes some notion of rank. Some of Takeuti's
refinements of PMW2 do assert that the universe is wide in some
sense, since they contradict the axiom of constructibility, 106 a
"minimum width" principle. 107
The second difficulty is that it is hard to see why principles
derived from PMW2 should be plausible. Takeuti certainly thinks
105 105a
so, and others state similar opinions. Their reasons for
this attitude--and the resultant rejection of CH, which is incompatible
with any reasonable version of PMWZ--are hardly clear, however.
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Some strong versions of PMW2 formulated by Takeuti are surely
to be rejected, since they contradict the axiom of choice. 10 8
It is still possible, however, that we may find reasons for
adopting some version of PMWZ, and then we will have another
point of view from which we can see how equally natural
CTS-like structures can arise: they may satisfy different,
incompatible version of PMW2.
Whether it is actually plausible, as opposed to just conceivable,
that different equally natural interpretations of ZF which are not
isomorphic may be arrived at in these or other ways, or whether
the independence of CH adds to this plausibility is quite another
question. I will argue that the CH does not make this situation
more likely, but the sort of argument given here is sufficient
to suggest that such questions are worthy of further investigation.
Historical Cases of Unclarity of Mathematical Notions
The argument of the previous section might be taken as a
kind of cartesian demon, a rationale for challenging what we
think--or at least Kreisel thinks -- we know. But our object is
not merely to raise skeptical objections about mathematical
knowledge, but real ones. To show that it is at least sometimes
reasonable to question whether our notions are clear--that is,
susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. I will review
several historical cases where unclarity in some fundamental
notions was partly responsible for failure to resolve important
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questions. The special advantage of historical cases is that we
can now look back and use a more developed theory to characterize
views in a clearer way than could the participants in these past
controversies, Since we cannot look into the future, we lack this
advantage in set theory.
The first example is from the history of set theory itself.
Roughly, I claim that about 1900, the notion of set was unclear in
at least the sense that what sorts of reasoning about sets is legiti-
mate and in particular what sorts of putative definitions or descrip-
tions of sets actually define sets was enormously unclear. These
difficulties and a number of incompatible strategies for resolving
them were described in a 1905 paper of Russell. 109 This paper
contains, in outline, most of the devices for avoiding the paradoxes
subsequently incorporated into set theories we have listed in previous
sections. I claim that a survey of set theory up to the time when
Russell wrote, as contained in Van Heijenoort's collection, 110 shows
that Russell was correct in maintaining that the difficulties would
not be resolved "until the fundamental logical notions employed are
111
more thoroughly understood". It is clear that Russell included
both the notion of set and that of definite property among these
"notions of logic".112
Russell saw the outstanding problem of set theory as that of deter-
mining which one free variable sentences ("norms") define sets (are
"predicative"), which is roughly the problem of which properties are
definite.113 At the same time that Russell was puzzling over which
set definitions are proper, a group of prominent French mathematicians
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were debating the issue of whether every set must be definable,
a position almost no one would now defend. This controversy was
provoked by Zermelo's announcement of the axiom of choice. The
debate, recorded in the so-called " cinq lettres" correspondence,
is discussed in appendix A. 114
Although I claim that the naive notion of set seventy years ago
is an example of an unclear notion, 115 one which made it impossible
at the time to answer such questions as "is there a set of all ordinals?",
I do not claim that this shows that the notion of set is now unclear.
After all, a lot of progress has been made in seventy years, and
the particular question just cited can now be answered in the negative
with considerable conf idence.
The Vibrating String in the 18th Century
We will go over this famous controversy in outline, focusing on
the part played by the notion of "'arbitrary function". 116
In 1746, Jean D'Alembert published a memoir on the vibration
of a stretched string, whose motion be described by what is essentially
the well-known wave question:
117829 2 829
(W) = c
8 t 8x
This equation is valid provided the amplitude of vibration cp (x, t) is
vanishingly small, where t is the elapsed time and x is the dis-
tance from one end of the string. Brook Taylor had already shown
in 1713 that, in effect,
(T) cp(x,t) = B sin (Z rt) cos (2Zrx /L)
is a solution to (W), where L is the length of the string and B is
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a constant. D'Alembert sought the general solution to (W), recog-
nizing that (T) is not the only possible one. He argued that this
general solution has the form
(L) p(x, t) = A(ct+x) - A(ct-x)1 18
where A(u) is a function called the "generating curve". D'Alembert
proceeded to calculate A(u) for given initial position of the string
Y(x) and initial velocity V(x). He claimed, however, that the prob-
lem could be solved only for rather special initial V(x) and Y(x):
... one obtains the solution of the problem only for cases
where the different shapes of the vibrating string may be
included in one and the same equation. In all other cases it
seems impossible to give [ Cp (x, t)] a general form. 119
It follows from this restriction that Y and V be given by an
"equation" that they must both be odd periodic functions of period 2L.
The restriction to initial conditions given by "equations" thus has
the astounding consequence that for such simple initial shapes as
triangular ones, the problem cannot be solved.
The term 'equation' occurs here for an important reason.
For D'Alembert, as for virtually all 18th century analysts, 120
functions must be given by an equation, 121 although the operations
to be permitted in forming these equations were not precisely
delimited. Roughly, D'Alembert's notion of function coincides
with the modern notion of analytic function of a real variable,
that is, function which can be expanded in a power series of its
derivatives at every point. Such functions must have continuous
derivatives of all orders. He assumes, without a hint of proof, the key
property of such functions, that if they agree on any finite interval,
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they agree everywhere. The restriction to such functions turns out to
account for the cases of the string problem where D'Alembert
had contended solution was impossible. 122
D'Alembert's memoir prompted an immediate reply by
Leonhard Euler,123 repeating DIAlembert's arguments, but
without his restrictions on the initial shape and velocity.124
These ... curves ... are equally satisfactory, whether
they are expressed by some equation or whether they
are traced in any fashion, in such a way as not to be
subject to an equation. in5
Thus Euler admitted non-analytic functions as solutions to (W),
both as mathematically and physically significant. This
departure from the conventional wisdom of the time has been
called, rather extravagantly, "the greatest advance in scientific
126
methodology in the entire century'. In any case, it was an
important development. D'Alembert refused to the end of his
life to admit "mechanical" (i. e., non-equation-defined) functions,
either as solutions to physical problems or in mathematics
127generally. He regarded this restriction as entirely obvious,
while never giving any reason for it.128 This question, and not
any intrinsic interest of vibrating strings, was the scientific
basis of the bitter controversy over the string problem which
was to last the rest of the 18th century.
Euler's notion of function may be described in modern
terminiology as "continuous function with piecewise continuous
slope and curvature" 12 9 but it should not be supposed that his
own conception of the matter was clear. His notion of an "arbitrary
136
function"f as "any curve..., irregular or traced at will" 13 0 was,
if anything, less clear than D'Alembert's, although more general.
Unlike D'Alembert, however, "no error results from Euler's
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failure to supply precise definitions"1. While errors on Euler's
part did not result from imprecision, it is clear that the length
and complexity of the controversy was partly due to imprecision
on all sides. The problem of the vibrating string was not finally
laid to rest until the modern notion of function as a many-one
relation finally emerged in the 19th century.
The real extent of the controversy on the nature of "arbitrary
functions" in the string problem is not sufficiently indicated in
the exchange we have described so far. Of the many other
participants, two deserve mention. The first is Daniel Bernoulli,
who had worked on the string problem before D'Alembert.
Bernoulli's memoir replying to Euler and D'Alembert is full of
132
ironic references to their ",abstract calculations". His view
was that Taylor had already proved that the only solutions were
sinusoidal, but he generalized this notion to included sums of sines,
133
i. e., trigonometric series. He held that
All these new curves and new kinds of vibration given by
Messrs. D'ALEMBERT and EULER are absolutely
nothing else than a mixture of several kinds of TAYLOR's
vibrations. 134
Bernoulli's observations can now be seen to be correct in a
certain sense; the functions concerned can be expanded in
trigonometric series, although Bernoulli did not prove this.
137
Euler was sure that this was not possible, but his argument was
135fallacious. Bernoulli's "contribution" to the debate was to
abuse Euler and D'Alembert for their "abstract analysis", which,
"if heeded without any synthetic examination of the question proposed,
is more likely to surprize than enlighten".136 Bernoulli goes so
far as to suggest that the issue between Euler and D'Alembert is
merely a verbal dispute, "an issue ... concerning the meaning
of certain terms".137
The remaining participant of note is Lagrange. His 1759
memoir attacks Euler's integration of non-analytic functions:
"it seems indubitable that conclusions drawn from the rules of
the differential and integral calculus are always illegitimate ...
if this law [of continuity] is not assumed".138 Nevertheless, he
believed Euler's result to be correct, 139 and tried to establish
140it by other methods, which were grossly defective. D'Alembert
detected the errors, but Lagranage was never able to remove them
completely.141 Later, as D'Alembert's political influence in
the Berlin Academy increased, Lagrange came aroung to his
point of view, D'Alembert meanwhile having made some concessions
142
on the operations to be admitted in equations. The new operations,
such as (sin(wrx)) , give rise to non-analytic functions. D'Alembert
seems in the end to have given up the notion that all derivatives of a
function must exist, allowing some to be infinite.143
Non-Euclidean Geometry
There is a third incident in the history of mathematics which
138
we must consider because it is much discussed in connection with
the independence results in set theory. This incident is the
discovery of the independence of Euclid's Fifth postulate of the
144 145 146
other axioms of geometry. Cohen, Mostowski, Kreisel, 146
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and Suppes, among others, all cite this discovery as an
important historical precedent. Kreisel is anxious to draw distinctions
between that case and the independence of CH; the others urge that
the comparison is most apt. Mostowski, for example, compares the
current situation in set theory with the development of a variety of
notions of "spaces" in modern geometry:
Probably we shall have in the future essentially different
notions of set just as we have different notions of space,
and will base our discussions of sets on axioms which
correspond to the kind of sets which we want to study. 148
Since the fifth postulate is regarded by these authors as an
important parallel to our own case, we cannot avoid discussing it,
but I doubt very much that this example really shows what Mostowski
says it shows. We do now have different notions of "spaces", but
the fact remains that under the intended interpretation as a question
about space, the question has--subject to future developments
in physics--been settled.
Up until the 19th century, almost no one doubted that the
parallels postualte was true, 149 and when it was discovered that
it was independent of the (perhaps more evident) remaining axioms,
Lobachevsky150 and (probably) Gauss,151 two of the co-discovers
of this fact, immediately regarded it as an astronomical question,
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and proposed experiments to settle the question. As Lobachevsky
put it:
The fruitlessness of the attempts made, since Euclid's time,
for the space of 2000 years, aroused in me the suspicion that
the truth, which it was desired to prove, was not contained in
the data themselves [i. e., the other axioms]; that to establish
it the aid of experiment would be needed, for example, of
astronomical observations, as in the case of other laws of
nature. 152
My own view is that Lobachevesky and others who have and do
regard 18th century geometry as about physical space (and the
parallels postulate as false under this intended interpretation) are
152a
entirely correct. There are, however, two main competing
152b
views: (a) geometry is about space, but not physical space,
and (b) geometry is (or may be construed as ) about physical space,
but which geometry physical space has is entirely a matter of convenient
152c
stipulation. Advocates of (b) differ as to which stipulation ought to
be made, and hence on the truth value of the parallels postulate. 152d
This not the place to discuss these rival views, but I do want to
make the following observations on the condition that my view
announced above is correct.
Our two previous historical cases concerned unclarity of key
notions, but I see no reason to regard this as such a case. In
particular, I see no reason to suppose that the notions of "point",
"straight linefF, "parallel", etc, which are central to Euclid's
geometry, were or are unclear, or that any unclarity there may
have been was responsible for the difficulties in determining whether
the parallels postulate is true.
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The Historical Cases Summed Up
Our announced intention in reviewing examples from the history
of mathematics was to show that unclarity of fundamental notions
not only occurs, but it matters. Have we shown this? One reason
for answering "no" is that each of the questions we have raised has
now been answered with reasonable certainty. There is no set of
all ordinals, there are non-analytic solutions of the wave equation,
and, subject to the view of geometry adopted above, the parallels
postulate is false.
Leaving the matter here, however, ignores the crucial point,
that naturalness of an interpretation can change with time. The
clearest example of this is the notion of function. We have give
Euler credit in the string controversy for his more nearly correct,
although vaguer, notion of function. Euler's notion is shown to
be natural by making possible the solution of a class of physical
problems. But D'Alembert's notion was natural too-it just wouldn't
do for the new problems. In effect, Euler acknowledged the
naturalness of his opponents conception by the definition he gave
in a textbook published two years after his first memoir on the
string problem: a function of a "variable quantity" is "any analytic
expression whatsoever made up from that variable quantity and
from numbers or constant quantities".153 From the point of view
of modern analysis, however, neither Euler nor D'Alembert had what
is now that most natural notion of function.154
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Euler's greater generality counted in favor of his interpretation,
but the case of geometry shows that the most general notion need
not be the most natural interpretation of a given theory. If our
interpretation of geometry is correct, the parallels postulate is
a proposition about space, but there are far more general
notions: differentiable manifold, metric space, topological space,
etc. This point has relevance for set theory because it could well
turn out that there -is a natural interpretation of ZF given by an
extreme "maximum width" principle which contradicts the axiom
of choice. As we argue in Appendix A, AC is a plausible
principle, so a more general (wider) interpretation need not be the
most natural.
The question we must now turn to--at last--is whether any
of the recent discoveries in set theory make it plausible that the
notion of set is now unclear in the specific sense we have been
employing-- equally natural CTS-like structures.
The Independence Results and Multiple Interpretations
A number of writers make definite claims that the notion of set
is vague or imprecise. Mostoswki, for example, maintains that
the "intuitive notion of set is too vague to allow us to decide whether
the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis are true or false."155
It is clear from his discussion that he is claiming that the present
notion, not just the naive one, is vague. His example of a more
precise notion is that of constructible set, which we will discuss
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momentarily. Mostowski predicts that set theory will "split"
into a ffmultitude of set theories", 156 and his view is shared by
157 158
a number of others: A. Robinson, L. Kalmar, P. Suppes, 159
and, at one time, Cohen.160 Although some of these defend
"multifurcation", of set theory on formalist grounds--after all,
if set theory doesn't answer to anything, isn't one consistent new
axiom as good as another? -- the interest of Mostowski's position
is that he claims that there are or will be distinct intuitive notions
of set to go with such divergent theories.161 Further, Mostowski
makes it clear that it is the independence results for the CH and
related statements that has lead him to such a position, specifically
the fact that it is relatively consistent with ZF to assume that the
continuum has any one of an enormous variety of cardinalities.162
Mostowski claims that the models of Godel for ZF+AC+GCH and
of Cohen for ZF+AC+ -CH give "various possibilities which are
open to us when we want to make more precise the intuitions
163
underlying the notion of a set". He also makes it clear that
there are incompatible was of doing this "precising" which give
164different truth values for CH. I will now proceed as follows
in discussing this suggestion: we will examine the models which
Godel and Cohen use in their independence proofs in sufficient detail
to see if there is indeed reason to believe that they represent
essentially different natural notions of set, or at least suggest
how to develop such notions. Since Cohen's work uses Godel' s
ideas, we begin with Godel's notion of constructible set.
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The Constructible Universe
The constructible sets may be defined by a method analogous
to the ranks, where the powerset operation is replaced by the
operation x -4C(x), where C(x) is the set of sets first-order
definable over x. We define a function M by transfinite induction
as follows: M(O) = 0; M(c~ +1) = M(a ) UC(M('a )); M( )= UM (ca).
Let L = UM(Qa) . The proper class L is called the constructible
0/
universe. Godel proved that if ZF is consistent, then L is a
"model" for ZF+AC+GCH, hence this latter theory is consistent
if ZF is. Actually, L is not quite a model for ZF since it is
a proper class. If there are any standard models for ZF, and
there are arguments which make this plausible, 165 then there are
standard models of ZF which consist only of constructible sets,
and which, of course, satisfy AC+GCH. The same proof shows
that it is consistent with ZF to assume that the universe consists
only of constructible sets (written V = L). Cohen showed that
it is also consistent with ZF to assume that not every set or even
every set of integers is constructible, even if the AC and GCH
are added. I. e., if ZF is consistent , then so is ZF+AC+GCH+V L. 166
ZF+V=L is not consistent with some of the "'large cardinal" axioms
(measurable cardinal, Ramsey cardinal). In fact, these axioms
are sufficient to yield a set of integers which is not constructible
and has a relatively simple definition in second-order mmber theory. 167
Since V = L is consistent with ZF, the notion of constructible set is
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one of Mostowski's candidate interpretations for a more precise
notion of set. The great difficulty with this is that most workers
in the field find V=L implausible; I claim it follows that it is not
a plausible way to "make precise the intuitions underlying the
notion of set" either. We review some of the evidence.
There are several common points of view from which it is
natural or imperative to disbelieve V=L. In the first place,
one would expect an informalist of either of the types discussed
in Chapter I to reject V=L. Essentially the axiom says that the
universe consists of just those sets got by taking the ordinals
as given and adding the minimum of sets assuming that the definite
properties are just those expressed by first-order formulas.
That is, L is the common part of all standard "models" (allowing
"models" to be proper classes) which contain all the ordinals.
Also, the common part of all standard models is itself a model
which satisfies V=L. This is the so-called minimal model M;
it is, or course, countable. 69 All the informalist positions we
considered, however, deny that all definite properties are
expressible by first-order formulas of set theory, so they would
presumably also deny that all such properties can be expressed
by a such formulas with constants in some M(a). Interestingly,
we can construct an analogue to L using the notion of "second-
order definable over". This also yields a "model" of ZF, the
class of "hereditarily ordinal definable" sets. Both the CH and
14 5
its negtaion are consistent with ZF+AC+ "every set is hereditarily
ordinal definable",, and it is consistent with ZF that the constructible
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sets are exactly the second-order constructible sets. This
gives another sense in which we do not get any help in deciding
CH by using second-order properties of sets.
A second position closely related to the informalist objections
is that of Godel, the inventor of the axiom. Godel raises two
objections against V=L. The first is that L gives a narrow notion
171of set, and he wishes a wide one, as we have seen. Godel's
second objection is that V=L implies the continuum hypothesis,
which he finds implausible because of a number of its consequences
172in topology. I dispute this claim in Appendix A.
Thirdly, the advocates of the more ambitious ',large cardinal
axioms" are oblidged to reject V=L, since it is incompatible with
173them. Since a number of people find some of these axioms
plausible, they have conclusive reasons to reject V=L. For my
own part, I see little reason for accepting or rejecting these
axioms--see Appendix A.
The fourth, and perhaps the most common position is simply
that there is no good reason to believe that V=L is true.174 Indeed,
there are practically no defenses of V=L in the literature. The
only one known to me is a UCLA Carnap Prize Essay by R. Van Zuyle. 17 5
He recommends V=L on the grounds that (1) we could never know if it
were false; (2) it "solves" outstanding problems, and (3) it gives a
more predicative structure to the universe of sets.
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As for (1), this is simply false unless we could never have
any reason to believe the large cardinal axioms which contradict
it, a possibility he does not discuss. For (2), we need some
reason to believe that the problems "solved" by assuming V=L
are decided correctly if such solutions are to could in its favor.
In considering (3) we make two points. First, V=L departs from
predicativity in an important respect by making use of ordinals
not previously '"constructed" in the definition of L. That is, we do
not have (ac) (a s M(c)). In thus taking the ordinals as "Igiven",
we in fact take all of L as "given". The precise result is that
the theory of ordinals can be given an axiomatic development in
such a way that a definition of set can be given within that theory
and all the axioms of ZF plus V=L can be proved. The usual
development of the theory of ordinals within set theory gives the
converse result as well. So, in a precise sense, the deductive
strengths of set theory and ordinal theory are the same.176
Secondly, if V=L really did give a predicative notion of set, that
would be reason to believe that it is false, since such basic portions of
mathematics as analysis cannot, as far as we know, be developed
177
on a predicative basis. What we are left with in (3) is the claim
that a notion which is "sort of" predicative is for that reason a
more plausible notion of set, and Van Zuyle provides no argument
for this.
It is fair to conclude that "refining our intuitions" about the
notion of set to conform to V=L can only lead to a less plausible
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notion of set than that which we have at present. It remains to
examine Cohen's models of the negation of CH to see if they
provide a natural notion of set.
Cohen' s Constructions
Let us describe informally the idea of Cohen's construction
178
of a model for ZF+AC+2 = 2178 We start with the minimal
standard transitive model M. Since M is countable, and there
are uncountably many sets of integers, there are plenty of sets
of integers not in M. But the cardinal R2 in M (written M 2
Mis actually countable. Cohen's strategy is to add M2 new sets
of integers and a set which is a one-one correspondence between
M MS2 and the continuum of M, P(w) . We will then have a
structure in which 2 = •Z2 If this structure is to be a model
of ZF, we have to add certain other sets, in particular, all sets
constructible from the "new" sets using ordinals in M. In
0
order to have 2 = N2 in the resulting structure, we have to
check that we do not add enough new sets to change the cardinals
M M
of M, say be adding a one-one correspondence between ? 1 and R 2
Cohen showed that the new structures resulting from IiM in this
way will be models of ZF if the "new" sets are of a special sort,
called generic sets. The structures resulting from adding
generic sets and sets constructible from them to M are called
"Cohen extensions" of M. Cohen's methods for obtaining generic
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sets of integers and proving that the resulting Cohen extensions
form models of ZF with the same cardinals apply to other
models as well as M, provided they satisfy certain conditions
discussed below.
It is plain that the models we have considered so far cannot
be considered natural interpretations of ZF since they are
countable. Cohen' s original techniques for obtaining generic
sets requires that the starting model be countable, a requirement
satisfied by M of the previous paragraph. Since we are interested
in models which also satisfy AC, the Cohen extensions of M are
countable as well. 179 Other writers have developed generalizations
of Cohen's techniques which, together with plausible hypotheses, imply
that there are also uncountable models of ZF+AC+ "CH, in fact, models
of cardinality as large as desired, although this cannot be proved from
180ZF+"ZF has a standard model" alone. These other techniques,
however, still use facts about the starting model (and hence the Cohen
extensions) which show that they are not natural interpretations of ZF.
These include such characteristics of the starting model and the extension
as having "uncountable cardinals" which are actually countable. Such
hypotheses could be eliminated in general only if it could be shown that
there are uncountable cardinals less than the cardinal of the continuum,
but this is the negation of the continuum hypothesis'.
This last statement needs to be somewhat more delicately put. In
the techniques of Cohen and their generalizations, we need to show (1)
that there exists a Cohen extension containing a one-one correspondence
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between the continuum and some cardinal t greater than NI of
the starting model; (2) that R. is still greater than b1 in the
extension (if the extension has this property, call it a "nice" exten-
sion). It is a consequence of a theorem of Solovay and Martin18 1
that we can't use Cohen's techniques to prove that every model M
has a nice extension unless the Zca of M is actually less than 2H °
Of course, the CH says that such an ~a of M must be actually
countable. 182
So again with the more general techniques of other authors, both
the starting model and the extension have such obviously "unnatural"
properties as that some of their "uncountable" cardinals are actually
countable, and the construction technique depends on our knowing
183
this. This is true unless we know that the CH is actually false or--
to avoid begging the question against Mostowski--that there is a natural
interpretation of "set" according to which the CH is actually false. If
we knew that there were any such interpretation, however, we would
be interested in that, and not the tricky models conjured up with Cohen-
style techniques.
Despite the failure of Cohen constructions to provide natural inter-
pretations of ZF+AC+.CH, there is a natural "width" principle which
has developed out of Cohen techniques. This is the new axiom proposed
by Solovay and Martin.184 This axiom, which they call "A", says that
sets generic w. r. t. the various substructures of the universe which
cardinality less than that of the continuum are already in the universe,
so that the process of "adding" new sets to a model which does not con-
tain them to obtain a pathological extension cannot be carried out. It
thus seeks to counteract the very feature of the starting model of ZF
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which made the construction of the extension possible--that it did
not contain all sets of integers.
Axiom A does not imply, but is implied by CH (since if the CH
is true, all the relevant substructures are countable, and the exis-
tence of generic sets for countable structures is unproblematic).
Axiom A itself implies many of the "interesting" consequences of
CH. Specifically, 48 of the 82 consequences of CH which Sierpinski
proves in Hypothese du Continu 18 5 are also consequences of A and
the remainder become so when "denumerable" is replaced by "having
cardinality less than that of the continuum". 186
This brief discussion should indicate that A has some intuitive
support as a "maximum width" principle, asserting that models of
ZF+A must already contain those sets which would be artificially
added by Cohen techniques. This will not help Mostowski's case,
however, for it is perfectly plausible to construe this axiom as a
suggestion about how to characterize the "actual" universe, not as
representing a distinct notion of set. I think that is is fair to conclude
that Mostowski's suggestion that the models constructed in the indep-
endence proofs give us-- or are likely to give us--essentially different
intuitive conceptions of "set" simply does not stand up under examina-
tion.
Undecided Questions: Do They Show Unclarity?
In the previous section, we showed that the models of Godel and
Cohen do not themselves provide natural interpretations of ZF at all,
much less natural interpretations according to which the truth values
assigned to CH differ. A different but related claim by Mostowski
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must also be examined, that the notion of set is shown to be "vague",
"unclear", or in need of "clarification" 18 7 by the mere fact that a
"multitude of seemingly very simple questions" (including CH) have
not been decided by "two or three generations of mathematicians. ,,188
Analyzing this claim requires us to do two things: (1) to analyze
the claim that the notion of set is unclear, and (2) to see why the
fact the "seemingly very simple" questions resist solution should tend
to show that the notion of set is unclear. For (1), we have bee con-
sidering throughout this chapter the possbility of multiple equally
natural interpretations. Not only is this a reasonably clear formula-
tion of "unclarity", it is also the sort of thing Mostowski himself has
in mind. The conclusion that he wants to draw from the alleged un-
clarity of the notion of set is that set theory can be expected to split
into a multitude of different theories, only the "common part" of which
"could claim a central place in mathematics". This common part, he
worries, may not "contain all the axioms needed for a reduction of math-
ematics to set theory". 1 8 9
Accepting the formulation of unclarity in terms of multiple inter-
pretations, we can now put the question in (2) as: ,'Even if the indepen-
dence proofs themselves do not provide alternative natural interpret-
ations, don't they give us reason to believe there must be such inter-
pretations? "
The method I will follow in attacking Mostowski' s contention is to
draw an analogy with number theory. That theory has its own "apparent-
ly simple" unsolved problems which have resisted solutions for gene-
rations, but no one, to my knowledge, draws the conclusion from this
fact that the notion of natural number is unclear, nor should they.
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The longevity of the outstanding problems of elementary number
theory and the enormous effort expended in attempted solution of
them is quite remarkable. Goldbach's conjecture, Fermat's "Last
Theorem", and other questions in the theory of Diophantine equations 19 0
have been the object of study for centuries, with no reason to believe
that solutions are near. Fermat's "Theorem'", proposed in 1637, states
that the equation: xn + yn = zn has no solutions for positive integral
values of x, y, z if n is greater than 2. This conjecture has been
verified up to fairly large n, but the general case remains unproved.
Goldbach's conjecture, proposed in 1742, is that every even positive
integer is the sum of two primes; it also remains unproved, although
a similar conjecture, that every "sufficiently large" odd integer is the
sum of three primes, was finally proved by Vinogradov in 1937. 191 It
is not known that any of these open questions are actually undecided by
the usual axioms of number theory. The possbility that they may be
independent is suggested by the fact that some of the attempted solu-
tions, and Vinogradov's proof, use methods from the theory of complex
variables which cannot be expressed in elementary number theory and
for which no elementary replacement is known. If either Goldbach's
or Fermat;s conjecture is false, however, it cannot be independent,
since any counter-example would be a true numerical formula without
quantifiers, hence provable in elementary number theory. 192
The fact that the conjectures are not known to be independent of
formal number theory does not destroy the usefulness of the analogy
with set theory. Since all obvious methods and many subtle ones have
already failed, solutions of the outstanding problems of number theory
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will undoubtly require discovery of quite new principles of number
theory--not necessarily principles independent of Peano's axioms,
but still principle entirely novel w. r. t. present number-theoretic
practice. Of course, we can be certain that any novel principles of
set theory which decide CH will be unprovable in ZF (if that theory
is consistent). Thus, we are certain to have some problems about
the justification of any such principles which we might not have for
principles which decide the outstanding problems of arithmetic. In
neither case, however, is the immediate problem one of justification
of available plausible principles which decide the open questions. As
Mostowski puts it:
We need new axioms to codify the intuitive set theory. The 1disquieting fact is that we do not know where to look for them.
Actually the situation is not quite this bleak. A number of new
principles have been suggested, but they either don't decide CH (the large
194cardinal axioms and other principles we have discussed, such as
"All sets are ordinal definable "195), or they are implausible
(V=L, axiom of determinateness l9) or they are simply suggestions
to be investigated whose plausibility is unknown (Takeuti's width
principles). We are plainly far from a solution to the continuum
question, but it is not the case that we have no ideas.
Of course, once we have a really plausible principle for set
theory which decides CH, we will still have the problem of giving
a real justification for it. Just how hard this will be, we cannot
tell until we have a suggestion whose justification is sought. In
comparison with unsolved problems of past set theory which were
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eventually solved, the longevity of the CH as an open question
is not particularly astounding. Cantor promised a proof that every
set could be well-ordered in 1883,197 but Hilbert still listed the
well-ordering of the continuum as an outstanding problem of math-
ematics in 1900. 198 Zermelo gave a proof of the well-ordering theorem
in 1904, 199 but this proof used the axiom of choice, which was not gene-
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rally accepted for another generaltion. Hence a problem indepen-
dent of principles accepted when it was proposed, took more than
fifty years to solve, but it was solved.
I conclude that set theory and number theory are analogous in this
important respect, that they both have outstanding problems that are
superficially elementary, that is, they can be simply stated in familiar
terms. In number theory, this situation has rightly not led people to
believe that there is some unclarity in the notion of natural number. Of
course, we know that it will take a new idea to decide CH, but that is
the case for number theory as well. We know that any such new idea
for set theory will give rise to problems of justification that we may
not have for number theory, but the case of the axiom of choice shows
that this is not always impossible.
A Final Word on Independence and Multiple Interpretations
As we have noted, open problems resisting solution for centuries
have not in fact raised doubts about clarity of arithmetic notions. It
is interesting to note that the formal independence results for certain
pathological sentences had no such effect either. One reason for this
is that the independent sentences are interesting only because of their
independence, and are obviously true.
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Hypothetically, we may ask what would have happened if some
independently interesting sentence had turned out to be independent?
Would people have been as upset about it as about the independence
of the CH? As it happens, there is a real occurrence which
closely resembles our hypothetical one.
After Dedekind, the actual inventor of "Peano' s" axioms, 201
202
had published his formulation of arithmetic, Hans Keferstein,
an influential German mathematician, published a critique. Keferstein
suggested what amounted to abandoning the induction principle
203(although this was not obvious). Dedekind wrote to Keferstein
to justify his axioms:
How did my essay come to be written" ... it is a synthesis
constructed after protracted labor, based on a prior analysis
of the sequence of natural numbers just as it presents itself,
in experience... for our consideration. What are the mutually
independent fundamental properties of the sequence N, that is,
those properties that are not derivable from one another, but
from which all others follow? 204
Dedekind answered this question by listing the axioms on which
he and Keferstein agreed: N is a set, every number has a successor,
distinct numbers have distinct successors, and 1 has no predecessors.
He then states that
I have shown in my reply ... , however, that these facts are
far from being adequate for completely characterizing the
nature of the number sequence N. 205
206
Keferstein was finally persuaded by these arguments, and
rightly so. His own axioms were inadequate because they failed
to characterize a well-understood structure, which "presents itself...
for our consideration". Given a bit of set theory, Dedekind's
axioms do charcterize this structure.
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In constrast, we do not find the same confidence on the part
of set theorists that they are studying a given structure. There
are several explanations for this. One is that a good many set
theorists are formalists or are sympathetic to that view. A
second is that, as we have noted, there is a variety of incompatible
set theories, and it is rational to hesitate in choosing among them.
Third, the structure of any theory which hopes to encompass the
whole of mathematics must be enormously more complex than
number theory. Given a small fregment of set theory, the
natural number series and truth in that structure can be characterized
quite easily. We have seen that the same cannot be said for the
CTS. We were unable to give an unexceptionable characterization
of either the CTS itself or truth in the whole structure.
As I have argued, this third point (and indirectly, the second)
give some reason to doubt that there is a unique intended interpretation
of ZF. I have also argued in the previous section that the fact
of the independence results does not itself tend to show this.
There is, however, a way in which the independence results
bear on uniqueness of interpretation. As the Dedekind-Keferstein
controversy suggests, grave methodological worries should not
be provoked by independence proofs if one is confident that a
"given" structure is being studied. Of course, the independence
results for CH would be sensational in any case, because they
are profound technically and deal with interesting questions. But
the considerable disaffection with set theory as a working basis
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for mathematics evidenced by Mostowski, Suppes and others,
and even the conversion to formalism by Cohen, 206 and others,2 0 7
shows that set theorists are not confident of a unique CTS.
As Kreisel says,
... several recent results in logic, particularly the
independence results for set theory, have left logicians
bewildered about what to do next: in other words, these
results do not 'speak for themselves' (to these logicians).
I believe the reasons underlying their reaction necessarily
also make them suspicious of informal rigour. 208
Kreisel takes these "underlying reasons" to be "pragmatic" and
"positivist" objections (including formalism) and the belief that
intuitive notions are unreliable. 209 As I have argued,
methodological queasiness over set theory cannot be put down
entirely to bad philosophy of mathematics, but I do agree with
Kreisel that this is probably the main reason for is prevalence
among working set theorists.
Argument (A) Reconsidered
So far, our attempts to show that the premises of (A) are true,
and consequently, that CH is determined, have not succeeded.
These attempts proceeded by assuming a realist position (B),
formulated in terms of truth, and then trying to develop a
notion of truth sufficient to justify the premises of (A). Having
failed to produce such a notion of truth for all sets, however,
there is another course open: to explain truth only for the portion of
the universe that involves the CH. This represents a major
retreat from (B), for there we assumed the truth of most widely
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accepted theorems of ZF, (under some interpretation) and some of
these concern set of arbitrarily high rank, for example, the
statement "every set has a rank". Of course, the fact that we
were unable to supply the account of truth for all the statement
assumed true in (B) does not make that assumption unwarranted;
it simply doesn't help to explain realism in set theory. In any
case, we now confine our attention to truth in a small initial portion
of the universe.
As CH is usually formulated,i. e., 2 = "1, it concerns sets
of moderately high rank, since N1 = wl, and wl has rank wo l
Since we are assuming AC, we can give an equivalent formulation
using sets of lower rank:
(C) (x)(x c P(w) D(2f) ('"f is a 1-1 correspondence between x and w"
or "f is a 1-1 correspondence between x and P(w) "))
It is easy to compute how much of the CTS this statement need
be taken to quantify over. All members of w are members of
R(c), so w and all its subsets are members of R(w+l). So
P(w) r- R(w+ 1), and P(w) e R(w+2). The correspondences f
are sets of ordered pairs of subsets of w , or of such subsets
and integers. With a suitable definition of ordered pair, all
of these pairs have rank no higher than R(w+ 2). The correspondences
themselves thus have rank R(w+3). A standard model
M = (R(w+3), etR(w+3)) containing all such correspondences
then has rank slightly higher than c +3. Since M is a set,
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we would have no particular problem about explaining primitive
denotation w. r. t. M if we could satisfy ourselves about its
uniqueness. Our strategy for considering this question of
uniqueness will be to analyze the first w +3 iterations of the
powerset operation. Before doing so, however, I want to
digress to consider another natural argument that CH is
determined which seems to avoid dealing specifically with
interpretations and structures, as does argument (A).
An Argument that CH is Determined:
Consider the formulation (C) of CH given in the previous
section. Then we have
(1') The CH is true iff ...
and
(2') The CH is false iff it is not the case that...
where the '...' is replaced by the sentence (C). In addition,
we have
(3') ... or it is not the case that ...
(with the same replacement for '...') is a logical truth. It
follows that
(4') The CH is true or the CH is false.
This seems a simple solution to our problem, but in fact it
will not do. Our assent to (1') and (2') is surely not reasonable
if the terms and quantifiers of (C) are given just any interpretations.
'Wf had better denote w and 'P(w)' the powerset of w; the range
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of the function quantifier had better be all 1-1 correspondences
of the appropriate type, etc. But suppose that there are equally
natural interpretations of any of these notions; then the argument
(1') - (4') will not show that CH is determined, but it can fail
to do so in several different ways, depending on exactly how we
understand the premises.
If we regard 'the CH' in (1'), (2') and (4') as the name of a
particular proposition, (1') and (2') may be true on some
perfectly good interpretations and not on others. If, on the other
hand, we regard 'the CH' as simply a name of the sentence (C),
then (1') - (3') and hence (4') will be true under each interpretation.
But the fact that (4') is true under each natural interpretation
does not show that CH is determined, for we have no guarantee
that the same disjuct of (4')is true under each appropriate
interpretation. So, in one way or another, we cannot avoid talking
about natural interpretations of set theory; considering the fact that
we have not been able to give a clear account of truth for the whole
universe, let us return to the analysis of R(w+3).
Analyzing R (w +3)
The first w iterations pose no problem. All the sets thus
obtained are hereditarily finite: that is, they and all their members,
members of members, etc, are finite. There is a natural
isomorphism of all such sets with the set of natural numbers w,
so we need have no worries about uniqueness this far.
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The situation is more complicated for the next iteration, to
R(w+l), but we can still make a good case for uniqueness. We
have already noted that the continuum P(w) is a subset of R(w +1).
In fact, we can use the natural isomorphism of R(w) and w to
construct a natural isomorphism between P(w) and R(w +1).
The importance of this manuver is that P(w) is, or is naturally
isomorphic to, the continuum of real numbers R. Next to the
natural number series, this is the most studied structure in mathe-
matics and it is of central importance to physics. Both of these
facts give reasons to believe that R (and hence R(w+l)) has been
uniquely identified.
To argue this point, our first consideration is a "sociological"
examination of alternative theories of the continuum of the same
kind we made for set theory and number theory. There are two
main types of alternatives to standard real number theory. The
first is the so-called non-standard analysis.210
In this approach, one adds non-Archimedean field, i. e., a
field with elements x such that x A 0 and for all positive natural
numbers n, xl < . The theory of analysis based on this
formulation of the real numbers is not, or course, exactly that of
standard analysis, but it is plain that non-standard real number
theory still makes use of R, although it adds other elements as
well. In particular, if we consider a language for the theory of
real numbers with a constant to name each real, then the non-
standard models of this theory are exactly the elementary
162
extensions of R. In fact the most interesting models of non-standard
analysis are obtained by simply starting with R and using
ultraproduct constructions to obtain non-standard structures with
the same cardinality. Thus non-standard analysis is equivalent
to standard analysis in the sense of elementary equivalence, but
also in the stronger sense of elementary embedding (in our large
cardinality language). Every non-standard model of this sort
contains an isomorphic copy of R. 210a
The second (group of) alternative(s) is the range of "constructive"
treatments of real numbers, including the intuitionist ones. In
standard analysis, one can treat reals as equivalence classes of
convergent sequences of rationals, f xnlne w . Constructive
analysis imposes various restrictions on such sequences, usually
in the form of a recursive function f(m, n) such that (n)(m)(IXn -Xm
1 211
< (n, ) The idea of this formulation is thus to study the reals
f(n, m)
by means of sequences of rational approximations, with "constructive"
restrictions on the type of reasoning permitted. Despite these
restrictions, it is easy to see that the same structure is being
studied. It is obvious (speaking as a "classical" mathematician)
that every real number has an infinite decimal expansion. The
finite initial portions of such expansions give a sequence of
rationals satisfying the stated restriction, i. e., I x -x I < 1010-max(m,n).
Constructive analysis based on this theory of the reals does indeed
have somewhat different theorems (even when they sound the same
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as classical ones ); whether any such formulation of analysis
is adequate for physics is yet to be seen.
There is a second kind of reason for confidence in the
adequacy of our knowledge of R to guarantee uniqueness. This
is the central role of that structure is physics and, indeed, in
natural science generally. Instants of time, locations in space,
and a host of physical quantities take a continuum of values.
In maintaining this, I am taking a realist interpretation of physics;
I will not defend such a view here--it has been extensively argued
elsewhere. 213
The fact of the physical realization of the continuum does have
a particular significance for us, however, for this reason: We
saw that there are special difficulties with causal theories of
primitive denotation for mathematics. But if causal theories
can be developed for theoretical entities at all, it is surely not
absurd that human beings could causally interact with continuous
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physical quantities, such as energy, momentum, etc.
Up to the Next Rank, R(W+2)
It is possible to continue our analysis to the next rank, R(w±+2),
but I shall not do this, for two reasons. The first is that we
could only do so by the method used for R(w+1) with some
decrease of confidence in uniqueness. The objects of established
mathematics which appear at this level are the real-valued functions.
Historically, the notion of "arbitrary function" of this type was
only clarified by the development of set theory. The second
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reason is that we can show by Cohen- style methods that there
is a fairly natural proposition about members of R(w + 1) which
is independent of ZF.
L
This proposition is that N1 , the first uncountable cardinal
of the constructible universe, is countable. If V=L, this
proposition is false; if there are measurable cardinals, it is true.
215 L
Addison has shown that " R1 is countable" can be given a
formulations quantifying only over real numbers. The significance
of this fact is that we have an independent question only a few ranks
below that of the continuum question, whose independence cannot
be attributed to multiplicity of natural interpretations. This is
our final reply to Mostowskian arguments against uniqueness.
Conclusion
At the beginning of this chapter, we cited a simple, obviously
valid argument (A) to the effect that CH is determined. I do not
claim to have shown conclusively that the premises of this argu-
ment are true. But I believe that it has been shown that they are
plausible given to the modest realism of (B) , and that none of
the objections to these premises hold water. I conclude that it is
rational to be confident that CH has a truth value. Only future
research can show how hard it will be to find out what it is.
APPENDIX A
Introduction
This appendix will be concerned with the plausibility---that is,
the probable truth---of several principles which are independent
of ZF. The princinal ones which will concern us will be CH
and AC, but others will come up in the course of discussing
these two. Other plausibility arguments, concerning the axiom
of constructibility and Martin' s axiom, will be found in Chapter II.
We will omit any systematic treatment of "large cardinal" axioms,
making a few general remarks at the end.
Plausibility Arguments
It is beyond the scope of this appendix to attempt a systematic
account of plausibility arguments in mathematics, but we must
give an indication of what sort of arguments are to be taken to fall
in this category.
Generally, we will take a plausibility argument to be an
argument for the truth of a mathematical proposition which is not
deductively valid, and therefore falls short of the standards of
mathematical proof. We are, of course, only interested in those
arguments which actually give or may be thought to give some
reason to believe the conclusion. We will consider the following,
general types and some others not easily labeled:
(A) Analogy to or generalization from known cases, for
example, generalizations from theorems about finite sets to
infinite ones. Such generalizations or analogies may be refuitable
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or there may be incompatible variants which are equally supported
by analogy. We will find such cases in discussing AC and the
axiom of determinateness.
(B) Arguments based on consequences in the natural
sciences. Such argument have played an important historical role
in the history of analysis , but set theory is sufficiently removed
from physics that such arguments will prove to be of limited
usefulness in discussing AC and CH. It is useful to describe
one hypothetical example of an argument of this sort which actually
gives quite good a posteriori reasons for believing a mathematical
proposition. Suppose that we are unable to determine whether
a system of differential equations S has a solution for any
parameters in some region Q, but we can prove that if S has a
solution for any set of parameters in Q it has one for all of them.
Suppose as well that we know how to build an electrical circuit which,
if it works in the intended way, is described by S. Such an assumption
will no doubt involve our having sufficient reason to believe a
substantial body of current physical theory. If we can build such
a circuit with parameters known to lie in Q---although their exact
values may be unknown---and it works, then we have shown that S
has solutions for all of Q. Such "experimental" verification of
mathematical propositions are not entirely hypothetical, for similar
verifications are in fact performed for engineering problems using
analogue computers.
167
(C) "Geometrical" or "intuitive" arguments. Such
arguments are by far the most difficult to describe or evaluate,
if only because of the substantial volume of conflicting philosophical
views on the epistemic importance of "intuition" in mathematics.
Kant and the Dutch and French intuitionists have maintained
versions of the thesis that one is justified in accepting a mathematical
result only if one has had certain "intuitions. " These authors
suppose "intuitions" to be a type of, or akin to, preceptions.
A number of leading figures in set theory have also supposed that
"intuition" or "intuitions" provide the ultimate basis for accepting
the axioms of set theory. Zermelo, in particular, stated flatly
that set theory is a science " resting ultimately on intuition" .
A general discussion of such issues is too ambituous a project to
take up here, but I believe it possible to admit some examples of
arguments "based on intuition" without adjudication of the larger
questions. For, as a practical matter, it is useful or even
necessary to attempt to visualize mathematical structures which
one wishes to study, and to use this visualization as an aide to
understanding existing results and suggesting new ones. For
example, in studing the real line, one may imagine it as
consisting of an extremely large number of tiny objects, such as
grains of sand. Imagining selections or transformations of these
objects may then convey information about their mathematical
counterparts.
I believe that it can be argued successfully that "intuition" of
this sort is very useful indeed in the ways mentioned, without opting
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either for the positions of the intuitionist schools or those like
Zermelo's. Detailed studies of the history of analysis such as
Boyer's 4 make it clear that intuitive notions did in fact play
an enormous role in the development of analysis before and during
the foundational work of Cauchy, 5 Weierstrauss and Cantor which
finally gave definitive formulations to the fundamental notions and
proof methods in that field. 6
It may be denied that this role was either a necessary or a
useful one. In fact, one of Boyer's main contentions is that
reliance on intuitive notions retarded the precise formulation
of the concepts of limit, derivative, etc. But far from being
incompatible with the claim that "intuition" can be a reliable guide
before fundamental notions receive a definitive formulation, this
contention tends to support it. The fact is that reliance on
intuitive notions did not make the practice of analysis impossible,
even if it retarded further development of that field.
During an extended period--several hundred years---in which
the difficulties in analysis were at least as great as those in naive
set theory before resolution of the paradoxes, a rich theory of great
practical ultilty was developed and the overwhelmingly greater
part of this theory remained intact after the precise formulations
were finally developed. It seems eminently reasonable to maintain
that the influence of "intuition" in early analysis was generally
beneficial and, at the time, necessary to research.
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That "intuition" has played this role in analysis does not
decisively refute the contention of philosophers such as Quine
who have maintained that "intuition is bankrupt" in set theory, 7
but the fact of the utility of "intuition" in a field with strong
logical and historical ties with set theory suggests that intuition
may play a role here as well. This is really beside the point
we will need, however, because the "intuitive" arguments which
we will examine will actually be about consequences of AC and
CH in analysis itself.
Despite the previous argument to the effect that "intuitive"
arguments can be of some value, this writer doubts that propositions
supported only by considerations of tjypes (A) or (C) can be
regarded as well established. Persuasive arguments of type (B)
can probably be constructed only in a relatively small range of cases.
All three sorts of arguments are often put to a different purpose,
that of suggesting new directions for investigation. No doubt
it is easier to establish the conclusion that such and such is
worth looking into than the stronger assertion that such and
such in probably true.
THE AXIOM OF CHOICE
Origin and Early Controversies
The axiom of choice states that for every set S of mutually
exclusive non-empty sets, there exists a set containing exactly
one member of each set in S. Although several earlier author s
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mention related principles, 8 the axiom was first introduced by
E. Zermelo, who used it in his proof that every set can be
well-ordered. This proof met a number of objections against
AC, mainly from the French intuitionists. Borel, in particular,
maintained that reasoning which presupposed, as he initially
thought AC did," an arbirtary choice made a non-denumerable
infinity of times" is "outside the domain of mathematics".10 The
publication of Borel's remarks provoked a series of exchanges among
French mathematicians, the so-called Cinq lettres, in which Borel,
Baire and Lebesgue attacked the "principle of Choice", and
Hadamard defended. it. 11
In this debate, the main issue which emerged was whether
the sets whose existence is guaranteed by the axiom might fail
to be definable. Poincare pronounced the special case of the
well-ordering theorem for the continuum "devoid of meaning or
false or at least not proved" on just such grounds.13 All of
these opponents of the AC objected as well to other aspects of
Cantorian set theory which are now hardly controversial. Borel,
for example, regarded Cantor's theory of cardinality as having
little "intrinsic value", although it " served as a guide to more
serious reasoning. "14
Well-ordering and the Continuum Hypothesis
One consequence of the well-ordering theorem which particularly
concerns us is that the continuum can be well ordered. For
otherwise, P(w) has no cardinal at all in the sense we have been
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employing (von Neuman' s) and in the alternative sense of cardinal
of Frege-Russell, it would turn out that the cardinal of P(W) is
not equal to and not less than any , so is larger than any N&
to which it can be compared under the ',greater than" relation for
cardinals.15 Thus in either case, the Aleph Hypothesis (AH)
that 2 = ý1 , which, lacking AC, we must momentarily distinguish
from CH, cannot be true if the continuum cannot be well-ordered.
For von Neumann Cardinals, it doesn't even make sense" since
'2 0' does not denote, and for Frege-Russell cardinals, it is
about as false as it could be. The continuum hypothesis proper,
that there are no cardinals properly between 80 and 2 , fares
just as badly. For von Neumann cardinals, it still doesn't make
sense. For Frege-Russell versions, CH will be false if any
N0
N with N greater than 0 is comparable with 2 . Otherwise,
we will have even less hope for solving the continuum question than
with AC.
Since the continuum and the series of natural numbers are
perhaps the two most important structures in all of mathematics,
the inapplicability of Cantor's theory of Ms to one of them
would substantially reduce the interest and practical importance
of that theory. This should certainly count as an undersirable
consequence of a failure of AC radical enough to result in the
non-well-order ability of the continuum.
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Later controversies about AC
Four years after his first proof of the well-ordering theorem,
Zermelo published a new proof and a set of replies to objections to
his first paper, dealing in particular with objections to AC. Zermelo
maintained that AC meets the same criteria as other axioms in that
it is "intuitively evident and necessary for science.16 In support of
this contention, he cites implicit use of the principle in the work of
earlier invertigators, including Cantor. 17 As we shall see below,
what is essentially Zermelo's view has become the dominent one,
but other developments were to come first.
The objections of the French intuitionists to AC were, in effect,
objections to non-constructive existence arguments, that is, they
were of a general, methodological character. Later objections were
based on supposedly implausible consequences of the axiom. In 1905,
Vitali proved that AC implies the existence of a set of real numbers
which is not Lebesgue measureable.18 This result can also be obtain-
ed on the weaker hypothesis that the continuum can be well-ordered
(WOC).18 So, by the remarks of the previous section, 'Every set of
reals is Lebesgue measureable' (LM), implies not-CH, since it im-
plies not-WOC. LM has proved to be an attractive, if not
particularly plausible, hypothesis.
In 1924, Tarski and Banach cast the existence of a non-measurable
set in a striking form. They showed that, assuming AC, the
unit sphere can be decomposed into a small finite number of "pieces, "
which can be "reassembled" by translation and rotation into two
unit spheres.20 At first glance, at least, this seems an absurd
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result---that an object can be cut into "pieces" which when rearranged
yield two objects the same size as the first. This appearant absurdity
can be at least partially explained away by pointing out that the "pieces"
(sets of points) in question are very far from corresponding to any
intuitive notion of "piece. " They are, for example, neither open
nor closed sets, nor sets formed from finite or countable unions
or intersections of such sets, or any other sets even remotely
resembling pieces cut with scissors. The result might still be
troubling if one only had to apologize for lack of correspondence
with intuitive notions in connection with AC. This is not the case.
There are a number of "paradoxical" results in elementary analysis
21
which require similar explaining away. One such well known
example is Peano's "space-filling curve", a continuous curve which
22
touches every point of an open rectangle in the plane. This result
is certainly counter-intuitive, but no one has seriously proposed
that it shows some serious inadequacy in the notions involved or in
the principles---which do not include AC--used to prove it.
Single examples are still occasionally used, however, to argue
that AC is implausible. Fairly recently (1947), Borel used the
standard non-measurable set construction minus the measure-
theoretic terminology to obtain a decomposition of the unit interval
of the real numbers into countably many sets which are all
translations of one another. This example forces us, he claims, to
either give up the AC or to modify the notion of "Euclidean equilivence"
(i. e., "being translations of one another" for sets). The former
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course is the one he recommends.23 Such arguments are now,
however, rather unusual.
Present status of AC
Discussion of the present status of the axiom can be organized
under two heads suggested by Zermelo's remark that it is "intuitively
evident and necessary for science. " We will first review in just
what sense AC may be necessary for science, arguments which
are broadly speaking of type (B).
Several authors have reviewed elementary analysis to see to
what extent AC may be necessary for standard results. Fraenkel
and Bar-Hillel list a number of propositions of the type taught in
beginning analysis courses whose proofs require AC. A more
careful survey has been made by Rosser, who claims that AC for
countable sets (CAC) is necessary to develop to theory of
Lebesgue measure.25 CAC is not, however, sufficient to prove
the existence of a non-measurable set. 26
Outside analysis, numerous useful principles and some standard
27
theorems of topology and algebra are equilivent to AC, and some
propositions weaker or apparently weaker than AC have no known
proofs from principles better established than AC.28
The role of AC in set theory itself is especially important,
particularly in such basic areas as the theory of cardinality.
Comparability of all Frege-Russell cardinals is equilivent to AC, 29
and only sets which can be well-ordered have von Neumann cardinals.
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We have already seen what havoc is wrecked in this area if crucial
consequences of AC are unavailable.
Apart from the theory of cardinals, it should be remembered
that AC is implied by the (apparent) restriction of the notion of
set either to constructible or to ordinal definable sets, as we
have already noted elsewhere. That AC holds of such semi-
constructive notions suggests that the objections of the French
intuitionists on the ground of definibility may not have been well
taken even if their general prospective is accepted.
We may summarize this section as follows: AC is
"necessary for science" in the sense that it is necessary for a
great deal of mathematical science that most mathematicians
accept. Although there are some who are willing to give up those
portions of contemporary mathematics dependent on AC, they
generally also reject other portions of "classical" mathematics
as well. Many more accept the attitude of Hilbert that AC "rests
on a general logical principle which is necessary and indispensable
for the first elements of mathematical inference."30
AC and Physical Science
Given that AC is essential for some fundamental sorts of
mathematics, it is interesting to ask whether the truth of some
of this same mathematics may not be a necessary condition for
the truth of parts of physical theory which we have good reason
to believe true. If this were the case, we might construct a
rather loose argument of type (B) for the truth of at least some
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weakened version of AC. The ever increasing volume of mathematics
required (at least in a practical sense) for contemporary physics
suggests that this might be the case.
There are counter-indications, however, in the development
of "constructive" analysis, including a version of Lebesgue measure
theory, by E. Bishop31 and, independently, by a group of Soviet
analysts,32 without using AC or other "non-constructive"
principles. The work of these writers contain theorems which
sound like the standard theorems of classical analysis, but often
this is deceptive, for some of them are very far from meaning
the same as their classical counterparts. 33 Getting to the bottom
of this particular question is plainly beyond the scope of the present
inquiry.
"Intuitive Evidence" of AC
The question of the types and strength of plausibility arguments
which may support AC is complicated by the following fact: much
of the widespread agreement to accept AC is undoubtedly the result
of its indispensibility for results of considerable elegance and
utility of the types already noted. Many of these results now have
a place in the training of young mathematicians such that their
unattainability would now seem counter-intuitive in itself. Consequences
of AC formely adduced as evidence against it, such as the Banach-
Tarski theorem, tend now to be treated in elementary courses and
texts as amusing curiosities, and not mentioned at .all in more
advanced treatements.
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Cohen has drawn the conclusion from such facts as these that
the axiom has won acceptance out of "philosophical opportunism", 34
by which he means accepting a principle for it aesthetic, financial
or other pleasing consequences.35 Those who, like Cohen, believe
that it is at least extremely problematic whether we have grounds
for believing AC to be true might profitably ask themselves whether
the situation is any better for other powerful axioms of ZF, say
Replacement or Powerset.
Each of these is independent of the remaining axioms of ZF, and
one would be hard put to give a conclusive argument for their truth
in every case which made no appeal to utility or elegance of resulting
mathematics. Eliminating Powerset entirely would undoubtedly
leave us too little mathematics for physics, but such an arguement
will certainly not do as a justification for all applications of Powerset,
especially in conjunction with Replacement. Why, for example,
must there exist a powerset of 1R (w + w)? As far as one can see
now, sets this ,"far out" in the ranks have no physical significance
36
and play no role in classical mathematics. The ordinal w + W
itself cannot even be proved to exist without Replacement. Restricting
Powerset or abandoning Replacement would be inelegant (and perhaps
therefore implausible) in the former case and inconvenient in the
latter, but other considerations are not easily forthcoming.
It is possible that, if pressed, Cohen might concede that the
acceptance of Power-set and Replacement is opportunistic as well,
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since he is defending a formalist position. But this leaves no
room for objection to AC in particular.
Cohen is right in this much, that the "satisfactoriness" of
the resulting set theory as a working basis for the rest of
mathematics has favorably influenced peoples' attitudes about AC.
While it is true that not every reason for accepting an axiom is a
reason to believe it true, we will only reduce ourselves to an
impotent skepticism if we label arguments based on "satisfactorinessi,
as mere opportunism, since we can hardly do better for other axioms.
For realist positions, at least, why the most satisfactory
theory--in the stated sense for set theory, or others for others
areas of science---should be the most plausible remains an
unsolved question in the "theory of science". For formalists ones,
the question of probable truth of such theories does not arise.
In any case, we will side-step all such problems, and inquire
whether any alternative to AC may yield an equally satisfactory set
theory, using whatever plausibility arguments may be available.
Alternatives to AC--Their Relative Plausibility
Few principles yielding any hope as satisfactory alternatives
to AC have been proposed by its opponents. In 1927, Church listed
two alternative "assumptions", but suggested no arguments to
support them. 37 Nor can this writer see any reason to find them
attractive.
AC and its equilivents such as the mulplicative axiom, which
says that the cartesian product of arbitrarily many non-empty sets
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is non-empty, are generalizations of principles provable in ZF for
finite sets. Until fairly recently, AC represented the only really
attractive such generalization, but there are now others in the
field. To describe them, we need to explain some notions from
the theory of games.
The axiom of determinateness
We can describe informally a positional game of perfect
information as follows. Two "players" alternately "choose"
successive elements of a sequence from a set M of possible
"moves". In making his "choices", each "player" is assumed
to know the sequence of "moves:' up to that point. This is the
"perfect information" clause. Player I moves first, and if the
sequence is infinite of order type greater than w , he also
"chooses" at limit ordinals. Player I "wins" if, when the sequence
is completed, it is a member of a previously designated set of
winning sequences P; otherwise, player II "wins". The game
thus described is designated G M(P), where , is the sequence
order type. We also consider the modifications to G7M(P) in
which (a) at his "turn", the first ,"player" may choose any finite or
empty sequence of elements of M (written GM(P)*) or (b) each
player may choose a finite, non-empty sequence from M (written
Go (P),: ).
If both M and the sequence length are finite, it is a theorem
of ZF that one player can always "win" the game Gn(P), no matter
what choices his opponent makes and what sequences are in P.
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In this case, G M(P) is said to be determined for all P, written
Dn and similiarly for other games. This determinateness theoremM'
will not tell us which player has the perfect strategy, for that will
depend on the particular set of sequences P.
The most obvious generalization of this theorem to the infinite
case is DU for all a and all M. This statement is inconsistentM
with ZF, 38 as are a number of other ambitious generalizations,
S39 40
including D D , D D Several other generalizationsW 1
2 ,, 41
are more interesting. "For all M, DM i euilivent 
to AC. 4 1
D , which is equivilent to DW, and inconsistent with ZF+AC, is
called the axiom of determinateness (AD). 4 2
Whether AD is consistent with ZF (without AC) is not known,
and if true, it will be practically impossible to prove, since Con(ZF+AD)
implies Con(ZF+AC+ "there is a measurable cardinal").43 Thus,
proving Con(ZF+AD) will require principles stronger than the most
"outlandish" currently considered principles. In fact, AD implies
that N1 is measurable. 4 4
AD was origionally proposed by Steinhaus and Mycielski in 1962,45
and Mycielski has studied its consequences extensively. It must be
said that some of these consequences dealing with the properties of
the continuum of the kind studied in descriptive set theory are
extremely interesting. We list a few here:
(1) Every set of real numbers is Lebesgue measureable. 4 6
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(2) The AC holds for every denumerable set of disjoint non-
0 47
empty sets whose union has power less than or equal to 2
(3) Every non-denumerable subset of the Cantor set has a
perfect subset.48
(4) 1l is regular but there is no choice set for the Lebesgue
decomposition of the real line. 49
S w* w** w* "'** 50(5) D, D , D"'. D... D"0 W W 2 2
Comments on (1) - (5): As we have already remarked, (1) implies
not-CH, and also the falsity of the Tarski-Banach theorem.
Mycielski shows that AD implies in addition that 2 and 1 are
actually incomparable.
(2) is a special case of CAC which Mycielski claims to be
"sufficient for most applications of the axiom of choice in analysis. "51
In support of this contention, he shows that (2) implies the countable
additivity of Lebesgue measure. 52
(3) is a particular case of the AH, which we must here again
distinguish from CH. Since every non-empty perfect set has
0 53
cardinality 2 , (3) states that every uncountable subset of the
N0 0Cantor set has cardinality 2 . If 2 and N1 were comparable,
the Cantor set would have to have a subset of power Z1, and we
would have 2 0= N1, but also, we do not have comparability.
As for (4) and (5), (4) is one of Church's alternatives, and
(5) lists generalizations of AD (that is, D2 ) to countable M's and
the '*' and '"~' modifications of positional games.
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Plausibility of AD
Mycielski evidently regards these "many interesting
implications" of AD as real advantages of ZF+AD over the
"'sad facts' following from the axiom of choice, such as, e. g.,
paradoxical decompositions of the sphere. "54 He had also wished
to obtain an "infinitistic rule of De Morgan, " but was unable to
find a consistent formulation of AD with this consequence. 55
In a later paper, Mycielski proposed another axiom to
supplant AD, which we shall call AD', which also implies (1)-(5).
AD' is D , where IR is the set of real numbers. According
to Mycielski, AD' recommends itself because "the consistency
of this new form is a conjecture which is much better founded" 5 6
than that of the old AD. The basis for this claim is that an
important special case of AD' is a theorem of ZF augmented by a
version of AC implied by AD'. 57 This special case is that the game
GR (P) is determined if P is an analytic set of sequences. 58
It should be noted that the consistency of AD, would be as difficult
to prove as that of AD, since it still implies consistency of ZF+AC+"
there is a measureable cardinal".
Mycielski makes it clear that he has arrived at AD--and AD'--
by casting about among incompatible conjectures, trying to find one
which will not be plainly inconsistent with ZF. It is in order to
ask what guiding principles might govern this selection. Mycielski
and Steinhaus offer the following "'intuitive justification" for their
choice:
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Suppose that both players I and II are infinitely clever and
that they know perfectly well what P is, then, owing to
the complete information during every play, the result
of the play cannot depend on chance. (AD] expresses this.
The great difficulty with this "justification" is that it suggests no
relevant difference between AD or AD' and other generalizations
from the finite case, such as DW , which are inconsistent with ZF.
Why, for example, should increasing the cardinality of possible
moves to R 1 make the outcome "depend on chance"?
Strangely, Mycielski and Steinhaus regard AD as false in the
"classical universum of sets, " because they regard AC as true in
this "universum. " They propose that their axiom be considered as
"a restriction of the classical notion of a set leading to a smaller
universum, ... which reflects some physical intuitions which are
not fulfilled by the classical sets. "60 They cite the Tarski-Banach
theorem as an example of not "fulfilling physical intuitions. ,,61
The view that both AC and AD might be true in different
"universa" closely resembles positions defended about CH which
we have discussed in Chapter II. Mycielski and Steinhaus do not,
however, suggest that the "universum", appropriate to AD contains
"sets" which are not in the classical one. They state that the
notion of set appropriate to ZF+AD is a restriction of the classical
notion.
Taking this attitude lets Mycielski and Steinhaus "off the hook"
as far as justifying their axiom as against the powerfully supported
AC, but it also confines AD to the status of a curiousity since they
admit that it is false according to the "classical", that is, the
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usual notion of set. On the other hand, Mycielski's and Steinhaus'
clear intention is to propose a new axiom of mathematics to be
used by mathematicians not interested in the curiousities of
foundational research, and to accept the "sad fact" of the failure
of AC as a consequence of this recommendation.
The philosophical attitudes which best accord with such
recommendations are either to hold that the question of the truth
(as opposed to the utility) of the new axiom does not arise--a
formalist attitude--or to maintain that AD or AD' is, or may be
true. That AD might be true under a reinterpretation of set
theory aides neither view. Since we reject formalist positions
under the assumptions of the present work, and indeed Mycielski
and Steinhaus do not suggest that this is their view either, we
are left with the latter view. But here we find little reason
to accept determinateness. The only positive advantages cited
for AD are the Lebesgue measurability of all sets of reals, and
similar propositions, and we have already noted the highly
unpleasant consequences of such results. Mycielski and
Steinhaus suppose that these consequences to be advantages of
AD because they are "interesting" and because they contradict
the Tarski-Banach theorem. But I have already argued that
this theorem is no more paradoxical than theorems of analysis
not requiring AC.
A final unsettling fact is the very real possibility that either
AD or AD' or both will turn out to be inconsistent with ZF.
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We know that this particular problem cannot arise with AC.
Since Mycielski and Steinhaus published their work, set
theorists have shown a good deal of interest in the technical
consequences of AD and its variants. 62 It has been shown, for
example, that various nice properties provable for sets at some
level of the analytical heirarchy can be proved for all sets at some
63higher level in the heirarchy by assuming AD. Other
investigations have been carried out on the relation between various
versions of determinateness and large cardinal axioms. Martin,
for example, has shown that if there is a measurable cardinal,
then every z1 (analytic) set is determined, 64 a result parallel
65
to that obtained by Mycielski for AD,. Davis has proved in
ZF+AC that certain simple Borel sets are determined. 67
All these results are technically interesting, but they do not
bear directly on the plausibility of AD or AD'. They merely show
that these hypotheses are mathematically interesting.
There is one other reason to regard AD as an interesting
proposal, however. Since both it and AC are supported by
"generalization" arguments from finite cases not obviously differing
in strength, we are oblidged to disregard such arguments for AC.
The case for AC must then rest on an appreciation of its consequences
of all kinds, that is, on the "satisfactoriness" of ZF+AC.
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THE CONTINUUM HYPOTHESIS
In contrast to the extensive literature arguing for or against AC
or presenting plausible or implausible consequences of it, much
less of either kind of material is available for CH. As we noted
in the Introduction, a number of earlier authors, including Cantor,
Konig, and Hilbert were sufficiently confident of the truth of CH
not only to attempt to prove it, but to announce that they had done
so. As it began to seem that CH might not be a theorem of ZF and,
simultaneously, more consequences of CH became known through
the work of the Polish school of set theorists, some authors began
to suggest that CH might be false. Lusin seems to have been the
first to deny CH, outright proposing an hypothesis whose "certitude
appears to me to be beyond doubt''68 which obviously implies not-CH.
Modern writers who have expressed opinions about CH almost
uniformly disbelieve it. Godel has given extensive arguments
against it which we will examine below. 69 Cohen maintains that
the point of view t"which may eventually be accepted is that CH is
obviously false. "70 Cohen supports this contention by stating that
since the continuum is "generated by a totally new and more powerful
principle, namely the Powerset axiom", it is "unreasonable to expect
that any description of a larger cardinal which attempts to build up
that cardinal from ideas deriving from the Replacement axiom
can never reach [the cardinal of the continuum]. " 71 Cohen presents
no arguments for adopting this attitude toward the Powerset axiom,
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but merely expresses the hope that "future generations will see the
72
problem more clearly and express themselves more eloquently."
In what follows, we will be mainly concerned with arguments against
CH presented by Godel. and with certain plausible consequences of
CH not mentioned by him.
Consequences of CH
In the main, the consequences of CH are neither as far-reaching
nor as striking as the consequences of AC examined in the previous
section. Generally, CH plays the role of a simplifying assumption
in otherwise less manageable situations. This is hardly surprizing,
since CH is, in an obvious sense, the simpliest hypotheses about
the position of 2 in the series of X's. This simplifying role
is exploited in a specific way to obtain a number of the consequences
of CH which will be cited below: "The continuum hypothesis permits
intricate constructions because in a well-ordering of R of type 1l'
73
any segment is countable and so easy to handle." GCH also plays
a simplifying role in areas requiring intricate calculations with
cardinals. In model theory, it is common to be able to prove power-
ful results on the assumption of GCH, and not even severely restricted
versions of these without it.74 One cannot convert this simplifying
role of (G)CH into a plausibility argument in its favor without a
liberal dose of wishful thinking or some analysis of the plausibility
of the particular results obtained. Prefering the latter, we now
turn to specific examples which are interesting either for their
own sake or because they are cited by Godel as implausible. Most
of these propositions are contained in Sierpinski's compendium of
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consequences and equilivents of CH, Hypothese du Continu. 75
We give these in the form of a list of theorems of ZF+CH, followed
by commentary.
Non-Measureble Sets of Reals
(1) There is a set of real numbers which is not Lebesgue measureable.
We have already seen that (1) is a consequence of AC as well as of
0
2 = N , for any ca> 1. CH, or the much weaker hypothesis that
2 0 is not greater than or equal to any weakly inaccessible cardinal
yield s:
(2) (Ulam) Every finite-valued measure defined on all subsets of R
which is zero for sets consisting of a single point vanishes
identically for all sets of reals. 76
It follows that no modification of Lebesgue measure will change the
situation in (1). Although it is a consequence of ZF that Lebesgue
77
measure can be extended to any particular set of reals, CH
implies that
(3) (Banach) There is a countable family of sets of reals to which
Lebesgue measure cannot be extended. 78
All but perhaps the last of these assertions can already be
obtained from ZF+AC, so if we accept AC they will be irrelevant
to the plausibility of CH. If AC is held to be in doubt, they amount
to minor drawbacks of CH. Ulam's construction in the proof of (2)
will appear in a more interesting context in the proof of proposition
(11).
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Relations of Measure and Categroy
(4) (Erdos) Assuming CH, there is a one-one mapping f of R
onto itself such that f = f-1 and f(E) is of first category if and only
if E has measure zero.
Both "measure zero" and "first category" are ways of making
precise the notion of a very "small" or "sparse,, set of reals, the
former from measure theory and the later from topology. Although
neither class of sets in contained in the other, there are wide-
ranging analogies between their properties and many close parallels
80between the main results for each sort of "small" set. In view
of (4), CH permits us to assert a kind of '"duality principle" which
gives a precise sense to this parallelism:
(5) True propositions (expressed in a language appropriate for the
field of sets of reals) about sets of reals remain true when 'measure
zero' and'first category' are interchanged. 81
Existence of "Sparse" Sets
The following are consequences of ZF+CH, where E is the interval
[0, 1]:
(6) (Sierpinski) There is a set of reals X of the power of the
continuum whose intersection with every perfect set A is of first
category on A. 82
(7) (Lusin &Sierpinski) There is a set of reals Y of the power of
the continuum whose image under every continuous mapping of R
into itself has measure zero. 83
(8) (Sierpinski) There is a set of reals Z of the power of the
continuum such that for any infinite series of reals ! an ne w' Z
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can be covered by a set of intervals such that the length of the nth
84interval is a .
n
(9) (Sierpinski) The sets of reals X,Y, & Z of (7), (8) & (9) can
be chosen so that they coincide except for countably many points
with every translation of themselves along the real line. 85
(10) (Lusin) There is a set of reals W of the power of the continuum
which is covered except for countably many points by every dense set
of intervals. 86
(11) (Ulam) For each subset M of E, of the power of the continuum
there is a countable family a i of decompositions of M into continuum
many sets with the following properties:
(a) for all i, a. = fA i 1 and M= U Ai1 xxR X X
xsR
(b) for all i, Ai l A = 0 if x ý y
x y
(c) for all i, x, Ai has the power of the continuum
(d) for any increasing countable sequence i i I j~m and
1.
any countable sequence f x. , M- U A 3 is at most
8j J
countable.
The "Implausibility" of (6) - (11)
Godel asserts that propositions (6) - (11) are "highly implausible, "88
and thus "indicate that Cantor's conjecture will turn out to be wrong."89
He also claims that (10) and (11) remain implausible when 'power of
the continuum' is replaced by 'power 1 ' 90
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Beyond the general remark that (6) - (11) assert "an extreme
rareness of the sets concerned", Godel does not explain why these
propositions should be considered implausible. In order to
construct an argument in aide of his claim, we will need some
"intuitive" explanation of (6) - (11) which indicates why they might
be thought implausible.
Each of (6) - (11) can be seen to have a slightly paradoxical
character in that each asserts the existence of a set large in
cardinality--the power of the continuum--but smal in various other
senses,and also "uniformly spread out', in various senses. In the
following paragraphs, we explain why each of these propositions
can be characterized in this way.
As to (6), sets of the first category are intuitively "small",
but (6) also requires that X be of first category on every perfect
set A contained in R. Since perfect sets can themselves be small
(e. g., first category on R), (6) requires that X be a "small"
portion of a number of "small" sets. On account of (9), X must
also be "uniformly dispersed", i. e., that any translation
("sliding") of X along the real line will cover all but a countable
portion of it.
In (7), Y is required to be "small" not only in the sense of
having zero measure, but also to remain "small" under any
continuous "deformation" (continuous function). Continuity is a
non-trivial condition here, because since Y has the power of the
continuum, it can be "deformed" into a set of any desired measure
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by a non-continuous function. Y is required by (9) to be
"uniformly spread outf1 in the same sense as was X.
In (8), Z must have zero measure because the total length of
the intervals, 7 an can be made arbitrarily small. Since Z is
n=1
uncountable, some interval must always cover uncountably many
points of Z. This would seem to require that much of Z must
be concentrated in a small area of the real line. But on account
of (9), Z must still be spread out.
In (10), at most countably many points of W can lie outside
any dense set of intervals of R, but there are such dense sets
whose compliment is uncountable, e. g., the compliment of the
Cantor set. W must therefore be both very small and very spread
out.
In (11), each a. is a decomposition of M, say [0,1] itself,1
into continuum many disjoint sets of the power of the continuum,
but the union of any countable selection of at most one of these
disjoint sets from each a, omits at most countably many points
from M. The fact that any such countable selection has this
property suggests that most A;,s must be spread out along M.
Since U A i = M for each i, and the A i are disjoint for each
x x
xGR
i, most of the Ai must be small. (11) is equilivent to the
x
existence of a family ..' satisfying (a), (b), and (c) of (11) and
the following condition:
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(d'): for each x, M - U A I is countable.
i=l x
Certainly the plausibility of this assertion (call if (11') ) is about
the same as that of its equivilent (in ZF) (11). (11') is an immed-
iate consequence of CH plus the following theorem of ZF. 92
(12) If M is a set of reals of power N1, there is a family of
decompositions of M into N1 sets Ai of power Nl such that
(a) M= U A i
Y< , I W 1
(b) A' 0 A =0 if 0 <P <W 1'
CO i
(c) M - U A is at most countable for all i, all ca< w 
.
i=l 1
It is difficult to see why (12) should be any more or less plausible
thatn (11) or (11'). But we have already noted that Godel finds (11)
implausible even if CH is not assumed and M is taken to have
cardinal r1. Thus we find that if we grant Godel's judgement,
we infer that a theorem of ZF -- that is, (12), is implausible.
This may be so, but it certainly removes any objection to similar
consequences of CH.
Explaining away implausibility
In so far as the "intuitive" translations of (6) - (11) given in the
previous few pages are accurate, I believe that these propositions
may be counted implausible or at very least, surprizing.
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Godel insists that these "implausible" consequences of CH cannot
be explained away in the same way as Peano's space filling curve
or other "highly unexpected and implausible '" 9 3 geometrical
results not requireing CH (or AC). This method of "explaining
away" is the one we have already noted in connection with the
Tarksi-Banach theorem, pointing to the "lack of agreement
between our intuitive geometrical concepts and the set theoretical
ones occuring in the theorems." 9 4
Since Godel does not say why he considers (6) - (11) "highly
implausible, " it is difficult to conjecture what would count as an
adequate reply to his claim. If one found a wide-spread evaluation
of (6) - (11) as implausible and no supporting argument for this claim,
then one could hardly explain this away by citing lack of agreement
between geometrical and set-theoretic concepts, because (6)- (11)
contain no commonsense geometrical terms at all. But I doubt that
many will react this way to (6) - (11) without any discussion which
connects these propositions with more "intuitive" notions.
Suggesting such a connection was the intent of the previous few
pages discussion, and Godel himself has already opened the door
to this by his characterization of (6) - (9) as " asserting an extreme
rareness of the sets concerned. "95 It is, of course, open to object
that the approximate translations are implausible but that they
inadequately represent the sense of (6) - (11). But this simply amounts
to allowing the defense of inadequate correspondence to intuitive
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notions or it leaves us unable to evaluate (6) - (11) until some
improved explanation is available. Godel has not supplied this,
and I am unable to do so either.
Cardinality questions and plausibility
Since the analogues of (6) - (11) requiring the small spread
out sets to be only countable are straight forward theorems of ZF,
the "power of the continuum" clauses in these propositions are vital
to any implausibility arguments. But it is just this notion of the
cardinality of sets of reals which it is difficult to describe in
intuitive terms.
There are far less arcane examples which present the same
problem. It is obvious from the countable additivity of Lebesgue
measure that there are countable sets of reals of measure zero.
It is not so obvious that there are also uncountable zero sets.
Perhaps one expects sets of large cardinality to correspond more
nearly to familiar geometrical "parts" of the continuum. The standard
example of such a set--the Cantor discontinuum--is not the sort
that a neophyte would think of in a few minutes time. It turns out
H N0
that there are only 2 0 countable sets, but there are 22  sets
of measure zero, so that the obvious examples are actually a minority
of the sets of small measure. It is hard for this writer to see the
relevant differences in the plausibility of (6) - (11) and such familiar
examples examples except their familiarity.
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Expert opinion is not all on the side of Godel in this connection.
Solovay and Martin, who believe as Godel does that CH is false,
confess that they "have virtually no intuitions at all about" the
problematical propositions.97 They see no immediate hope of
supporting or rejecting their own axiom, 98 which also implies
(6), (7) and (8).
Hypotheses incompatible with CH
Godel offers one additional reason for finding CH implausible,
that "as against the numerous plausible propositions which imply
the negation of the continuum hypothesis, not one plausible
proposition is known which would imply the continuum hypothesis. "100
Godel does not cite any of these numerous propositions, and I find
only one in the papers cited in his notes. This is Lusin's continuum
hypothesis:
(13) 2 = 2
which is implied in turn by:
(14) Every set of reals of cardinality 1 is the compliment
of an analytic set.
Lusin says that the "certainly of [14] appears to me beyond doubt. "101
but his reasons for saying this are obscure. This much is clear, that
they derive from his constructivist reinterpretation of the notion
of analytic compliment. According to this reinterpretation, "real"
analytic compliments are distinguished from "ideal" ones, and the
latter eschewed.
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Since Lusin admits that the problem:
(15) are there any analytic compliments of power N1 ?
102has resisted more conventional solution, (14) is apparently among
the propositions '"which may appear entirely implausible
[entierment invraisemblables ]" on views other than his
reinterpretation. The theorem on which such speculation undoubtedly
relies is:
(16) Every analytic compliment (CA) is the disjoint union of
I Borel sets. 10 3 If there is a CA set suct that the sets of the
decomposition are all at most countable, then (16) implies that the
answer to (15) is "yes". Lusin hoped that by restricting the notion
of CA set so as to exclude the "ideal" ones, he could not only
answer (15) in the affirmative, but establish (14). Since single
points are Borel sets, (14) is a special case of the converse of (16).
We know now that either answer to (15) is consitent with ZF+AC+CH.104
If there is a measureable cardinal, then the answer is "no". 10 5
If Lusin's (14) is accepted, there are 2 CA sets. Other
arguments show that there are 2 of these, so (14) implies (13),
102 = 2 . No arguments known to this writer other than Lusin' s
pretend to establish either (13) or (14), and if their is a measureable
cardinal, (14) is definitely false.
Since 2 1 1 , (13) implies not-CH, so the nepgtion of (13)
is consistent with ZF+AC. Other arguments show that (13) itself is
also relatively consistent with this theory. 106
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Plausibility of CH Summed Up:
CH has some plausible consequences, and a number which
may or may not be implausible. Not-CH is implied by (13), but
this writer finds no reason to regard this proposition as particularly
plausible. Godel is undoubtedly correct in claiming that no known
plausible hypothesis implies CH.
Each of the prominent set theorists who have ventured an
opinion about CH, Godel, Cohen, Solovay and Martin, believes it
to be false, although they cite no convincing reasons for this belief.
One does find a number of mathematicians who publish results
with CH or GCH as an hypothesis, and few who use hypotheses
incompatible with CH, but this may be purely a matter of the
greater ease of obtaining results with CH. Although the weight
of expert opinion seems to be against CH, almost nothing else
definite can be said.
OTHER PRINCIPLES
For completeness, we should look briefly at the plausibility
arguments for the principal remaining set theoretic axioms which
cannot be proved in ZF, the so-called ,"large cardinal" axioms.
Since, as we have already suggested, sets of rank greater than cu +
have no apparent significance outside set theory, these axioms
are far more removed from mathematical practice than either AC
or CH.
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The considerations occasionally urged in favor of these axioms
are almost entirely of two kinds. The first is a group of generali-
zation arguments of the following sort. One considers some
property P possessed by 0 but not by any finite cardinal. Thus,
one can regard such properties as being possessed by comparatively
large cardinals. If some cardinal greater than N 0 were to possesses
this property, it would seem reasonable to regard such a cardinal
as large compared to .0. If P is the property of inaccessibility,
one obtains in this manner the axiom of inaccessible cardinals,
107
and similarly for measureable and Ramsey cardinals. Presumably,
one can now construct some argument for these principles, that
since there are "arbitrarily larger, cardinals, there should be
cardinals large enough to have P.
The second sort of generalization argument applies to those
principles, particularly measureable cardinal, which permit results
of the same kind as, but of greater generality than, whose available
1in ZF. For example, one can prove in ZF that every E1 set of reals
has a perfect subset.108 In ZF+ 'there is a measureable cardinal',
one can prove that every EZ set of reals has a perfect subset. 109
Both of these sorts of arguments are classificable as type (A).
No argument of either other type seems possible at present. The
feeling of this writer, and evidently some others, is that such con-
siderations are entirely too tenuous to come to any even tentative
conclusions.
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One additional argument for measureable cardinal deserves
mention, which is based on a generalization of the reflection principle.
This principle is a set-theoretic version of the Lowenheim-Skolem
theorem which says that every sentence p (x1 , ... , xn) of ZF with
free variables among x, . .
. ,
xn is "reflected" in a portion of the
universe. That is, there is an ordinal a such that 1R (0a) cp (x 1, . . . xn)
if and only if cp (x 1, .. , Xn), if x, ... , x n  are elements of
1R(a). 110 Reinhardt has shown that a similar principle for second-
order sentences implies measureable cardinals exist, and conversely.111
But since the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem for second-order sentences
is false, we have no better reason to believe this generalized
reflection principle than to believe that measureable cardinals exist.
APPENDIX B
AXIOM SYSTEMS USED IN THE TEXT
I. ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory). Language: first-order predicate
calculus with one two-place relation symbol 's', read "is a member of".
(Identity is included among the logical notions).
Below, we denote this language 'LZF' ; in the text, it is sometimes
called simply "the language of set theory". ZF has the following
axioms:
(1) Extensionality: (x) (y)((u)(u ex - u ey) x = y)
(2) Pairing: (x)(y) (Hz) (u) (u e z - u = x v u = y)
(3) Sumset: (x)(2y) (u) (u ez = (9v) (u ev & v ex))
(4) Null s et: ([ x) (u) (u e x)
(5) Powers et: (x) (9 y) (u) (u c y = u c x)
(6) Infinity: (Sx) (x # 0 & (u) (u ex D(2v) (v ex &vEc u &vv u))
(7) Foundation (schema): (zl) - '(Zn)(( v) q0 (v, z, . ., Zn )
((av) (p(v, z1,...,zn)  & (u)(u e v D ~ (u, 1, ...,  n)))) .
(8) Replacement (schema): (z1 ) .. (Zn) (x) ((u) (u ex D(E! v)
yp(u,v, zl,..., Znv)D(2y) (v) (vey - (u) (u ex &
0 (u, v, z1, ..., zn))) '
In (7) & (8), n can be any integer, and cp is any formula of LZF whose
free variables are among those shown such that no clashes of variables
result when it is substituted in (7) or (8). ZF is not finitely
axiomatizable. Standard reference: P. Suppes,
Axiomatic Set Theory, New York, 1972.
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II. VBG (von Neumann-Godel-Bernays set theory). The language
is the same as LZF except that there are two styles of variables.
Upper-case Roman letters (class variables) are primitive;
Lower-case variables (set variables) are understood to be relativized
to the defined predicate M(X) = df (SY) (X e Y). VBG has the
following axioms:
(1) Extensionality: (X) (Y)((u) (u e X - u Y) D X = Y )
Axioms (2) - (6) are the same as those of ZF.
(7) Replacement: (F) (x) ((<u, v>) (<u, w>) (<u, v> e F &<u, w> eF
Sv= w) :( y) (v ey E ( 2 u) (<u, v> eF & u ex)))
(8) Foundation: (X) (X i* D(2u) (u eX & u nX = •))
(9) Comprehension (schema): (X 1) ...(Xn) (HA) (u) (u cA - q((u, X1 X ))
In (9), ýp is any formula of the language of VBG which does not contain
A or bounded class variables. (9) can be replaced by a finite list of
its instances. Standard reference on VBG: Godel, The Consistency
of the Continuum Hypothesis, Princeton, 1940.
III. VBG (Bernay's version). Bernays' version of VBG takes LZF
plu:s the following logical notions: (a) Class variables -- class
quantification is not permitted: (b) descriptive set terms (i x)(W (x),0);
and (c) class terms xj y (x) }. Operations (b) &(c) require the
following axioms:
(A) ye IxI p(x) (y)
(B) Wy(x) &(y) (ýy(y) Dx = y) Dx = (iz) (W(y), ,)
(2x) ((Wp(x) &(y)(p(y) Dx = y)) v ( i z) (W(z), ,) =,
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In (A) and (B), qO(x) is any formula in the language of Bernays' VBG,
which may include free variables other than x. Of course, clash
of bound variables must be avoided in choosing suitable p (x)
in (A) and (B). Equality of sets is taken as a logical notion,
but equality for classes is defined: A eq B - (x)(x eA - x e B).
The set axioms are the same as (1), (4), (5) and a modified version
of (6). Axiom (7) is introduced for sets only:
(7) Foundation: x / A D(2ay) (y ex & (z) (z ý y v z x)
The Replacement axiom need not be added, since the class formalism
of this variant makes it a theorem. Standard reference: P. Bernays
and A. Fraenkel, Axiomatic Set Theory, Amsterdam, 1958.
IV. ZF 2 (Second-order version of ZF). Language: LZF plus
second-order predicate variables of one place. The new logical
axioms for second-order quantification are:
(A) (P)(p D 1Y) D(p D(P) Y) where P is not free in cp.
(B) (P) qp D S'x) where S is the substitution operation
defined in A. Church, Introduction to Mathematical
Logic, Vol. I., Princeton, 1956, p. 192, and p9
satisfies the substitution restrictions in Church, op. cit.
The set axioms of ZF 2 are the same as those of ZF
except for (7) & (8), which are replaced by:
(7) Foundation: (P)((az) P(x) D(Hu) (P(u) &(x) (x/u v~P(x))
(8) R eplacement: (P)(x)(( <u, v>)(<u, w>)( P(<u, v>) & P(<u, w>)
Ov =w) D (Ey)(v e y -(1u) (P(<u, v> &u e x))
204
V. VBI ( von Neuman- Bernays-Impredicative set theory). This
system is identical with VBG as described in section II above, except
the restriction on bound class variables in axiom schema (9) is
removed.
VI. STC (J.I. Friedman's set theory of "Extended Sets") The
language is that of VBG with an additional one-place predicate M(x),
read "x is an extended set". STC has the axioms of VBG plus
the axiom of Choice (see end of this appendix for AC). The axioms for
the predicate M(x) are:
(10) SubsetsM: x e MDx nZ M: wher
Z is any class, possibly extended.
(11) UnionM: x e M D UMx e M; where
U is "union".
(12) PowersetM: x e M DP(x) e M; where
(13) PairingM: x, y eM D {x, y} M
(14) InfinityM: (ax) (x e M & T(x) e M &"x
T(x) = x UUx UUUx UUUUx ...
SM = {x I M(x)} and
UMx = U(x fM) and
P(x) is powerset of x.
is infinite'") ; where
(15) UniversesM: {x 1 T(x) e M Uz} e V: where V = {x I x = x}
(16) MaximalityM: x eK P (x Mp v (2 < )((TM(X ) M YM )
where TM(x) = x UUMx UUMUMx U... , 'p' means cardinal similarity,
Kp= {x eV - MI T(x) c M UUK } (a recursive definition)
Mp ={x eM I T(x)c M U UK }
V <
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The main facts about STC are given in the text. The only reference
is Friedman's paper in Math. Ann. 183(1969), pp. 232-240.
VII. NTT (Nodal Type Theory). The language of NTT is formed
from LZF by the following process: Let A(oa,p) be a relation
on ordinal numbers which satisfies the following sentence CA:
(a) (9! P) A(a,P ) &(Ga) (P) (A(a,p) D a <P ). If A is a formula
of LZF, the degree of the variable XA is 1. The degree of a set
variable is 0. If n is the maximum of the degrees of variables
in a formula A satisfying CA, then the degree of XA is n+l.
The resulting atomic formulas of the language of NTT are
x e y, XA e y, x e XA, X XB. Let R(a) be a rank; we define the
relativation of a formula yp to R(a!) as follows: For formulas
containing no variables of degree greater than 0, qpR() is defined
as usual. For quantification of higher degree variables, we define.
pR (a) as follows: (XA)ýp(XA) R (c ) = df (CA &(HP ) (A(a, ) &
(x R (a)) ( R ( (x)) v (- CA &(x eR(oa)) R(a)(x)). The set axioms are
axioms are those of ZF (1) - (8). In addition, NTT has a new one place
predicate N(X), and the following axioms:
(17) (X)(N(X) DO ' X c On) where X is a variable of any degree, and
On is the class of all ordinals.
(18) (X) (Y)(N(X) & X c Y c- On D N(Y))
(19) (X)(y)(N(X) D N(X - y))
(20) (X) ((x)N(Xx) D( fa' (x eR(Ca))( e Xx)})) where Xx = X" b.
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(21) (X) (N( ( (x eR(a)) (p(x, X)) q;R(Q)(x, X n(a))) ))
(22) the wc-rule.
In axiom (21), the formula yp is assumed not to contain the predicate
N(X). The only reference on NTT is Takeuti's "The Universe of
Set Theory", in J. J. Bulloff, et. al., eds. , Foundations of
Mathematics, New York, 1969.
VIII. NF (New Foundations). The language of NF is LZF minus
identity (which is later introduced by a definition) The axioms of NF
are
(1) Extensionality: (x = y &y s z ) Dx e z
(23) Comprehension: (2 x) (y) (y ex -Ip ), where pý is any formula
of the language of NF which does not contain the variable x, and
which satisfies the following condition (called "Stratification"):
every variable of ýp can be assigned a natural number such that the
same number is assigned to every occurrence of a given variable,
and if m is assigned to x and n to y and 'x e Y' occurs in y0,
then n = m+I. Standard Reference on NF: W. Quine, Set Theory and
its Logic, Cambridge, Ma, 1969 (2nd Edition).
IX. ML(Mathematical Logic). We may conveniently take the language
of ML to be that of VBG, without identity, whicnhas with NF, is to
be introduced by definition. As with VBG, we understand lower-case
variables to be relativized to elements; i. e., (x) (... is to be read:
(X) (2Y) (X eY D ..---. The axioms of ML are then:
(1) Extensionality: (X = Y & X e Z) D Y e Z
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(24) Sethood (as in NF): ( 2 x) (y) (y ex =E (), where ýo does
not contain the variable x, is stratified, and all free and bound variables
of p9 are lower-case.
(25) Comprehension- (SY) (x) (x e Y = (x)); .p need not be
stratified. General Reference: see under NF.
X. TSS(Theory of Semi-Sets) The language of TSS is the language
of VBG. We take as axioms (1), (2), (6), (9) of VBG. In addition,
we take the axiom of separation:
(26) Separation: (x) (Hy) (z) (z e y z e x & ýp (z)) ' where
q (z) does not contain y.
Finally, we need an analogue of the replacement axiom, which it is
easiest to describe in words. We say that Y is a semiset if it is
contained in some set; Sm(Y) = df (Sx) (Y c x). Let R be a class of
ordered pairs which is one-one and functional. Let Dom(R) be the
domain of R: {x (F y) (<x, y> e R). We say that R is regular if for
all x, R i x} is a semiset. We say that R is nowhere constant if
(x)(y)((x, y e Dom(R) &x /y) •R {x / R/ {y})
If R is regular and nowhere constant, it is called an exact functor.
Our new axiom then states that:
(27) If R is an exact functor, then the domain of R is a semiset
iff the range of R is a semiset.
If we add to TSS the axiom "Every semiset is a set", the resulting
theory is equivalent to VBG minus Foundation. Reference: P. Hajek,
"On Semisets", in Gandy and Yates, Logic Colloquium '69, Amsterdam,
1971, pp. 67-76.
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XI. Other Principles:
(28) The axiom of choice: (x)(qf) (u)((u /ex & " f is a function) D
f(u) e u)
(29) The axiom of Determinateness--see Appendix A, T. 179.
(30) The axiom of constructibility -- see Chapter II, D. 143.
(31) "'Every set is ordinal definable,,: This axioms says that
every set x is first-order definable over the ran',k R(a), for some a.
(32) Measurable Cardinal: Let x be an uncountable cardinal.
Suppose that there is a function 4: P(K) -+ 0, 1 such that for every
pair-wise disjoint set of subsets of f x I i eI} such that the
cardinality of I is less than nt, the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) " (U xi) = 4 (xi)
isI i eI
(b) (K) = : (c) for < a<
Such a function is called a measure on {. If { has a measure, it is
said to be a measureable cardinal.
(33) Regularity: A cardinal is said to be regular if it is not
the union of fewer cardinals of smaller cardinality.
(34) Inaccessibility: A cardinal is said to be (strongly)
inaccessible if it is regular and cardinally greater than the powerset
of any smaller ordinal.
APPENDIX C
EQUIVALENCE OF VBI AND ZF 2 + E
Proposition: If cp is any formula of VBI and cp* is the formula
2
of ZF which results from replacing every atom of <p of the form
x eX by the predicate variable X(x), then ZF + E - cp: iff VBI
A sketch of the proof: Since all the axioms of VBI except the
class comprehension axiom schema are converted into axioms of
2ZF + E by the *-transformation (and conversely for the non-logical
axioms of ZF 2 + E under the inverse transformation), we need only
prove the following two lemmas which relate the comprehension
schema of VBI to the substitution schema of ZF 2 :
Lemma 1: If <p (x, x, ... ,x, P' .. ,Pk) is a formula in the
language of ZF 2 whose only free set and predicate variables are
as indicated, then ZF 2  (xl) (xn) (P1).(P) (P)(y)
( (y, X1 , ''.'' Xn' P'''' P,) P(y)), where y is alohabetically
the first variable not in <p.
Lemma 2: If <p(X) is a formula in the language of VBI with X free,
and the substitution restrictions (Church, p. 192) for X are satisfied
by the VBI formula L (x,. .), then VBI - (X) <p (X) D p(~Y(x .. ))).
Plainly, these lemmas permit proof of the remaining axioms of
VBI(ZF 2 ) in ZF2(VBI). We now si'etch proofs of the lemmas.
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For lemma 1, the following is the contrapositive of an instance
of Church's substitution schema "509n:
,•(x,...) &(y)((Y v.) ( (y,...))&(~( O(yY .. ) ~O(y ... )))
(1)
(aP) (Px &(y)((<p(v, ... ) P y) &(,, p(y,...) ~,Py))
The antecedent is logically equivalent to
quantification theory,
ZF 2 ýp (x, (2) 1 P) (y) (c (V, Xl..
On the other hand, if we replace cp (x,..
and cpq (y,..), respectively, in (1), we
2
ZF PWýO (X, :D (9 F) (y) xi
<y (x, . . ): hence, by
'xn, Pl'Y'''' P ) - P y )
.) and y (y,. .. ) by -Cp (x,...)
obtain, in a similar manner,
S..., x, Pi'' ''' P) Py).
_ _ - z
From these two formulas, we need only construct a dilemma
to obtain
ZF2 1- (xl) "" "(x n)(Pl) . k) ( P) (a ) ( Y(,YX,...,' X ,PI""' 1k - PY)
For lemma 2, p (X), cp (Y(x, .. )) are alike except that ' (x, . . .)'
occurs in place of 'x eX'. p (i(x, . .) satisfies the condition that no
free variable of Y (x, . .. ) is bound in p (T (x, . . .)) except possibly
x or its alphabetic variants which may arise in the substitution of
T (x,...) and we assume for the time being that X is not free in
(x, .). Since X is not free in TY(x, ... ), we have
(2Y) (x) (x e Y T (x .... ))
by the comprehension axiom of VBI. Instantiating (7Y) to A, we have
(x) (x eA = I (x, ... )).
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Since the only free variable in the formulas x eA, T (x,...)
which may be bound in ýp(A) is x, we can use the Equivalence
Theorem of quantification theory (Mendelson, p. 71) to obtain
It is then a matter of routine quantifier logic to obtain
(2) (X) yO(X) DO Y(~(x,...))
as desired.
In case X is free in T (x,...), we first substitute for it some
variable not used in any of the formulas of the proof, and then
substitute X for that variable in (2). X does not thereby become
bound in the consequent of (2) since the quantifier (X) only binds
the antecedent.
APPENDIX D
"Categoricity'" of *ZF 2
Proposition: Every *-model of ZF2 is isomorphic to the entire CTS
or to a natural model with first-order universe R(h), where ; is
inaccessible.
The proof of this proposition is presented here so that the reader
may see how it depends on the assumption of "*-ness". The
argument is a minor modification of an argument for VBG in
Shepherdson's Daperl, which in turn relies on Zermelo's work1 . 2
As we have remarlked in Chapter I, every *model of ZF 2
is Well-founded; that is, every subclass of the FO universe has an
e - least element. By the Isomorprhism Theorem, 4 every well-founded
model of ZF 2 is isomorphic to a transitive e - model, that is, an
e -model in which every element of the FO universe is a subset of
that universe. Transitive e -models M have the property that for
a large class of formulas op,
q(xl, .. . ,x  ) iff M P q(X ,...,Xn)
for all xl,..., ,n e M. Such formulas are called absolute; all
absoluteness results used in this appendix are from Shepherdson. 5
Without loss of generality, we confine our attention to transitive
e- models of *ZF 2: M = <U, C, R>.
As before, we let CTS = U R(ca), where 0 is the class of
all ordinals. Within M, we define an analogous rank function r(a)
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as usual: r(O) = $ & e > 0 D(x er (a) -(,p ) (@ <ac& xc r(p ))
Since 'x is an ordinal; 'x e y', 'cra< ', 'x = y', ' x = 0 ', and
'x c y' are all absolute, every "ordinal" of M is actually an
ordinal, and for all a, U, r(y) c R(a). I.e., all the "ranks"
of M are contained in the "real"t ranks. We want to show that
for all aC U, r(a) = R(ca), i.e., the universe of M coincides
with an initial portion of the "real" universe. We prove this by
induction on a' that is, let y be the least 0aeU such that
for some set a, a e R(y), but not a e r(y-). y- cannot be 0, since
M = r(0) = 0 and 'x = 0' is absolute. y cannot be a limit ordinal,
since R(0a), r(ca), are just unions of smaller R(1 )'s and r(3 )'s
respectively, if a0 is a limit. We can assume, therefore, that y
is a successor.
Since R(y) is transitive and asR(y), ac R(y). Since a eR(y)
iff every member of a is in some R( ), for p < y, and R( ) = r( )
by the induction hypothesis, we also have a c r(y). We need to
show that a e U : y is a set of M, so by the replacement axiom,
r(y) is a set of M. Since M is a *-structure, and a c r (y) c U,
we have a e C. If we let a = P, then , by the second-order axiom
of separation, M (9y) (z) (z ey z e r(y-) & P(z)). Since
M z (z) (z sa - P(z)) and Mt ac r(y-), M y = a, so y = a,
so a e U. We now need a er (y).
Since y is a successor, let p + 1 = y. By hypothesis,
r(P ) = R(P ), and since a e R(y), aC R(c ) = r(0 ). Since 'xc y'
is absolute, M ý ac r(p ), and then using the theorem
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ZF 2 - (x) (oQ) (x c r(a') D x e r(a+ 1)) and the fact that 'x e y'
is absolute, we have a e r(y). This contradicts the hypothesis.
Hence every *:-model of ZF2 is (isomorphic to) a model of the
form <R(c~), P(R(cv)) , e t lR(a) >. We refer the reader to
Shepherdson for the proof that a must be inaccessible.
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